

JPRS 77213

22 January 1981

# Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2250

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## NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

FATAH OFFICIAL ON U.S. STANCE ON PLO

LD311305 Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 28 Dec 80 p 19

[Interview granted by Fatah Movement Central Committee Member Hani al-Hasan to AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM correspondent in Amman--date not given]

[Excerpts] Amman--Hani al-Hasan, Fatah Movement Central Committee member and political adviser to Yasir 'Arafat, said that the United States will not recognize the PLO as long as it believes that it can liquidate it and, therefore, we must not live under the illusion that the United States will consider recognizing the PLO. Al-Hasan added: "Indeed we have achieved a great victory in the diplomatic battle and have defeated U.S. diplomacy on its own ground. We have defeated the United States at the United Nations since we are now stronger there than is the United States."

He said: "The Zionist lobby was defeated in the recent U.S. presidential elections, which marks the beginning of the awakening of the American people. Otherwise, how would we explain the downfall of [Senators] Jacob Javits, Church and others."

Giving further proof of the defeat of the Zionist lobby, al-Hasan said: "Findley, who supports the PLO, defeated the candidate of Zionism. Yasir 'Arafat's picture with Findley was used by his enemies during the election campaign. Therefore, we have achieved a significant victory in the American public opinion and in isolating the United States diplomatically."

He added: "But in the final analysis the United States is what the power of the tank and aircraft represents. Therefore, we have resisted the United States. If we succeed in erecting an Arab barrier in the face of the United States and if we succeed in following the right tactics, the creation of conditions for the defeat of the United States is possible, particularly in the light of the continuing Soviet offensive."

Al-Hasan said: "Unfortunately the United States is still advancing and achieving victory in our area and for this reason the coming state will be one of confrontation."

In a cautioning tone, al-Hasan added: "Everybody must realize that the Palestinian people will not be prepared to starve while the rest live in affluence; the Palestinian people will not live in fear while the rest enjoy safety. But the



Palestinians must open the door to all those who wish to confront Camp David whether they agree with their beliefs or not; this is unimportant in politics. What is important is that you may say what you like and, in the final analysis, I do what I want. Only God the Almighty passes judgement on intentions while we here on earth we pass judgement on actual actions. For this reason [Senator] Percy's statement is considered important because he was impressed by the PLO when he visited Beirut."

Al-Hasan affirmed that "the United States will not recognize the Palestinian people unless it feels that its interests force it to recognize the Palestinian existence and unless it realizes that it no longer has a practical plan to liquidate the PLO in the foreseeable future."

Al-Hasan added: "I must tell you that a group of Israeli assassination experts have arrived in Lebanon, particularly in southern Lebanon, and have begun making plans to assassinate a number of Palestinian leaders because the CIA and the Israeli intelligence believe that if a number of revolutionary leaders were to be killed then the Palestinian revolution would collapse. It was on the basis of this belief that they carried out the Verdun [street in Beirut] operation 7 years ago. But they did not realize that if there is any problem about this giant nation [that is, the Palestinians] it is that its leaders are so numerous [that is, those that might be liquidated would be quickly replaced]."

Replying to questions regarding the belief held by some people about the possibility of Israel's withdrawing from the West Bank and Gaza and about the Zionist enemy's ambitions in Jordan as well as about the alternative [Palestinian] homeland in Jordan or Lebanon, the Palestinian official said: "The Zionist enemy does not wish to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza sector. He is resorting to maneuvers and creating conditions for the further eviction of Palestinians from the occupied territories. The enemy is still contemplating occupying the East Bank of Jordan so as to use it for bargaining over withdrawal from the West Bank. He will then occupy other areas for further bargaining and so there is no end to his ambitions."

He added: "As I said before, Begin has been stressing that Lebanon is the alternative homeland for the Palestinians while he is still seeking to occupy the south. But Peres will in future concentrate on Jordan and will try by various means to drive a wedge between it and the PLO."

CSO: 4802

## INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

### SUMMIT CONFERENCE PRODUCES NEW JOINT ARAB ACTION FORMULA

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 28 Nov 80 pp 20, 21

/Article: A New Format for Summit Conferences, Abrogating the Old Arab League Charter"/

/Text/ Observers were bewildered in interpreting the recommendation 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam, Syrian foreign minister, presented last week. Some of them explained that his demand for a postponement of the summit held on the 25th was aimed at a cancellation, while others said he just wanted a postponement. The fact is that the Syrian minister did not demand a cancellation but recommended a postponement and only a postponement! This recommendation is the right of any country in the League of Arab States, and the league council must accept it or reject it. The rule is that the recommendations assume the character of a resolution only if the league council agrees to them. Every proposal is subject to the resolution of the majority. Nonetheless, no member has the right to give his recommendation the character of a rejection, nullification or threat in order to make the other members subject to the will of a single country.

Here is the real dispute between Syria and the other members of the League of Arab States who were in favor of convening the summit meeting at its appointed time and place. Officials in the League of Arab States say that the time and place of the meeting and the issues of discussion and investigation had been determined beforehand by a majority, if not unanimity, of votes. That was during the Tunis summit, the 10th summit of Arab kings and presidents. Therefore, the members in favor of holding the conference rejected the Syrian demand, saying that there was no scope to resume discussing the place, the time or the subjects of the summit.

In the past, summit conferences were not regular in character or have previously set times. They came about as the result of the recommendation of an Arab country or group of countries. That is, they did not possess a legally binding character. This binding nature was one of the objectives of the Tunis summit resolutions, in their report on holding summit conferences alphabetically by Arab country. In addition, there was another objective in what was resolved in Tunis. That was that the summit conferences possess the character of an institution. This has its legal meaning as regards the current conference, and all future summit conferences. It convenes with the members who attend it, as Arab international jurists say. If some countries are absent, their absence has no effect from the legal standpoint or changes the binding effect of the resolutions on the members present. The summit and its resolutions draw up rights and obligations. Therefore no country has the right to derive will benefit and be of use to it from the summit resolutions and refrain from whatever does not correspond to its interests!

Legal scholars consider that if every Arab country attends the summit conferences, that will be preferable and give weight to the force of the resolutions, but that nonetheless the absence of a member or group of members absolutely does not mean in any case whatsoever that the resolutions will not be binding if unanimity is not attained!

As regards the binding character, sources in the League of Arab States say that the commitment is observed, regardless of disputes among states. For example, Syria, by virtue of the Baghdad and Tunis summits, received some billions of dollars in the name of support and perservance. Syria spent these amounts on completing its intrinsic forces and on its domestic development. Iraq, which differs greatly with Syria, did not suspend its support or its financial commitments toward Damascus.

Jordan, for its part, would not be satisfied to have the summit postponed or cancelled. It spent a whole year preparing everything to hold the conference in its capital, and this required Jordan to exert administrative, financial, political, and other efforts. Jordan refuses to be told at the last moment, "No conference, postponed or cancelled!"

Knowledgeable persons say that the new bylaws of the League of Arab States have eliminated two features of the many disputes among Arabs. These features caused the Arab peoples sleepless nights.

The old League of Arab States Charter gave every country, of whatever size, the right to declare any league resolution void. One vote would cancel all votes! The problem of whether the conference would or would not be held would freeze all discourse and repress all important discussion.

The old league charter was abrogated, and the old format was abrogated with it. The official abrogation has not yet occurred. The League of Arab States has prepared a new charter which the current 11th summit conference was to discuss and agree to. Some absent countries state that they would not agree to the new charter or that their rejection of it meant their adherence to the old charter, that is, their adherence to the right of nullification! However, those who are in agreement with the new format answer this assertion by saying that they agreed to the new charter at the Baghdad summit. Their mere agreement to it means their agreement to the new charter rules it contains.

On the refusal to adopt the Syrian proposal now, legal scholars say that Damascus' commitment to the new charter was realized at the Baghdad summit. Since that is the case, there is no scope for accepting the Syrian proposal for a postponement. On the basis of this opinion, the majority of the countries were confident that the summit would be held, although they acknowledged the opposition.

From the practical standpoint, the Syrian recommendation stirred up many questions and predictions, creating an atmosphere in the countries' foreign ministers' meeting which could have been avoided; Arabs and observers had attached many hopes to the meeting. It was the first Arab conference held to discuss and take decisions on a single issue. Studies had been set out and recommendations had been formulated, after many preparatory conferences in which thinkers, economists and



specialists from various Arab countries took part and in which the Council of Economic Unity and the Social and Economic Council of the League of Arab States also took part.

The most important, serious thing which emerged from the joint Arab economic action plan was central national planning, which is an inseparable part of Arab national security. The document recommends that 10 percent of total Arab national economic product be allocated in the next 5 years and that this sum is to be devoted to joint Arab economic activity. Experts have estimated that the 10 percent is equal to about \$62 billion. Some experts have said that this sum is very large and is large in terms of the absorption capacity of joint Arab projects. The document allocated \$15 billion to food and agricultural and village development, \$10 billion to industrialization, \$19 billion to social development and \$12 billion to scientific research and studies and technological development.

However, the economic experts in the league say that there is no doubt that absorptive capacity will be limited at the beginning, but it will grow and accelerate with time to expand beyond these sums. When the Arab countries and their peoples see all the benefits of joint national economic activity, they will accept it with greater enthusiasm.

The idea of a common Arab economy and central national planning itself, in any case, requires a political decision to agree on the part of the 11th summit conference. Herein lies the gist, and the parting of the ways: here one may discuss at least one of the reasons for the Syrian delaying tactics, if that is the correct sage, which did not appear on the surface suddenly but has roots going back to the Baghdad conference.

The Baghdad summit conference, as is known, occurred by initiative of the previous Iraqi president, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, with a rapid response from King Husayn, to stop what was called an Arab breakdown. In the Baghdad summit conference, the king played a big role, said to have been one of the biggest roles, in attempting to consolidate Arab ranks. At the Baghdad conference, as everyone remembers, an Iraqi-Syrian axis emerged under the umbrella of what was called the Joint National Action Charter, which some people at the time considered the biggest guarantee for stopping the Arab breakdown and starting along the road to perseverance.

The two fraternal countries at that time decided to establish a joint higher political command consisting of the leaders of the two countries, which would assume charge of the supervision of all bilateral affairs and relations between the two countries in the political, military, economic, cultural, media, educational and other fields and would bring about coordination and integration between them on behalf of the unificationist goals the charter spelled out.

Until what was called the conspiracy was discovered in Iraq in July 1979, on the same day President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr relinquished the presidency and his deputy Saddam Husayn took it over, it appeared as if the two fraternal countries were progressing toward the full unity which they had started working toward with obvious seriousness and activity. Although Syria disavowed responsibility for the conspiracies, and the Iraqi officials were convinced and exercised maximum self control, relations between the two fraternal countries entered their worst state,

to the point where one began to fear for the actions of the summit conference in Tunis and the new Arab format which the Arabs discovered in Baghdad to stand up to Camp David.

However, these fears to a large extent disappeared, or their severity lessened, at the 10th Arab summit conference in Tunis, from which Arab diplomacy emerged most triumphant. At this conference the Arab breakdown was stemmed, that is, the Baghdad conference resolutions were established in spite of international attempts to make the conference a failure, and the conference took a second step forward by agreeing to set out an economic plan for joint national action as well as setting out fixed bases to establish the character of Arab summit conferences.

It seems that the Iraqi initiative which manifested itself at the Baghdad conference remained in Iraqi hands at Tunis, when President Saddam Husayn, in his speech, recommended the convening of a summit conference devoted to economic matters.

The importance of a realistic approach to the Arab economy becomes apparent by reading a secret American document related to American strategy in Africa, whose situation is not different from that of the Arab nation. The document, dated 1978, concerns what America must do in Africa so that it, that is America, can preserve the fragmented state of the African countries, maintain their rifts and disputes, protect America's special relationship with the racist white regime in South Africa, continue to exploit the tremendous sources of raw materials in black and white Africa alike, keep African markets open to American industry and trade and protect the waterway of the Cape of Good Hope, through which passes 65 percent of the Gulf oil going to Europe. Last but not least, the document comments on the interrelationship between black Americans and Africans and the effect of each on the other.

The economic formula presented at the Amman Summit is federalist in orientation, concentrating on the collective leadership of Arab heads who are to meet regularly and adopt political decisions on all economic and military affairs affecting national security. This is in essence a realistic, pragmatic formula. The basis for it is to create a formula for understanding and cooperation among Arab regimes of different characters and types, founded on integration, not competition, among them.

Syrian opposition to the economic summit is not new. Last July the Arab foreign and economics ministers held a meeting in Amman. Before the meeting, news went out that Syria would not attend the meeting, but, at the last moment, Mr. 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam got in touch with Amman from Damascus and said "Include us in."

Syria actually was included. The Palestinian delegation came bringing a joint working paper which was said to have been set forth in participation with Syria; Abu al-Lutf presented it to the conference. Syria's objection to the conference was that it was economic and isolated from political affairs and that the main issue of the Arab-Israeli dispute was kept out of the conference. An unfriendly atmosphere arose at the beginning of the conference which was the talk of all Amman. However, Arab diplomacy soon triumphed. At that time it was said that



Jordanian diplomacy was active in every direction. The conference resolved to form two committees, one political to discuss political affairs, the other economic to discuss economic affairs. Arab diplomats at the time stated that the economic resolutions were basically by political resolution.

The political resolutions which Syria and the Liberation Organization presented were summarized as the final rejection of Resolution 242 and the demand that Israel withdraw from the territories occupied in 1948 and 1967 without restriction or condition; the economic recommendations Syria presented could be summarized as the immediate transformation of the Arab economy into a war economy and a 25 percent reduction in the oil the Arab countries export to the United States.

Although some people saw obvious inhibiting points in the Syrian-Palestinian recommendations, they agreed to the political segment of it as regards formation of a seven-party Arab committee of foreign ministers which would set out a national action strategy for the next 5 years and to the year 2000. The Perseverance and Steadfastness Front represented roughly half the committee members, since Syria, Algeria and the Liberation Organization joined the committee. There was nothing more to ask. Thus the seven-man committee set out its report, which Syria, Algeria and the organization were to have contributed to formulating.

In the interim two serious developments occurred which laid out the principles for the new unificationist format of the summit conferences - or perhaps the developments numbered more than two, if we consider the declaration of the Syrian-Libyan union on 1 September a development along with the first one, the Iraqi-Iranian war, and the signing of the Soviet-Syrian friendship treaty on 10 October as the second one.

A reading of developments in the Perseverance and Steadfastness Front, its relationship with the Soviet Union and its position on the Iraqi-Iranian war was difficult for observers to comprehend, just as the positions of the two big powers on the Iraqi-Iranian war were more difficult to comprehend.

However, the fact over which there is no dispute, as neutral observers say, is that the new formula for unificationist activity through summit conference has now passed and taken long strides on firm Arab ground. It is a practical, pragmatic formula which offers enticements for all Arab regimes which make it impossible for them to resist it. Observers also say that neither of the two big powers like this format; while they disagree over means for dividing up the spoils of the Middle East, they do not in principle disagree over the principle of dividing the spoils or the principle of keeping the countries separated by economic and political rifts.

However, the more Syria and Iraq become estranged, following the collapse of the axis, the greater the possibility becomes that they will come together in the context of the summit conferences. The Iraqi-Syrian estrangement has taken big strides, perhaps as great as the rapprochement which the new Arab unificationist formula has taken in the context of the summit conference.

Observers say that Syria's demand for a postponement is just to gain it some time to study more of the options available to it. Perhaps it is proposing the postponement for the sake of a sure bet that the white thread will become apparent from the black one.

However, it appears that the summit caravan will not wait long. If we want to embrace a measure of optimism in the renewed triumph of the Arab diplomacy which triumphed at the Baghdad and Tunis summits, the results will astonish observers and the two big powers alike!

All disputes are to be resolved within the institution of the summit conference, not outside it. The institution has now started to possess the tools for resolving disputes and developing Arab society and intrinsic Arab capabilities in a manner which will rule out domestic struggles and realize national security on all levels.

Optimism still very much prevails over pessimism!

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CSO: 4802

## INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

### SYRIAN MOVES TO OBSTRUCT, POSTPONE SUMMIT DESCRIBED

London AL-HIWADITH in Arabic 28 Nov 80 pp 19, 20

[Article: "The War to Postpone and Blow up the Summit"/

[Text] There was an outlook for evening rain in Amman, and the Arab delegations to the conference of Arab foreign ministers were waiting in the warm air of the Holiday Inn Hotel to open their conference, which preceded the convening of the 11th summit conference, at 1800 hours in the evening. The word went about in the wings of the delegations that King Husayn would open the conference. Some people wondered, How so? At least four foreign ministers were absent, holding an abbreviated conference in Damascus. When the Syrian foreign minister, 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam, left Amman the afternoon of the previous day for Damascus, accompanied by Abu al-Lutf, head of the Political Department of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and Mohamed Seddik Benyahya, the foreign minister of Algeria, they did not give the impression that they would be certain to return. All that Khaddam told the members of the seven-man committee which prepared the Arab Strategic Document was that it should continue its work of completing the document. The committee members stayed up until 0600 hours Thursday morning to complete it. Thursday morning the other Arab foreign ministers started to come in, anticipating that this intractable document which had been filling the world's ears, preoccupying the seven-man committee for more than 4 months until they agreed to it definitively after discussing it then presenting it in ready form to the summit conference which met 5 days later, would be presented to them.

However, 1800 hours passed, then 1900 hours, and the conference of foreign ministers did not open as scheduled. More than 300 Arab and foreign newsmen ran out of patience in exasperation in the foyers of the hotel, knowing nothing, until news began to be bruited about in the form of whispers!

The first item of news was that 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam was coming at 2030 hours exactly. The second item, secret and not for publication, was that Yasir 'Arafat sent word from his Gulf tour that King Husayn had told him on the tour that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the state of the emirates had become somewhat inclined to accept the proposal to postpone the Arab summit conference for a very short period -- from 1 to 2 weeks -- in order to clear the Arab air. The third item of news was totally in contradiction to the first two items, namely that Damascus radio had drawn listeners' attention to the fact that "a former advisor to the prime minister of Jordan" would appear on television that evening at 2030 hours sharp to reveal

secrets on Jordan's involvement in conspiracies against Syria and that the meeting would be rebroadcast on Damascus radio at 2115 hours.

Observers started to wonder: how was it Syria started to launch such an attack on Jordan at the same moment 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam's airplane was touching down at Amman airport?

The Jordanians replied that a person named Muhammad Ziyad Salkah, whom the Syrians saw on television, was a Syrian citizen, not a Jordanian and not the manager of the affairs of Jordan's premier, Mudar Badran.

An informed person said that Khaddam was actually playing tactical games and being politically occupied observing and exploring the goals of the conference. When he and his colleagues went to Damascus, they went there to consult together and with their governments on what was to be done. Before Khaddam left Amman he said many things at seven-man committee meetings which included Syria, Jordan, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, and the Liberation Organization as well as the secretariat general of the Arab League, which had begun its meeting 2 days earlier.

Among the things he said was that the state among Arabs was one of undeclared war, the situation between Syria and Jordan specifically was in the worst state, "and if this state continues, we will be compelled to defend our national security, even over the borders, and I hope no one will be surprised!"

When 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam entered the Holiday Inn Hotel at 2100 hours sharp Thursday evening, the first question newsmen asked him was "Excellent minister, will you attend the summit conference?" His answer was, "This question is premature. There are basic points on which discussion and modification will take place and our position will be determined in the light of that."

It was in fact difficult for any political observer to realize what the basic points were on which there was argument, and it was difficult to pursue the paper or papers which were discussed, then amended, edited and mixed up. Observers did not even know one paper from the other or the points on which there had been dispute and those on which agreement had been reached.

When you talk with any member of the Palestine Liberation Organization delegation, he will say, "The summit was not a goal in itself but a means for reaching a goal. The value of any summit is the degree to which the will of the confrontation and support forces concur. If we want to confront the Zionist enemy seriously, one may not outflank the Syrian position, because the Syrian army is the biggest, strongest Arab army among confrontation forces, now that Egypt has departed. The summit is not a goal in itself so much as a means for combating the Zionist enemy."

The member of the Palestinian delegation goes on to say, "Proceeding from this conviction, Abu 'Ammar, in spite of his illness, after meeting with President Hafiz al-Asad, went on a broad Arab tour to explain the need to clear the Arab air as a basic condition for a successful summit, and, if so required, to postpone



holding the summit conference. One should bear in mind that the Palestine Liberation Organization is not fighting with any Arab country."

I told the Palestinian interlocutor, "It has been said that King Husayn invited Yasir 'Arafat to Amman to talk with him and clear the air, if the air needed further cleaning, after the talk the Israelis and parties to Camp David had raised on what is called 'the Jordanian option' in order to cast doubt on the Jordanian position and sow more seeds of dissension in the Arab front resisting Camp David. As far as I know, Abu 'Ammar was to appear in Amman on the 12th of the month, that is, 6 days before the convening of the seven-man committee in Amman.

"However, it appears that Abu 'Ammar was called to another meeting with President al-Asad at the same time and instead of going to Amman to clear the air he traveled on another mission to clear the air by attempting to postpone the summit conference. If we want to accept that cleaning the air is the desired goal, if even by other means, then what we are observing is that cleaning is not in itself the direct goal as much as it is a cover for another direct object, which is the postponement."

My interlocutor told me, "The fact is that we came to the seven-man committee meetings at the end of October, and the meetings failed, not producing the desired results. There was a feeling that it was necessary to clear the air first. Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad, the foreign minister of Kuwait, said that it was necessary to have a committee or committees of rulers to solve pending problems among Arab countries. He called for an abbreviated committee consisting of the secretary general of the Arab League and the foreign minister of Jordan to formulate a working paper which would take off from the joint Syrian-Palestinian paper and the readings the other committee members had expressed. The date of 18 November was set for a second meeting before the foreign ministers' conference, and we came and were surprised to see a paper which was below the desired level and did not set forth from the premises we had stipulated."

I told him, "But Mr. 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam started recommending the postponement of the summit conference before you came and read what was in the paper. Moreover there is a general Arab view that clearing the air is done inside the summit conference, not outside it, and is done by hastening it, not postponing it." My Palestinian interlocutor fell quiet, then said "We have never felt that we were in the proper milieu or in a comfortable milieu except when Iraq and Syria were in agreement, and that period did not last long. Party disputes between the two countries have wrecked everything. President al-Asad recommended that a neutral arbitration committee be formed to investigate the situation which has arisen between Syria and Iraq, and 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam recommended a neutral arbitration committee to arbitrate on the situation which has arisen between Syria and Jordan.

Syria does not believe that it is possible to clear the air in Jordan and holds that it is necessary to hold a number of conciliation meetings, or what are known as abbreviated summits, in Riyadh, for example, or Kuwait, or Abu Dhabi - meetings which will consist of President al-Asad, President Saddam, King Khalid, King Husayn and Abu 'Ammar, after which a move can be made to the house of the Jordanian brother to eat the meal of peace and celebrate the purity of hearts.



The Syrians, Palestinians and others who hold this idea say that this procedure is not new to Arab politics; the Arabs have passed through such a state and have gone beyond it with the question of Lebanon; there the solution was an abbreviated summit in Riyadh, which prepared for a successful summit in Cairo in 1976.

However, people who are in favor of holding the summit say that these are one set of circumstances, and those were other circumstances. There were summits before the Baghdad conference which differed from the summits after Baghdad. Why doesn't everything go on in Amman, within the summit conference? The Syrians reply "Amman is a party to the dispute, and because we are anxious to make the summit conference a success, we do not want it to blow up in Amman. It would be better for it to be postponed than to be blown up."

Iraq cannot understand this psychological condition on the part of its brother Syria, because "no one can come to a mature country" as Dr Sa'dun Hammadi said, "and say, Brothers, we want to offer you money to develop the Arab world in the next 10 years; this person falls into a position of defending himself while the beneficiary is dissatisfied; this is an unsound, unintelligent situation."

Money and economics might not, as the Syrians say, be everything, although they need it; they want to be sure about the intentions of others!

In conclusion, one can say that there is no longer any dispute over the joint Arab economic activity strategy, which is ready for presentation to the summit conference. One can say that on the first day of the meeting of the Arab foreign ministers, agreement was given to a political action strategy under two headings, one political and the other military. Agreement was reached with amazing speed, making the air seem as if it had been cleared, prompting 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam and the perseverance and steadfastness front countries to ask for a grace period from 1800 hours on the evening of Friday 21 November to 2230 hours in the morning of the following day to return to their governments and heads for consultation.

Lest it appear that there are no longer any grounds for postponing the summit conference, 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam said that essential points cause him to have reservations. While some people hastened to postpone the summit conference, if only for a few days, for the sake of their brother Syria, others wondered, "What are the essential points pending which prompt reservations? One Arab League official replied, "God alone knows!"

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CSO: 4802

## JERUSALEM COMMITTEE MEETING RESULTS CALLED 'IMPORTANT STEP'

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 27 Dec 80 p 3

[Text]

RABAT, Dec. 26 (SPA) — Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al Faisal described the results of the Jerusalem Committee meeting as "an important step and a base for confronting the challenge facing the Muslim world, the Palestinian question and Jerusalem in particular." The prince made the remarks before departing here Wednesday upon conclusion of the committee's discussions.

Concluding its meeting, the Jerusalem Committee expressed the grave concern of Islamic countries toward repeated Zionist aggression against Lebanon and the Palestinian people. The final statement demanded the U.N. Security Council an immediate solution to stop these aggressions and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the south of Lebanon.

The statement condemned Zionist attempts to Judaize Jerusalem, exercise collective punishments of its residents, building settlements to force the original residents to immigrate and assaults on the Islamic holy places. The committee reiterated that the Palestine question and the liberating of Jerusalem is an Islamic duty to which all Islamic countries adhere to under a political, military and economic strategy. The strategy would also maintain the victories of the Pales-

tine revolution according to a detailed and clear Islamic joint work.

The committee began its meetings Monday attended by Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan, Bangladesh, Lebanon, Syria, Sudan, Indonesia, Pakistan, Senegal, the PLO and the Organization of the Islamic Conference — who represented by Habib Chatti, the secretary general.

Moroccan Foreign Minister Boucetta said in a press conference after the final session that the committee had adopted effective and successful methods that would stop the Zionist arrogance according to a well-studied plan. The meetings were not restricted to the issue of Jerusalem only, but covered the Arab cause as a whole, Boucetta said.

He added that the strategy, endorsed by the committee and that will be approved by the upcoming Islamic Summit Conference to be held in Taif, will end the Zionist challenge, liberate Jerusalem and the occupied Arab territories and restore the rights of the Palestinian people. Boucetta expected that next year will witness decisive international changes.

CSO: 4820

## ISLAMIC AFFAIRS

### SCHOLAR SAYS THEOCRACY ANTI-ISLAM, ADVOCATES INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM

Kuwait AL-HADAF in Arabic 8 Aug 80 p 4

[Interview With Author Dr Muhammad Khalafallah; "Islam and Theocracy; Islamic Thought Discusses Everything, Including God's Existence"]

[Excerpts] The debate concerning the Islamic thought is touching off further issues and questions of importance and significance. Dr Muhammad Ahmad Khalafallah declares that the ancient Islamic thinkers gave themselves absolute freedom in discussing the issues of their times and excluded no issue, not even God's existence, from their discussions. Dr Khalafallah also explains how this thinking has deteriorated and how the current of al-Afghani and Muhammad 'Abduh was defeated. He discusses science and religion and points out how there is absolutely no conflict between them.

At the outset, Dr Khalafallah, the author of many Islamic and historical studies, the man who occupied the post of undersecretary of the Ministry of Culture and the author of the well-known book "This Is How Islam Builds," discusses the degree of freedom which the Islamic thinkers enjoyed in the past, saying:

Some religious thinkers said that God has two books, one of them revealed, namely the Koran, and the other created, namely the universe, and that neither can do away with the other. The Koran draws attention to the universe and calls for thinking of it. Contemplating the universe leads us to the scientific facts which, in turn, deepen the meaning of the Koran phrases regarding the universe in our minds to the degree that it can be said that every scientific fact is a Koranic fact.

[Question] But how was this liberal tide of Islamic thinking stopped?

[Answer] As of the second Abbasid era, [non-Arabs] prevailed [and they put barriers] in the face of the prosperity of the Arab thought for political reasons. The first Muslims, who had the impact in spreading Islam, were Arabs. When the state was Arab, the non-Arabs found full freedom of thought. But when the state came to be controlled by non-Arabs, the Arab mind stopped thinking and the Islamic thought then experienced stagnation and decline. The non-Arab state stopped calling for Islam and some Arabs go as far as saying that "the Ottoman caliphate was a sultanate and not an Islamic caliphate" because when it conquered other countries it did not conquer them with the purpose of spreading Islam but for the purpose of enlarging the domain of the sultanate. Intellectual advancement was of no concern to the (Ottomans) and there prevailed among them the belief that the ancients reached a number of sciences beyond which man should not go. Isolation from the problems of life and lack of thinking

of the universe started. Life itself became tied, in the people's minds, to religious thinking, even though this is in conflict with Islam.

The halt in the thinking of the Islamic Arab mind led to backwardness in all spheres of life.

[Question] This leads us to ask the question regarding the truth of theocracy in Islam?

[Answer] Islam is most explicit on this issue. It fights theocracy in all its forms. It fights it among followers of the book [Christians and Jews] when it rebukes them for following rabbis and priests, and not God, as their ruler. A clergyman can do the Muslim no harm and no good, regardless of his status (?!). It is enough that the Koran has asked the Prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, to warn his kinsmen and tell his daughters that he can do nothing for them before God. We are responsible and clergymen will not be held accountable for us [in the hereafter]. It is not at all right that the task of a clergyman be above that of the prophet, may peace be upon him. The task of the prophet, peace and prayers be upon him, was to forewarn and convey the good news. His task was not to seek power and all he had to do was convey the message.

[Question] What has this stagnation that has afflicted the Islamic thought done to us?

[Answer] It has led us to the cultural backwardness in which we live up to our ears. What is fundamental to a thinker, be he Muslim or non-Muslim, is that he be committed to the issues of the age in which he lives and be well-versed with the civilization of the age. As long as we fail to take from civilization that which helps us to find solutions to our problems, we will remain backward and the problems will continue to exist. Rather, the problems will become more complex.

America contained vast natural resources before the European immigrated to it. But the native American was not able to exploit those resources and America remained backward until the European immigrant--a civilized man--came to it and was able to exploit its resources and to build the American civilization that we see today.

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CSO: 4802



## ISLAMIC AFFAIRS

### THOUGHT, CHARACTER OF MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD FOUNDER DEFENDED

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 5 Nov 80 pp 8-9

[Article by Salah al-Shadi: "Why Are Some People Mean in Their Portrayal of Muslim Brotherhood Group; Judiciary Declares Brotherhood Innocent of Charge of Coups; Brotherhood's Danger Is to Jews and Imperialism"]

[Text] Salah Shadi is a Muslim Brotherhood member who lived with the Brotherhood's major events from the days of Imam Hasan al-Banna to the era of the late President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir with whom Shadi had contacts (by virtue of his being an officer in the Ministry of Interior in charge of the Muslim Brotherhood's activity among the military). Shadi is now a pensioned major general. He was arrested in 1954 with the Muslim Brotherhood group charged with attempting to assassinate Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir.

Shadi remained in jail for 20 years and is now living in Kuwait.

Following is the article he has written in reply to Dr 'Abd-al-'Azim Ramadan by virtue of his having lived in the period about which Dr Ramadan speaks in his study on the Muslim Brotherhood movement which is being published by AL-HADAF.

I have read Dr 'Abd-al-'Azim Ramadan's article on the Muslim Brotherhood group, published in AL-HADAF paper on Thursday, 30 October 1980, and I have been astonished by the difference between the article's contents and the writer's claim alleging that the article is a scientific study.

Despite the innocent "bouquet" with which the doctor introduces his talk about "the most dangerous religious movement in modern history" when he says that his study focuses only on the past and has nothing to do with the present and that, therefore, it would be wrong on the part of any organization to consider the study an attempt at condemnation or assault which are as remote as can be from the objectives of the true scientific study which, of course, the doctor seeks, the reader with any degree of intelligence cannot keep away from his nose the odor of the persistent effort that the "historian" doctor exerts to cast doubt on the goals and intentions which martyr Hasan al-Banna carried for the entire Islamic nation and which have been carried after him by the Muslim Brotherhood group.

While talking about that which assails the reader's nose in the new "bouquet" being presented to today's reader by the "historian" doctor, let us point out his old opinions which can "be smelled" by whomever has read the books he published in 1973



and 1976 about the development of the national movement in Egypt and in the book 'Abd-al-Nasir and the March Crisis, all of which do not swerve in their content from what he has raised before today's reader who, perhaps, has not smelled before the wind which indicates the origins to which the doctor's thought and his formulation of history's events belong.

You cannot fail to understand what the "historian" doctor means in the first lines of his article when he puts you face to face with an indisputable issue which, in his opinion, needs no discussion, namely "the concept of violence and the seizure of power among the Muslim Brotherhood group!"

He does not discuss this concept itself but gives you the impression that it is an axiom that can withstand no debate and that the issue that he brings up for discussion is only the issue of knowing the time when this concept began to occur to Hasan al-Banna!

I don't think that the "historian" doctor has forgotten that this "concept" was the subject of a case brought before the courts by the prosecution in what was called at the time "al-Jayb" [the pocket] case on which a verdict was issued in 1951.

#### Judiciary's Opinion

The judiciary heard a lot from the prosecution about the development of the journey groups [firaq al-rihlat], which the writer has used as the subject of his discussion, the rovers [or boyscout] groups and the battalions system and even about the development of the special system set up by Hasan al-Banna.

The verdicts on this case were issued after the assassination of al-Naqrashi and after the attempt at Hamid Jawdah's life in which the Muslim Brotherhood was accused. The prosecution even cited a mass of accusations which it attributed to the Muslim Brotherhood, including the incident of the "Jewish" Oriental Advertizing Company, the blowing up of the "Jewish" (Jatinio, Chicorel and Orico) Shops, the blowing up of the "Reciter" Jews Quarter and the blowing up of the Rabbinical Jews Quarter. The prosecution cited all this to underline the group's terrorist intentions. So what did the judiciary say in the particulars of the verdict on the Brotherhood and its system of education and of upbringing and what did the particulars say in reply to the statement about the attempt to seize power and about the concept of violence which the "historian" doctor has been disseminating?

The court, which issued its verdict on 17 March 1950 after the horde of accusations cited by the prosecution and charging the Muslim Brotherhood with sabotage and destruction, not only declared the Muslim Brotherhood innocent of the charge of terrorism but also praised the Brotherhood's honorable and heroic role in serving Egypt.

At the same time, the court declared the prosecution at fault for describing the special organization, "and not just the journeys organization," as a terrorist organization. In the particulars of the verdict, the court said that this special organization was a training organization compatible with the goals of liberating the Nile Valley and all the Muslim countries, that it did not constitute a crime and did not call for committing any crime and that the fact that some of its members engaged on their own in a criminal conspiracy to commit acts of murder and destruction did not concern the organization and could not undermine it.

But it seems that the "historian" doctor has not read these particulars and has not read the praise accorded the Muslim Brotherhood by Maj Gen Ahmad al-Mawawi and Maj Gen Fu'ad Sadiq in their testimony before the court and has not read what these two witnesses said about the sacrifices that the Muslim Brotherhood made in the Palestinian struggle and about "the high training standard attained by the Brotherhood members--something which the court appreciated in judging the Brotherhood's true intentions and goals."

#### Al-Banna's Head for Coronation Gift

So the ruling agency, led by the king, failed to distort the Muslim Brotherhood's reputation before the judiciary. However, Prime Minister Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Hadi succeeded in presenting al-Banna's head to the king as a coronation gift on 12 February 1950. This act symbolized the relationship between [King] Faruq and the Muslim Brotherhood--a relationship in which the "historian" doctor has tried to twist the facts in order to give the reader the impression that there was a common interest which set up an alliance between the Brotherhood and the king! However, he has cited no shred of evidence to prove this claim, except for his dark thoughts.

What is also regrettable is that the "historian" doctor has also failed to see an act of terror in Dr Hasan al-Banna's killing, as he has failed to see any terror in the acts of torture to which the Muslim Brotherhood members were subjected--and for which the court censured the ruling authorities--because of the so-called al-Jayb case and of the "alleged" acts of murder, including the attempt at Hamid Jawdah's life in which brother Mustafa Kamal 'Abd-al-Majid was accused. In this instance, Prime Minister Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Hadi went to where the accused was being interrogated in Misr al-Zadimah only to find him hanging in the air inside a room with his flesh cut by whip lashes. Still Dr Ramadan has failed to see in this any kind of terror or of assault on the dignity of the citizens generally and of the Muslim Brotherhood members in particular!

This is, in the doctor's opinion, fairness itself, even though it is in violation of the judiciary's opinion!

If the events are twisted in this manner, then what can you say about his objectivity regarding Hasan al-Banna's thought which Dr Ramadan has cited to us within such a framework of abasement that flouts the principles of the faith itself--principles which I thought have become axiomatic facts that no Muslim disputes.

What is astonishing is that it is all right for anybody, as long as he is not Hasan al-Banna, to say that Islam is religion and state, faith and law and a book and a sword.

But for Hasan al-Banna to advocate this principle with which nobody disagrees, then such advocacy is, in the opinion of Dr Ramadan, a deviation from the path of "love, fraternity and amity" which the man [presumable al-Banna] advocated in 1352 of the Hegira.

## Contradiction

If this contradiction exists in the doctor's conscience, then there is no doubt that he also sees a contradiction when he reads in God's book His words "call to God's path with wisdom and benevolent exhortation" and His words "fight all the infidels as they fight all of you" or in His telling Moses and his brother Aaron "go to Pharaoh who has become a tyrant and speak to him gently that he may remember or have fear" and the Hadith of the prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, "whoever among you sees an abomination, then let him rectify it with his hand. If he cannot, then with his tongue. If he cannot, then with his heart and this is the weakest of the faith."

If the doctor believes that there is contradiction in these phrases, then he is excused for the contradiction he finds in Dr Hasan al-Banna's behavior and in the principle of his call which was established on "love and amity" on the one hand and his call in 1938 for the need to force the government to follow the path of Islam on the other hand.

This is one of the doctor's fallacies.

## Second One

Another fallacy has found its way to the doctor's article and he has, as usual, dressed it up in the attire of the truth to convince the reader that what he says is a "real scientific study."

The doctor cannot explain the increase in the number of the Muslim Brotherhood branches from 10 to 50 in one year and then to 300 in 1938, "i.e. in 10 years!" Proceeding to explain this, he says: "If this is understood insofar as al-Wafd era is concerned, in view of the fact that al-Wafd did abide by the democratic constitutional line, it is not understood in the era of the coup. In any case, the observation remains true that the Muslim Brotherhood always flourished in the reactionary eras until division erupted and the alliance broke up in 1948!"

When talking about the era of the coup, I imagined that the doctor was talking about the army's movement in 1952. But he has surpassed this concept and considered the era of the coup the time in which the king dismissed al-Wafd cabinet and formed a cabinet of the minority parties!! He has called this a coup and a reactionary rule whereas we find that he describes the rule of al-Wafd as the rule abiding by the "democratic constitutional" line!

I am really surprised that the "historian" doctor seems to be convinced by what he is saying!

The Brotherhood did not escape the persecution--at times in the form of arrests, at others in the form of confiscation and at yet others through arrest and displacement--of any of the governments, including al-Wafd government.

The growth of the Muslim Brotherhood has nothing to do with any specific era or government. It is in the nature of Islam that it carries its strength within itself and that its dissemination emanates from the divineness it inspires in people's hearts and implants in their minds.

But our "historian" does not see in this strength enough cause for the Muslim Brotherhood to have 300 branches in 10 years!

But some fair people who, unlike the doctor, do not have their Ph.D in history have not been deterred by their hatred for the Brotherhood from saying the truth in this regard. In his book, *Searching for the Self*, al-Sadat narrates this incident on page 36:

"There is no doubt that the Muslim Brotherhood was a considerable force. It is enough to indicate this that al-Banna wanted to acquire a magnificent villa located across the Brotherhood's headquarters to turn it into the association's new headquarters. So he called for subscriptions and in less than one day, there were enough subscriptions and he bought the villa."

Therefore, the attempt to cast suspicion on the financial sources with which al-Banna was able to set up 300 branches in 10 years changes nothing in the eyes of the fair-minded, even if they hate the Brotherhood. But for the "historian" doctor the facts get so twisted as to make him say that he can understand the dissemination of the Brotherhood's branches in the era of al-Wafd because of al-Wafd's abidance by the "democratic constitutional" line but cannot understand such dissemination in the other eras!

How can the doctor forget that al-Nahhas Pasha, the prime minister and al-Wafd Party chairman, summoned Hasan al-Banna in 1942 after the latter had announced his nomination for the Ismailia district and asked him to withdraw this nomination, telling him frankly that the British circles would not let him enter the parliament. Al-Nahhas promised al-Banna that if the latter complied with his request, he--al-Nahhas--would let him engage in his activities freely and that the government would ban alcohol and prostitution, as requested by al-Banna, in return for this concession!

But as soon as 1942 approached its end, al-Nahhas Pasha closed the branches again, banned their activity and imposed surveillance on the movement of the members!

Does Dr Ramadan still believe that al-Wafd cabinet abided by the "democratic constitutional" line or does he believe that the Brotherhood's fortunes with al-Wafd cabinet were like their ebbing and flowing fortunes with the reactionary governments?

### Third Fallacy

There is a third fallacy which reveals to you Dr Ramadan's way of thinking when he says that he considers "Hasan al-Banna a unique model of the religious youth group rejecting the western current. None of the forms of the political, economic, social and intellectual struggle taking place in Cairo in the 1920's attracted his attention. Nothing other than what he called the "moral degeneration" attracted al-Banna's attention.

So the scrupulous historian believes that as long as Hasan al-Banna was concerned in his call with confronting the moral degeneration existing as a result of the



state of "westernization" emerging in the Egyptian society and embodied in the Egyptian woman's discarding of her veil, in her seeking education, in her entering the field of work and of politics and in her denunciation of polygamy, then this means that political struggle, not to mention the Brotherhood's economic and social organizations which were set up at a later date after al-Banna's and the Brotherhood's emergence, had not been among al-Banna's aspirational. Moreover, this means that [Dr Ramadan believes that] even the concept of the Islamic caliphate which al-Banna advocated in the fifth congress in 1938 and which he considered one of the mainstays of the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology did not concern al-Banna at the time!

Dr Ramadan makes the following serious conclusion on the basis of this [belief]:

"It is thus evident that the Muslim Brotherhood movement was not motivated by political issues concerning independence and the constitution or rejection of the existing system but by ancestral concepts opposing the "westernization" current. As for the concept of violence and of seeking to seize power by force, it did not occur to the minds of the Brotherhood's founders. [What they had in mind] was peaceful action embodied in the publication of Islamic newspapers, in sermons and preaching, in the formation of associations and in other means."

#### Truth Intended to Serve Falsehood

This third fallacy which Dr Ramadan uses as his means for understanding the Muslim Brotherhood movement as depicted in his aforementioned summary can only be described as a truth intended to serve a falsehood.

It is certain that the Muslim Brotherhood movement was not motivated by political factors concerning the issues of independence and the constitution or rejection of the existing system but by the firm faith that Islam is a comprehensive system of life which can be established soundly only through faith in the entire book. The state is a part of the system of life formulated by Islam.

There are no alternatives to this system, as there are no alternatives to the means of change established by the prophet of God, may God's peace and prayers be upon. These are the means of rectifying an abomination with the hand and, if impossible, with the tongue and, if impossible, then with the heart.

#### Comprehensive Thought and Coordinated Steps

Therefore, I do not think that the "historian" doctor who disapproves of Hasan al-Banna's progression can disapprove of the progression of the prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, as established by the prophet's practical Sunna and by his Hadith as recounted to us by history's events. We learn from history how the prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, could see victory for the Muslim armies while he was fleeing Mecca on his way to Medina and how he promised Sarraquah ibn Malik, who was following the prophet to bring his news back to the infidel, one of Khosrau's two bracelets when a horseshoe on one of the hoofs of Sarraquah's horse melted. So the prophet was not unaware of the collusion of the Romans and of the Persians against the Muslims and was not unaware of the victory of the Muslim armies over them--a victory which the prophet did not live to see--even while he was still planning for his escape from the tyranny of the infidel!

Did the Muslim invasions change the method of the Islamic call which is based on fraternity, love and amity or the change the Islamic approach of moral upbringing based on exhortation and guidance or did the prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, teach confronting war with war, malice with malice and aggression with aggression?

This is how Hasan al-Banna understood what was awaiting his followers on the basis of God's laws in the universe. The tyranny of falsehood had to be confronted with right and righteous men and with preparations and weapons which Dr Ramadan has considered a crystallization of the "concept of violence" whereas the court which tried the Muslim Brothers considered them a "training compatible with the goals of liberating the Nile Valley and all the Muslim countries."

But it seems that the impact of the Christian west's thought has prevented Dr Ramadan from visualizing this approach which seemed complete to Hasan al-Banna's mind from the outset of his call as it was complete in God's book at the end of the revelation to the prophet, may God's peace be upon him--beginning with the concept of the Islamic caliphate, which all Muslims know is a collective duty which some have to undertake and realize so its burden may be dropped from the shoulder of all the Muslims, and ending with the state system in the political and economic spheres and with the nation that lives constitutionally under the shadow of the divine religion so that the Muslim family may live under the protection of this [religious] constitution, so that the mainstays of the family may be based on this constitution, so that the individual's faith may be strengthened with it and so that he may develop his capabilities on the foundations of unification.

#### Well-Studied Steps

Hasan al-Banna understood all this. His steps were not haphazardly and his call did not rise from void. He was not a unique model of the religious youth group rejecting the westernization current, as the "historian" doctor says, but was a unique model of the religious youth rejecting all systems other than Islam, and not just the westernization current.

The efforts that Dr Ramadan has exerted to convince the reader that Hasan al-Banna did not care for any of the forms of political, economic, social and intellectual struggle taking place in Cairo in the 1920's and was only interested in the moral degeneration thus become words that need no reply. Al-Banna did not invent an Islam for himself and was not unaware of what every Muslim knows about the comprehensive nature of Islam's political, economic and social structure. The starting point [for al-Banna] was to build the individual on sound faith and strong morals in order to touch off his religious capabilities and to create the force which reformers need to attain the desired structure. Dr Ramadan considers this force an abominable crime and a black mark in the Brotherhood's history whereas al-Banna viewed it as a necessity for building and talked about it and about the revolution in a manner that saves us the trouble of answering the "historian" doctor.

#### Strength and Revolution

The martyred Imam Hasan al-Banna says in the message of the fifth congress: "Strength is the slogan of all of Islam's systems and legislations. The venerable Koran urges

urges clearly and plainly: 'Prepare for them all the strength and all the horses you can so as to send fear in the heart of God's enemy and your enemy.' Strength is the slogan of Islam even in imploration which is the embodiment of submissiveness and humility. Listen to the imploration which the prophet reiterated in the privacy of his heart, which he taught to his companions and with which he addressed his God; 'God, protect me from distress and grief, protect me from inability and indolence, protect me from cowardice and avarice and protect me from the hold of debts and from the oppression of men.' Thus, God's prophet implored God for protection from all aspects of weakness--the weakness of will as a result of distress and grief, the weakness of production as a result of inability and indolence, financial weakness as a result of avarice and cowardice and the weakness of dignity and prestige as a result of debt and oppression."

Al-Banna goes on to add:

"The Muslim Brothers are profounder intellectually and more foresighted than to be lured by superficial acts and thought and than to dwell on such acts and thought, weigh their consequences and analyze what they mean and seek. They know that the first degree of strength is the strength of creed and faith, followed by the strength of unity and solidarity and then by the strength of arm and weapon. It is not right to describe a group as strong unless it possesses all these elements. If a group uses the strength of arm and weapon while divided, disorganized and suffering from weak creed and indolent faith, then such a group's destiny is destruction and annihilation."

Al-Banna then asks:

"But has Islam, whose slogan is strength, recommended the use of force under all conditions and circumstances or has it set restriction and imposed conditions for its use and directed this use in a specific manner?"

"And is force the first cure used or is cauterization the last resort?"

After posing these questions, al-Banna answers:

"Revolution is the most violent aspect of force. This is why the Muslim Brothers view it more carefully and profoundly, especially in a country like Egypt which has tried its luck with revolutions and has reaped from them only what you know. After all these evaluations, I answer those who ask that the Muslim Brothers will use actual force only where everything else fails and only when they are confident that they have completed the implements of faith and unity. When they use this force, they will be frank and honorable and will first forewarn and wait. They will then proceed with honor and dignity and will take the responsibility for their position with utter satisfaction and contentment."

"As for revolution, the Muslim Brothers do not think of it, rely on it or believe in its benefits and results even though they have been telling every government in Egypt that if the situation continues as it is and if the people in charge fail to give thought to speedy reform and urgent cure, then the situation will inevitably lead to a revolution that is neither created nor advocated by the Muslim Brotherhood."

This is how the Muslim Brotherhood has understood force since Hasan al-Banna advocated it and this is how they have viewed revolution. The mentality of the "historian" doctor refuses to understand this view from the course of the Brotherhood's history for no reason other than the fact that the doctor wants to succeed in depicting the Muslim Brotherhood in a manner that scares both rulers and ruled. At the same time, the "historian" doctor refuses to understand Islam except with the mentality of a Christian [Khawajh] who considers religion a system of prayers and not a system of life! We even find him ask in his historic article:

"What pushed Hasan al-Banna to the field of politics?" Answering his question, he says that the growth of the intrinsic power of the Muslim Brotherhood is a main factor in this transformation.

So the "historian" doctor believes that the Muslim Brotherhood's entry into the field of politics is the symbol of a turning away from the truth and essence of Islam. Meanwhile, he says in the same article that women' entry into the field of politics is the symbol of the nation's civilization.

As for the Muslim's right to participate in the political field, this right needs, in the doctor's opinion, "a growing intrinsic power" to tip the scales and equalize him with the woman so that he may have the right to participate in the political field!

These words have a hidden meaning that our intellect cannot comprehend.

A final word, which I hope the doctor will understand, about the personality of Hasan al-Banna whose honor and life the doctor and his likes have often discussed.

The circumstances did not mold the characteristics of al-Banna's call. Rather, al-Banna was able to reform the soil in which the fruit grows so that the fruit may be strong and healthy. There is no doubt that you have read al-Banna's appeal to the Muslim Brothers: "Do not clash with the laws of the universe because they will triumph. But struggle with them, employ them, turn their current and use some of them against others."

I don't think that Dr Ramadan has forgotten, as long as he has read the message of the fifth congress, the words with which Hasan al-Banna draws up the future steps carefully and deliberately and in which he tells all the Brothers: "The lines of this path of yours are planned and its limits are marked. I will not violate these limits which, I am fully convinced, are the safest for reaching [the goal]. It is better for whomever among you who wants to rush the fruit before it ripens to abandon this call and seek others."

Finally, I have a whisper for Dr Ramadan's ear: It is better for him to view history's facts through God's laws in His universe rather than through suspicions he creates or through a thought which he propagates.

This is more conducive to truthfulness and to believing him, if he seeks good for the sons of his nation.

Peace be upon those who follow the right path.



CONSTITUTIONAL CONGRESS PREPARATORY COMMITTEE IDENTIFIED

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 28 Dec 80 pp 1, 4

[Text]

KABUL, Dec. 28. (Bakhtar).— Following is the composition of the high organising commission for preparation of the constituent congress of the National Fatherland Front, proposed by the organising commission of the conference of the national and patriotic forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, in alphabetical order, dated December 27, 1980:

1—Babrak Karmal, General Secretary of PDPA CC, President of RC and Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

2—Assadullah Habib, chairman of the Writers Union of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

3—Anahita Ratebzad, member of PDPA CC Politburo, President of the Peace, Solidarity and Friendship Organisation of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, President of Afghan-Soviet Friendship Society and President of the Democratic Organisation for Afghan Women (DOAW).

4—Baba Qelich, chairman of "Watan Jamiat" organisation.

5—Burhanuddin Ghiyas, first secretary to the Democratic Organisation for Afghan Youth (DOAY).

6—Jamala Palwasha, alternate member of PDPA CC and vice-president of the publicity, extension and education division of the Party Central Committee.

7—Esteemed Humaira.

8—Hamid Kargar, member of the Central Council of the Trade Unions of Afghanistan.

9—Rahim Andkhoyee from Faryab province.

10—Sultan Ali Keshtmand, member of PDPA CC Politburo, Vice President of Revolutionary Council and Deputy Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

11—Sayed Zaman Khan Sabri from Khost Loi Woliswali.

12—Sayed Karim Karim Momand from Goshta, Nangarhar.

13—Dr. Sayeed Afghani, member of the Central Co-

uncil of the Writers and Poets of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

14—Salam Elmi, member of the Islamic Affairs Department of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

15—Sher Abas Khan Masoud.

16—Saleh Muhammad Zeary, member of the Politburo and Secretary to PDPA CC and member of the RC Presidium of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

17—Esteemed Saleha Farouq Etemadi.

18—Abdurrahim Hatel, from Kandahar.

19—Abdurrashid Arian, member of PDPA CC, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

20—Abdul Satar Purdeli, President of the Central Council of the Trade Unions of Afghanistan.

21—Aisha Amir, president of the Family Guidance Association and member of the Central Council of the Democratic Organisation for Afghan Women.

22—Prof. Abdul Hai Habibi, advisor to the Ministry of Information and Culture and member of the Presidium of the Union of Writers and Poets of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

23—Prof. Ali Mohammad Zohma, member of the Academy of Sciences of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and member of Presidium of the Union of Writers and Poets of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

24—Omar Alam Bayat, member of editorial board of Yulduz periodical and member of the leading board of "Watan Jamiat" organisation.

25—Abdul Wodood, Farezabad Mayor, Badakhshan province.

26—Abdurrouf Bena-wa, ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in Libya.

27—Abdurrahman Baruch, member of Academy of Sciences of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

28—Abdul Karim Haqani.

29—Dr. Abdul Waned Surabi, advisor to the Ministry of Higher Education.

30—Ata Mohammad Khan, representative of peasants and member of the executive board of the Union of Agricultural Cooperatives of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

31—Abdul Ghafar Lakanwal, deputy minister of agriculture and land reforms and president of the Agricultural Cooperatives Department of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

32—Ghulam Ali Omaid, member of the Central Council of the Union of Artists of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

33—Farid Mazdak, second secretary to the Dem-

ocratic Organisation for Afghan Youth (DOAY).

34—Esteemed Fateh Mohammad "Ferqa Mesher".

35—Dr. Mahmoud Habibi, Kabul Governor and member of the Central Council of Journalists Union of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

36—Mehrchand Warma, President of the Chamber of Commerce.

37—Dr. Mohammad Musa Atesh from Nooristan.

38—Mohammad Din Zhwak, member of the Academy of Sciences and vice chairman of the Union of Writers of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

39—Mir Mohammad Siddiq Farhang, advisor to the Prime Ministry.

40—Dr. Mujawer Zhamad Zyar, vice chairman of peace, solidarity and friendship organisation of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

41—Dr. Najib, member of PDPA CC and RC and of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

42—Noor Ahmad Noor, member of Politburo, secretary to PDPA CC and member of RC Presidium of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

43—Najmuddin Kawyani, member of the Central Committee and chairman of the Organisational Setup of PDPA CC.

44—Wasef Bakhtari, member of Presidium of the Central Council of the Union of Writers and Poets of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

# U.S. MILITARY BUILD-UP CAUSES CONCERN

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 23 Dec 80 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text]

The expansion and continuation of the Pentagon's plans to concentrate US military forces in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean is of great concern to the progressive forces and peaceful people all over the country.

Recent reports indicate that the US Defence Secretary Harold Brown has repeatedly declared the Pentagon's intention to continue with its military build up in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean in a move to carry out the United States aggressive plans in this part of the world. These military build-ups are escalated under the pretext of protecting the "vital interests of the United States" in the region.

The United States of America have been monopolising and exploiting the oil and natural wealths of the countries located in the region.

As revealed from the latest speech delivered by the Presidential National Security Advisor Brzezinski the US military build-up covers a large area in an attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of the countries of the region.

The Presence of US military establishments and the growing military strength of the United States have posed a great threat and danger to the freedom, independence and territorial integrity of the independent countries in this part of the world.

The large military assistance extended by the United States to Pakistan and China and the flow of shipments of Chinese arms and military personnel to Pakistan is part of a large military strategy of US imperialism in Asia.

Aside from Persian Gulf the United States is con-

tinuing to enlarge its military bases in Diego Garcia Island.

In an attempt to expand its area of military influence the United States of America has already concluded a military pact with the Sultan of Oman providing for setting up military establishments including airfields. Furthermore, it is [words illegible] that the United States has signed agreements with the governments of

Somalia and Kenya under which the US armed forces would be allowed to use ports and airfields in those countries. The US imperialism has already provided large military assistances to Israel and the Sadat of Egypt has offered his services to the United States in Egypt to carry out its broad aggressive plans in the Middle East.

Washington intends to establish a military as well as political bloc and organisation in the Near and Middle East.

In this bloc all the conservative regimes and states are compelled one way or another to follow the imperialist policy of the United States. Washington is making every effort possible to draw these countries into a military and political

bloc with itself at the head.

The forces of imperialism and its accomplices pay little attention to the freedom, existence, anxiety and concern of the coastal states and the countries of the Near and Middle East over the danger which is going to engulf them by the aggressive military plans drawn up.

Thus the tension is mounting high and the situation is aggravating posing great threat and danger to the security of the region.

The government and people of independent and revolutionary Afghanistan share the concern of other peoples and countries of the region over the grave situation which has been created by the aggressive military plans formulated by the US imperialism.

We think the only way to relaxation of growing tension and to stability of situation in the region is to stop military build-up in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean and cease deploying weapons of mass destruction including nuclear arms and to put an end to intervention in the internal affairs of independent countries of the region.



SOVIET, GOVERNMENT FORCES REPORTED TO BE REPULSED

Karachi DAWN in English 22 Dec 80 p 10

[Text]

PESHAWAR, Dec 21: Herbi Islami Afghanistan reports from Maroof district of Kandhar province that the Soviet from with the support of Karmalites attacked the positions of Mujahideen of Herbi Islami in Hamanda area of Maroof district.

Heavy fighting took place between Mujahideen and the Russians. The forces consisted of 200 tanks and armoured cars. As a result, 200 soldiers were killed and a great number of them were wounded and 20 tanks and armoured cars were destroyed with mines and rocket launchers.

The invading forces were defeated and were pushed back to Kandhar. On way to Kandhar in the Samar Shah area Arghistan district the Russian troops were attacked by the mujahideen again.

As a result 50 Russians, including two officers were killed and 45 of them were wounded seriously. No casualties were reported

on the side of Mujahideen.

The representative of Herbi Islami in Nafah province reports that heavy conflicts happened between Mujahideen and Russian forces. The Russian troops were defeated, two tanks were destroyed and the Mujahideen captured 50 knalashicovs along with 5000 bullets.

The reporter adds that during the conflicts a great number of Russians and Karmalites were killed. This happened on Dec 14 and lasted for four hours.

Reports from Anikhil district of Paktia province say that in a conflict in Tarki Pass nine soldiers were killed and the Karmalites suffered heavy financial losses.

Another guerrilla group of Musa Khil front of Herbi Islami attacked a Russian convoy close to Khost and 25 soldiers were killed and 30 were injured and the Mujahideen captured five trucks along with supplies in the trucks.

—pp[

RELATIONS BETWEEN AFGHAN, SOVIET OFFICERS DETERIORATING

Karachi DAWN in English 30 Dec 80 p 6

[Text]

PESHAWAR, Dec 29: According to reliable information received from across the borders, relations between Soviet and Afghan officers are fast deteriorating due to complete control of Afghan Army and Air Force by the Soviet military personnel.

The Soviets whom Afghan officers admit to be more competent than them hang back in combat areas on the excuse that Afghans are more familiar with the terrain. This has led Afghan officers to believe that the Soviets simply do not want to expose themselves to Mujahideens' attacks as long as they can put Afghans in their place. Their relations are also hampered by poor communications between Soviet and Afghan officers as the Afghan Commanders are made to sign orders without understanding them because the Soviet officers issue orders without any translations. They combat effectiveness of Afghan Air Force has also undergone a dramatic drop due to Soviet control as Afghan pilots make no real attempts to destroy the targets and avoid contacts with Mujahideens.

It is further learnt that the Jalalabad area is being transformed into one of the most powerful So-

viet military bases in the eastern part of the country capable of undertaking extensive and far-reaching ground and air operations. There has been a strong military build-up in Jalalabad where large convoys of Soviet troops, armour and other military equipments continue to reach from Kabul after the visit of three Russian military advisers and a General who reviewed the situation in Jalalabad and assessed its military requirements.

Meanwhile, another incident of Soviet soldiers having attempted to rape the womenfolk of an ex-judge's house during the curfew hours in Kabul city has been reported. This and such other immoral activities of Russian soldiers have been strongly condemned by the Afghan women organization (Barmis-i-Zanan-i-Afghanistan) which distributed "Shabnamas" in Kabul city calling upon the women of Afghanistan to defend themselves against the Russian soldiers and to launch a "Jihad" since the men had left the country and were fighting the Russians in the country-side.

## AFGHANISTAN

### FIGHTING IN PROVINCES, PURGE ATTEMPTS IN ARMY REPORTED

Karachi DAWN in English 25 Dec 80 pp 1, 8

[Text] New Delhi, Dec. 24--Fresh fighting has erupted in Afghanistan's Logar province, south of Kabul, and continued guerillas' resistance has been reported from several other areas, diplomatic sources said here today.

The sources gave no details on the fighting in Logar where last month Afghan troops backed by Soviet forces pounded insurgent hideouts.

Heavy rebel casualties were reported in clashes in Logar and the provinces of Chazni and Wardak last month, the sources said.

They said the Soviets deployed heavy armour in the assault on the guerillas, despite the mountain terrain.

Reliable reports, the sources said, indicated a high level of resistance in the main regional towns of Herat, Kandahar, Mazari-i-Sharif, Jalalabad and Gardez.

The sources said clashes between rebels and Government forces broke out last week in the southern city of Kandahar, and in fighting in Mazari-i-Sharif the airport building was damaged.

In Khanabad in Qunduz province, north of Kabul, guerillas destroyed six tanks, the sources said.

They said a large convoy of over 100 trucks carrying arms and ammunition left Kabul last Sunday and apparently headed towards the east.

Friction was growing in the Afghan Army between supporters of the Parcham (flag) and Khalq (masses) factions of the ruling People's Democratic Party, the sources said.

They said there were attempts to purge the army of influential Khaliqis, hostile to President Babrak Karmal and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

The sources said elements of the 41st Afghan infantry regiment defections and purges had reduced the Afghan Army from 80,000 to about 30,000 men, according to Western estimates.

CSO: 4920

TORTURE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS ALLEGED

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 1 Jan 81 p 8

[Excerpts]

NEW DELHI, Dec. 31: Afghan political prisoners at Pul-i-Charkhi prison near Kabul have alleged they were tortured during interrogations directed by Soviet army officers. Western diplomatic sources reported here today.

The sources quoted an unnamed former prisoner as saying most of the 200 men in his cell showed him wounds they said had been caused by burning cigarettes and live electrodes.

The man was arrested several weeks ago and freed last Saturday.

The sources quoted the man as saying the Soviets did not even bother to hide their presence.

Kabul radio reported the release of 86 political prisoners from Pul-i-Charkhi jail last Saturday which coincided with the first anniversary of President Babrak Karmal's government.

CSO: 4920



RUSSIAN OFFICER REPORTEDLY WOUNDS DEFENSE MINISTER RAFI'

Karachi DAWN in English 25 Dec 80 p 3

[Text]

STOCKHOLM Dec 24: Afghan Defence Minister General Mohammed Rafi was badly wounded a week ago when a Soviet officer fired several shots at him, the Swedish newspaper "Expressen" reported today.

The paper's special correspondent in Kabul, Nina-Maria Lanta, said that according to rumours in Western diplomatic circles and among sources close to the Afghan Government, the General had strongly attacked the Soviet authorities for doing nothing about numerous rapes committed by their troops on Afghan women.

"Expressen" said the Soviet officer fired at the Minister during an inspection last Wednesday at the military airbase at Bagram, near Kabul. General Rafi was taken to the military hospital.—APF.

CSO: 4920

GOVERNMENT TROOPS KILLED, ARMS SEIZED

Karachi DAWN in English 3 Jan 81 p 1

[Text]

QUETTA, Jan. 2: The freedom-fighters had inflicted heavy casualties with 154 deaths on the Russian-backed Afghan Army in various provinces during the past week, and captured a large quantity of arms and ammunition.

According to a Press release of Hezb-e-Islami of Afghanistan (Yomun Khalis Group), Mujahideen attacked a camp of Afghan forces in the area of Tera Kot, in Nangarhar province, and destroyed three tanks. They also captured three light machineguns and four rifles. A Russian commander was killed during this attack.

Mujahideen surprised an Afghan Army headquarters in the area of Khogiani, in Nangarhar province, and destroyed three tanks. They also damaged the building of the headquarters. A Mujahid, Abdullah lost his life, while three others received serious injuries. Fifty Afghan troops were gunned down by the Mujahideen there. The freedom-fighters launched a heavy attack on a camp of Afghan army in the area of Zari, in Paktia province, and captured 140 Afghan troops.

They also seized 12 light machineguns, 40 rifles and 900 magazines. One Mujahid lost his life there. Mujahideen also captured four armoured cars in the same area during an ambush on a convoy.—PPI.

## KARMAL'S AUNT, NIECES REPORTEDLY SHOT

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 27 Dec 80

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Dec. 28 Three relatives of Afghan President Babrak Karmal were among 11 persons killed this month in a gun duel between members of Afghanistan's ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) and guerillas, a well informed Western traveller arriving from Kabul said here today.

An aunt of Mr Karmal and her two daughters as well as eight others were killed in the incident at Bothkak, 12 kms (eight miles) from the Afghan capital on Dec. 15, the traveller said.

He said Mr Karmal's aunt and her daughters were shot shortly before they were planning to leave for Pakistan with the help of her son who had become an anti-government guerilla.

The source said the son, who had previously escaped to Pakistan, returned to Kabul on Dec. 15 to take his family across the border.

But some members of the PDP heard about it and came to prevent them from leaving.

In the ensuing shootout, the aunt, her two daughters and eight others were killed, but the traveller said the son managed to escape.

The source said on the same day at Bothkak, a bus, carrying mainly construction workers,

was stopped by guerillas and four party members in it were killed.

But it was not known whether the two incidents were linked. He said a week earlier heavy machinegun fire was heard in Bothkak for more than an hour. But casualties, if any, were not known.

The traveller said there were also reports of sporadic incidents of fighting between Afghan guerillas and Soviet soldiers in the province.

On Christmas eve a Soviet plane crashed near Khane Sozi near Kabul, and there were reports in the Afghan capital that the plane was shot down by guerillas using rockets, the traveller said. But it was not known what kind of plane it was.

On Dec. 28, many people were killed when guerillas raided a wedding reception in Kabul. Several party members were attending the reception.

But the traveller said according to one report, seven helicopters and 25 tanks were destroyed in a fighting between guerillas and Soviet soldiers in Ghazni province.

Diplomatic sources here said earlier this week that there had been fresh fighting in Logar province adjoining Ghazni. — Reuter.

## POLICE FORCE REPORTED TO BE IN STATE OF UNREST

Karachi DAWN in English 1 Jan 81 p 6

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Dec 31: Unrest has gripped the Afghan police force following the Government's refusal to discharge conscripted policemen, western diplomatic sources reported here today.

The sources said about 100 policemen went on the rampage in Kabul last Monday protesting against forced extensions of their two-year duty tours.

Unarmed men in uniforms streamed out of the governor's compound in central Kabul, storming the Ministry of Information and Culture and a Soviet bookshop, the sources said.

They said police demonstrations also took place in some other parts of the country.

The six-month postponement of discharges also affect the army faced with manpower shortage.

The sources said no fatalities were reported in the rioting by the policemen in the Afghan capital.

But the Press Trust of India (PTI) last night quoted travellers from the city as saying at least three people were killed in shooting by Afghan soldiers.

The Soviet news agency Tass said in a report from Kabul on Monday that Afghan security forces detained a number of "criminal hordes" and subversive elements wearing military uniforms.

Western diplomatic sources in New Delhi reported reliable sources in the Afghan capital as say-

ing Afghan army officers were warned to keep a close eye on possible unrest among their troops.

The officers were reportedly told that soldiers would be informed they must remain on active duty until anti-government guerrillas are defeated.

Purges and defections have reduced the Afghan army from 80,000 to about 30,000 men, and the government last August launched a major conscription drive to boost the strength of the force.

Also ordered to enlist were teachers who had not completed their six years' minimum teaching acceptance period.

Diplomatic sources said hundreds of young men fled the country evading the draft.

The sources said Kabul was quiet but guerrilla activity continued in provinces.

They said Soviet forces suffered heavy casualties in fighting in the strategic Panjshir valley, northeast of Kabul, despite heavy artillery and air support.

The sources said the Soviets were planning a "massive assault" on the valley in the next few days.

However, Acting Afghan Education Minister Anahita Ratebad has said President Babrak Karmal has succeeded in quelling rebel activities and that he is in full control of the situation.

The United News of India quoted Mrs Ratebad as saying in Madras yesterday that only small pockets of resistance still existed.

Mrs Ratebad, who is also a staunch supporter of Mr Karmal, arrived in India two days ago to attend a women's conference.

She also said her government had decided to raise wages of all workers by 30 per cent from tomorrow.

She said the pay hike indicated the progress her country had made since Mr Karmal's government came to power a year ago.

Meanwhile, other Western sources said Afghan political prisoners at Pul-e-Charkhi prison near Kabul have alleged they were tortured during interrogations directed by Soviet army officers.

The sources quoted an unnamed former prisoner as saying most of the 200 men in his cell showed him wounds they said had been caused by burning cigarettes and live electrodes.

The man was arrested several weeks ago and freed last Saturday. The sources did not say why he had been jailed.

Earlier diplomatic reports had said several jailed former government Ministers told relatives they were being treated like common criminals.

The prisoner reported he was questioned by Afghan soldiers, the sources said.

The sources quoted the man as saying the Soviets did not even bother to hide their presence.

Kabul radio reported the release of 88 political prisoners from Pul-e-Charkhi jail last Saturday which coincided with the first anniversary of President Karmal's government.—Reuter/APP.



**MUJAHIDIN ATTACK KUNDUZ JAIL, FREE PRISONERS**

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 22 Dec 80 pp 1, 8

[Text] Peshawar, Dec. 21--According to a report from Kundu province, Mujahideen of the Islamic Alliance destroyed the wall of Kunduz Jail in a guerilla attack on Dec. 14.

They released about 3,000 prisoners from Takhar, Hunduz and Baghlan provinces. In this attack, the Mujahideen captured some arms and ammunitions.

Another report from Kunduz said that heavy fighting took place between the Mujahideen and Russian troops in Shura Khak of Chardara sub-province. More than 200 Russian and Babrak troops were killed by the Mujahideen and 18 persons of the enemy soldiers were captured with their weapons.

Eight Mujahideen were martyred in this conflict.

According to a report from Bamian province, recently a group of 40 robbers who were employed by the Babrak regime to defame the Mujahideen, were captured by the Mujahideen in Fouladi vottage. This gang, under the leadership of Abedin, were robbing people in Fouladi, Tajik, Tibooti and Khumiklak villages and introduced themselves as Mujahideen while committing the crimes.

The Mujahideen took strong action against them and finally captured them. After a trial, they were punished for the crimes they committed.

According to a report from Kunar province, the Russian and Babrak troops launched an attack on Mujahideen positions in Dayunga. After Mujahideen's strong resistance, the enemy troops were forced back and faced a shameful defeat.

The Mujahideen destroyed one tank and killed about 30 of the enemy soldiers.

Two days later the Mujahideen of Dayungal attacked a convoy of Russian troops and destroyed two tanks and killed 20 Russian soldiers. Three Mujahideen were martyred.

### Heavy Fighting

Heavy fighting took place between the Mujahideen and the Russians in Hamdan area of Maroof district, according to a Hezbi Islami report.

The Russian forces consisted of 200 tanks and armoured cars, escorted by eight gunships.

As a result, 200 soldiers were killed and a large number of them wounded. Twenty tanks and armoured cars were destroyed with mines and rocket-launchers.

The Russian forces were defeated and repulsed back to Kandahar. On the way to Kandahar in the Samar [word blurred] area of Afghanistan district, the Russian troops were attacked by the Mujahideen again.

Fifty Russians, including two officers, were killed and 45 of them wounded seriously. No casualties were reported on the side of the Mujahideen.

Reports from Anikhil district of Paktia province said that in a conflict in Tarki Pass, nine soldiers were killed.

Another guerilla group at Musa Khil front of Hezbi Islam attacked a Russian convoy near Khost.

As a result, 25 Russian soldiers were killed and 30 injured. The Mujahideen captured five trucks along with supplies in the trucks.--PPI

CSO: 4920

**MUJAHIDIN REPORT VICTORIES IN BADAKHSHAN, KUNAR**

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 31 Dec 80 p 1

[Text] Peshawar, Dec. 20--According to a reliable report from Badakhshan, Mujahideen of the Badakhshan Alliance for Liberation of Afghanistan had a very heavy fighting with Russian troops in Kesham which lasted for three days.

In this battle Russians were forced to retreat after suffering heavy casualties. Kesham sub-province came under Mujahideen's complete control.

Jalad Khan, the Sub-Governor, was arrested by the Mujahideen and executed after trial.

Mujahideen shot down three Russian helicopters and captured 25 tanks and armoured cars. Russian casualties were high but exact figure is not known. Ten Mujahideen were killed. After this great victory, the Mujahideen appointed new Governor and some other administrators. They attacked Qara Kamar road which connects Faizabad to Takhar and Kundo.

Reports add that recently the Mujahideen had brought Kalfghan district of Takhar province also under their control.

**Kunar**

According to a report from Kunar province, the Mujahideen destroyed two tanks and killed all those inside it when they launched an attack on Russian and Babarak troops on Dec. 12.

Eighty Russians and Babrak troops were killed in this fighting and some weapons and other supplies were captured by the Mujahideen.--PPI

CSO: 4920

## JAPANESE STUDENT RELATES EXPERIENCES WITH MUJAHIDIN

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 27 Dec 80 p 4

[Text]

OTTAWA, Dec. 28. A Japanese student, who spent a month with the Mujahideen in Afghanistan estimates that "the Russians must be suffering 10 casualties a day within Kabul to snipers and knife attacks, and at least 30 a day throughout Afghanistan."

Carrying ammunition and weapons over mountainous terrain, hiding in caves to escape Soviet attack, the 22-year-old Shunji Taoka, a sportsman from Tokyo University, wrote about his experiences in a Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun. A translation of his article has recently been sent to the English papers in North America.

Mr Kudo entered Afghanistan with an Afghan guerrilla, reaching an insurgent base tucked deep in the mountainous ravines of Logar province, 50 km. south of Kabul.

The eleven-man group was led by a 30-year-old former intern at Kabul University Medical School and also included an engineering graduate from the Afghan Institute of Technology.

The supply "convoy" consisted of three mules loaded with 30 rifles, including brand-new AK 47s and SKS carbines, and eight crates of ammunition. Kudo was dressed as a native Hazara youth, an appearance he maintained while with the guerrillas.

The Afghans are fast walkers and have the night vision of infra-red scopes, according to Kudo. They fled through hazardous mountain trails on moonless nights as if it was daylight.

Next day a messenger from the provincial command post of Jamiat-Islami, another Muslim guerrilla group, invited "the Japanese friend" to see some prisoners of war.

According to the explanation given by Kudo, twenty-two Government troops in an armoured personnel carrier and two trucks had been ambushed near the village of Sorhab.

Four were killed and 100 rest were taken prisoners. Although two lieutenants were executed, the enlisted soldiers were treated kindly, and the wounded were receiving medical treatment. "POWs haven't the slightest hesitation about joining the Mujahideen," laughed a guerrilla leader.

## RECONNAISSANCE PROBE

Three days later early in the morning, two Soviet helicopter gunships, an Mi24 and an Mi8, whirled in on a reconnaissance probe. The next day, the guerrillas learned that Soviet forces had left Kabul on a search-and-destroy mission against Sorhab. The guerrilla grapevine was remarkably efficient in spreading the news of an impending Russian attack. About 60 guerrillas deployed in the mountains to wait. The anticipated attack did not occur, but MIG patrol flights continued. Becoming impatient, the Jamiat-Islami guerrillas made a raid into Kabul killed several Russians and returned with 10 AKM rifles and 13 cases of ammunition.

## SOVIET ASSAULT

Later the guerrillas were tipped off of a Soviet assault-scheduled for 8 a.m. the attack began an

hour later than predicted when Russian armoured cars with 76 MM guns began firing into the valley where the guerrillas were holed up. The firing was light, about one round per minute, and even that stopped at 10 a.m. "Russians always take a lunch break," explained a guerrilla.

At 11 a.m., six Mi24 helicopter gunships circled overhead, each firing three salvoes of rockets at ground targets. When they left, another six gunships took their place. The helicopters reportedly attack in a standard pattern.

Some, like the American helicopters in the movie "apocalypse now," swooped down with "katyushas" blaring from loudspeakers. Their rockets, possibly 67 mm anti-tank shells, blasted holes in the dirt walls of farmhouses, but were generally ineffective.

After two o'clock Kudo left his cave shelter and went to the command post for lunch. Over tea the guerrillas boasted they would not let the Russians into their valley. Just then a howitzer shell exploded only 50 meters away. At 5 p.m. the Russian armour withdrew, but artillery fire and gunship attacks continued until 6.30 p.m.

Later that night when Kudo went down to the farmhouse where he had been staying, his host was being treated for gunshot wounds.

The man indicated through his hands that he had killed two Russians. The guerrillas lost 13 in the day's battle and the Soviets reportedly suffered similar casualties.—APP.



## BRIEFS

**AWARDS DISTRIBUTION--**Kabul, Dec. 21 (Bakhtar)--Certificates of the graduates of the 19th batch of the high course for officers were distributed to them in a special ceremony by Lt. Gen. Baba Jan, chief of General Staff of the Ministry of National Defence and Maj. Gen Gul Aqa, President of the political affairs of the DRA armed forces, yesterday. Following DRA national anthem, addressing the audience, Lt. Gen. Baba Jan said: "The present revolutionary conditions in our country require mobilization of all combatant patriots in a single and united front under the leadership of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan to crush the last resistance of the counter-revolutionaries and providing peaceful condition for building a new and equitable society. The decisions of the 3rd and 4th Plenum of PDPAAC, for ensuring such conditions society. [Excerpt] (Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 21 Dec 80 p 4)

**REPATRIATES RETURN--**Herat, Dec. 30 (Bakhtar)--3804 tormented compatriots have returned via Islam Qala over last days. They had abandoned their dwellings as a result of oppressive and despotic rule of Hafizullah Amin, the traitor, and his band of criminals. On return they were warmly welcomed by officers and soldiers of Islam Qala Frontier Forces. Bakhtar correspondent adds that the returnees expressed support for the policy of the party and government of the DRA readiness to defend the independence and freedom of their homeland and gains of Saur Revolution, especially its new evolutionary phase. According to another report, 84 families of our working people who had left the country on the same reasons returned to Nangarhar and Laghman provinces via Turkham. According to another report 300 of these tormented people repatriated via Islam Qala recently. On their return they were welcomed by officers and soldiers of the Frontier Force amid revolutionary remarks. [Text] (Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 30 Dec 80 p 1)

**MUJAHIDIN CLAIM CONTROL--**Lahore, Dec 23--Ayatollah Sheikh Mohammad Asif Mohsini, leader of Harkat-i-Islami, Afghanistan, today said that an Islamic Government could be established in Afghanistan within a week if the Soviet Union decided to withdraw its armed forces. Addressing a Press conference here, he said that at present 70 percent of the area in Afghanistan was under the control of Mujahideen, who were putting up tough resistance against the Russian troops in Afghanistan. Ayatollah Mohsini, who also represented the Afghan refugees at the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference at Islamabad, said that a very large number of Muslims, including men, women and children, had been killed since the external aggression. [Text] (Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 24 Dec 80 p 8)

## BRIEFS

**DRYDOCK DIVERSIFICATION**--Bahrain will attempt to improve its financial position by using workshop space in the country's drydock to produce steel, according to the Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard Company (ASRY), which is in charge of the drydock project. The workshops will produce steel for sale in Gulf countries building desalination plants. The ASRY drydock, which is owned jointly by the members of the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), has yet to make a profit since it opened three years ago. The 500,000 dwt drydock was designed chiefly to promote Arab economic cooperation and self-reliance in oil-related industries. The drydock's workshops normally make steel for repairing tankers. Now, the ASRY facilities could also supply a number of companies bidding for the Bahrain-Saudi Arabia causeway, an OAPEC official stated last week. The number of Arab tankers repaired at the Bahrain drydock rose to 20 per cent of total repairs this year, from 10 per cent last year, and a further rise is expected, the official added. Earlier this year, the drydock's General Manager had warned that the situation in Iran was causing a drop in custom, with ships preferring to dock into other repair yards because of the high insurance premiums demanded by Lloyd's, after declaring the area a war zone. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 8 Dec 80 p 2]

CSO: 4820

## MUSLIM 'INFERIORITY COMPLEX' DISCUSSED

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 22 Dec 80 p 2

[Editorial by M.A. Munjee: "The Inferiorty Complex"]

[Text]

In a couple of past editorials, we have referred to the destructive consequences of the inferiority complex among Muslims. It is time to deal with this sensitive, perhaps controversial subject as a central issue now. As one of the most self-destructive traits among Muslims, to which so many of our continuing problems can be traced, it deserves at least that much attention.

As in other exploited societies, the inferiority complex in the Muslim world is an affliction that is not the result of the victims own doing. In the early years of Islam, it is possible that some segments may have been highly impressed, by the blonde and the blue-eyed, but as many Muslims shared the Caucasian appearance, it is unlikely to have been pronounced or very prevalent. It was an era, for one thing, when Muslims were the civilized societies, not Europeans. Importantly, Islam stressed the equality of all colors and appearances, and Muslims had taken this as seriously as it should be.

The inferiority complex has taken hold over the centuries because of Western distortions and ridicule of our religion and of Muslim societies and customs. It began early, when many European leaders saw the benefits of unifying warring European tribes under the banner of the "crusades" by all kinds of wild distortive propaganda against Islam and the Muslims.

Through the ensuing centuries, as economic prosperity and leadership in "secular" learning moved to the West, this "tradition" grew bolder for reasons only incidentally related to religion. Soon, the Western public indoctrinated in and convinced of its own superiority, projected it, and the increasingly impoverished and exploited Muslims turned subservient. The era of Zionist media domination, especially the enormous power of the visual media — movies and TV — has taken it all to blatant heights as we know all too well. Aside from the obvious Zionist gains from all this, there has been the additional profits angle for Western media from it — studies have always shown

that a public glorified and made to feel superior to the foreign "they" is not only soothed and less likely to revolt against the oppressions of its own power structure, but in that glorified frame of mind, absorbs advertising messages better and is more likely to buy advertised products.

How does this inferiority complex, now so deeply ingrained, affect us? It is one of those diseases that we have to think, talk or write about, no doubt wishing that it will go away if we simply conceal it behind a show of bravado. As a result we seldom consider the extent of its destructive characteristics. It is for instance a manifestation of the inferiority complex that makes some of us ape the West in every way, to indiscriminately criticize whatever we can in an Islamic society, and end up, often, moving away from Islam. But it is also the same complex that can make some others among us resent everything Western simply because it is Western, or now part of the West. It makes some of us feel and act inferior to every Westerner but it can make some others among us — consciously or unconsciously — hide it by bombastic behavior towards every Westerner. It is from this complex that some might feel that everything in Western education is the best there is and others go the other extreme and feel that what one does not know is not necessary to know.

It is from ego repression through this complex that when the opportunity is available, we can become intoxicated with a modicum of fame or power. It makes some willing to learn from Americans or Europeans but refuse to accept superior qualities in someone of our own kind. It breeds extreme jealousies amongst us towards one another. It makes us feel that others of our kind are more worthy than ourselves of the West's contempt. (and therefore of our contempt too), it is from this syndrome that group and national prejudices among Muslim countries have gained momentum and it is this complex that has made so many Muslim leaders easy prey so frequently to Western exploiters, frustrating all attempts at Muslim solidarity. We know how critical such solidarity is — as Imam Khomeini has said, if there was such solidarity, no superpower could harm us, no matter how hard they tried.

This is by no means to underestimate the reality of our other problems in a Zionist dominated world, nor to conveniently make this complex the cause of our individual vices and excesses. But it is critical in the Islamic revolution to be brutally honest and aware of the evils that this disease has meant for the Muslim world. By now, its tentacles have spread in many unrecognized directions, and it will take a long time for it to be eradicated.

The Islamic Revolution itself has been a great boost in the right direction. The Islamic renaissance that we are living in, the growing pride and awareness of facts in world issues, these are the best trends for the eradication of the disease. But they will not go away magically, especially if we do not learn to



in our self-appraisal. The rest must come from better education and an uplift of the masses generally, a deeper understanding of the facts of history, of contemporary issues, from a wider awareness of the seamier side of Western "culture" and "civilization", which will help reduce — if not nullify — the skilled, glamorous presentation of the West about itself. True, all-embracing faith undoubtedly helps the most — the classic example is that of the Imam himself of course. From the first interview with Western media in Paris, his unpretentious manner and style have made the interviewers feel inferior, without any attempt on his part to make them feel so. Perhaps that comes from being at a spiritual level we cannot hope to achieve but it does prove the point.

For the rest of us, perhaps the hardest thing in the world is to admit even to ourselves that the disease does exist in us and to understand just how it affects our attitudes and behavior.

CSO: 4920

# IRAN, IRAQ OPPOSED ON OPEC POLICY

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 22 Dec 80 p 2

[Text] Tehran, Dec. 21, (Pars)

The Iranian delegation to the OPEC Conference in Bali gave a press conference in Tehran yesterday. Hassan Sadat, the head of the Iranian delegation after giving details of the way they put forth the issues of the kidnapping of the Iranian Oil Minister Mohammad Javad Tondguyan, and taking his picture inside the conference hall, talked about the reactions of the Iraqi delegation in this regard.

Mr. Sadat said, after bringing up the issue of Tondguyan and also stating the realities of the imposed war by Iraq upon Iran, the atmosphere of the conference changed to the advantage of Iran. The influence of these issues on the participants was such that most of the members present in Bali took out the earphones from their ears refusing to listen to a speech delivered by the head of the Iraqi delegation. This kind of encounter resulted in passivity for the Iraqi delegation and shades of shame were visible in the faces of each of the Iraqi members. He added that the faith and coolness of the Iranian delegation, in sharp contrast to the embarrassment and the fury the Iraqi delegation vividly indicated the stands of the two sides. Mr. Sadat added that

they had two goals in putting forth the issue of Mr. Tondguyan, first to show the legitimacy of Iran in its demands and secondly, to disclose the crimes of the satrap regime of Iraq. Thanks to God, they succeeded in both cases, he stressed.

Asked in what ways an agreement on the oil price reached by the OPEC Conference would affect the oil prices in Iran, Sadat replied, "The non-progressive camp has proposed \$32 for each barrel while the progressive side suggested \$36. However, it was decided that north African countries sell it at \$41 per barrel. Following this agreement a committee has been set up by the Oil Ministry to decide a new price for oil which would be imposed as of January 1st, 1981."

Referring to the Iranian oil export, he said that Iran has considered some privileges in its oil exports. In the first stage, the Iranian oil would be exported to the countries which had helped Iran during the war, secondly those who have helped Iran during the economic sanctions, thirdly, those who have cooperated with Iran after the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

In reply to another question on the stoppage of Iraqi oil exports, he said that Iraq's claims for exporting oil at one million bpd was a mere exaggeration and that Iraq could not export crude oil through the Persian Gulf. The Iraqi exports via oil pipelines have also been halted, he said.

Replying to a question about the Iranian oil exports, he said that Iran looked at oil as a political and economic issue and that it should be utilised for the high goals of the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Another main subject concerns the country's economy which should be transformed from the present mono-dimensional nature into a multi-dimensional one.

Referring to the repair of the refineries which have been damaged during the war, Sadat said planning had been done in order to repair them immediately after the end of the imposed war by Iraq upon Iran.

He also said that the price of the household gas had been calculated according to the area of the private houses. However, the price of gas has not been increased by ten times, he stressed.

# LABOR MINISTRY FORMULATES JOB CLASSIFICATION PLAN

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 23 Dec 80 p 2

[Text]

TEHRAN, Dec. 21, (Pars) — Several thousands of white color and blue color jobs are being classified under the supervision of the Iranian Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs in a bid to ensure better and more equitable pays to tens of thousands of workers throughout the country.

In an interview given by the Iranian Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, Dr. Bahman Zolfagharpur, in Tehran yesterday said that in the new revised job classification scheme such objectives as equitable pay to the workers, the elimination of discriminations, and compensatory benefits according to the number of the dependents of each worker would also be taken into consideration in addition to the more conventional factors.

He said that efforts were being taken to make the new job classification system a source for encouraging the less skilled workers to improve their skill by learning more. He added the conventional pay systems in Iran have been based on yearly salary increases in accordance with the inflation rate whereas this system

should be abandoned in favor of a more solid system wherein the inflation rate is fully controlled.

The Iranian Minister noted that the consumer price of more than 60 items would also be observed in formulating the pay setting system.

## MINISTER ANNOUNCES NEW ROAD CONSTRUCTION

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 22 Dec 80 p 2

[Text]

ISFAHAN, Dec 20 (Parv) — Mr. Mousa Kalantari, the Minister of Roads and Transportation, arrived in Isfahan this morning to participate in the two-day seminar held by the directors-general of road and transportation departments from all over Iran. After attending the first session of the seminar as well as the Islamic Association of the Employees of road and transportation offices of Isfahan Province, the Minister inspected various parts of the department, particularly the technical and repair workshops. He told the employees of the workshops, who were repairing machinery and making spare parts, that the question of self-sufficiency was not merely a slogan and every means should be provided for that purpose.

In response to a worker who had requested that another workshop be set up at the side of the existing ones, the Minister said, the government would not place any obstacles in the way of those who submit projects for commis-

sioning of workshops, they will even be supported. He took part in the unity prayer held by the employees and directors-general of the road and transportation departments throughout the country.

The minister declared, "20,000 kilometers of roads have been built during the last 2 years, and this activity is to proceed at full speed. Special priority is given to rural roads, efforts will be made in this direction to meet a small portion of the people's requirements."

As regards the question of self-sufficiency from the point of view of manpower and equipment as well as activities in war-stricken areas, the Minister said, "In the war-stricken areas, we are more engaged in transportation of army equipment, trench digging, and water canals more than in road building. Many temporary roads have been built, but it is not possible to build main roads under war conditions."



## BRIEFS

**VISA FORGERS ARRESTED--Tehran--**An Islamic Committee yesterday said it smashed a gang of Indians and Pakistanis in Tehran and arrested most of those who forged visas and passports and stayed illegally in the country with forged residence visas. Hojjatolislam Sayyed Hadi Tabatabai Qomi yesterday told the Pars that 30 persons were arrested after some person tipped off Committee 9 of the underground activities of the gang. Qomi, who heads headquarters 5 of the Committee, said 2 main gang leaders identified as only Golfaraz and Hassan Passdar known as Hassan Koochik were detained and two other leaders identified only as Iqbal and Ramzan have fled and the authorities were after them. [Text] [Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 15 Dec 80 p 3]

**IRAQI SUNNIS VISIT PRELATE--Tehran (Pars)--**A group of Sunni clergymen from the Kurdistan area of Iraq met and conferred with Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Baqer Hakim yesterday. During the meeting they discussed imperialist plots aimed at creating discord and disunity between Shi'a and Sunnis. Ayatollah Hakim stressed that the infidels were engaged in acts of sabotage in the Islamic countries where people worshipped one God and followed the teachings of the Prophet Mohammad. The imperialist countries were working hand in hand engineering plots for the destruction of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, and sought to gain their objectives by using economic sanctions against the Moslems, he said. Having failed in their previous plots, they had resorted to employing their lackey, the infidel Saddam, to attack the Islamic Republic of Iran. These infidels, the Ayatollah said, had brutally bombed mosques, hospitals and even children's nurseries. [Text] [Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 15 Dec 80 p 1]

**WAR ORPHANS FOR ADOPTION--Tehran--**The children orphaned as a direct result of the Iran-Iraq war can be adopted by childless, sympathetic or capable families. The head of the University Students Mobilization Headquarters told yesterday in an interview with the Voice and Vision of Islamic Republic that the children without guardians are being delivered to the Headquarters through the concerned organizations. The official said there was no "hurry" to pass on the orphans to their new guardians and only those persons with moral and financial capability will be investigated and considered for delivery of the parentless children. [Text] [Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 15 Dec 80 p 2]

**PRISON INVESTIGATOR ELECTED--Tehran (Pars)--**The Islamic Consultative Majlis in its closed session presided over by vice Speaker Ali Akbar Parvaresh yesterday studied "reports from the war stricken areas." The session was followed by an open session to elect a representative of the legislative to the committee to

investigate the conditions of the prisons and deputy Ali Mohammad Besharati Jahromi was elected to that position. The committee was formed on the orders of the Founder of the Islamic Republic Imam Khomeini, to study conditions in the prisons and to investigate the "rumor" that torture was still practised. Imam had Friday appointed Hojjatoleslam Mohammad Montazeri as his representative in the committee to ensure greater confidence in the torture probes. Mohammad Montazeri is the son of Qom's Friday prayers leader and Imam's representative, Ayatullah Husseinali Montazeri. [Text] [Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 15 Dec 80 p 2]

ABADEH ELECTRICITY NETWORK--The electricity network of Abadeh, during the last two months has completed the supply of electricity for sixteen villages in the vicinity of this township. The people of these villages are now benefiting from electricity. These villages are: Ali Abad, Ya'qub Abad, Firouzi, Dah Balan, Joosh Ghan, Sa'adat Abad, Mehdi Abad, Najaf Abad, Amir Abad, Dad Nejan, Shirin Abad, Dincheh Khair, Ganantoo, Chupoun, and Boushahr Mian. [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 23 Dec 80 p 4]

KURDISH TELEGRAM TO MONTAZERI--Sanandaj, Dec. 21 (Pars)--The Kurdish Ulama of Marivan in Kurdistan Province in a telegram to the country's prominent religious leader, Ayatollah Montazeri asked him to continue his supervision over the religious affairs of the city, including the establishment of an Islamic University in Kurdistan. [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 23 Dec 80 p 4]

CONDOLENCES TO TABRIZ CLERIC--Tehran, Dec. 22 (Pars)--On the occasion of the passing away of Hojjatoleslam Seyyed Hassan Angaji, the prominent religious leader of Tabriz, East Azarbaijan Province, the leader of the Revolution and Founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Imam Khomeini sent a telegram to Hojjatoleslam Seyyed Mohammad Ali Angaji expressing his condolences to him, his family as well as the religious community and people of Azarbaijan. [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 23 Dec 80 p 2]

ZOROASTRIAN CEREMONIES--Tehran, Dec. 20 (Pars)--The anniversary of the death of the Iranian prophet Hazrat Zoroaster (6th Century B. C.), founder of Zoroastrianism will be commemorated with special religious ceremonies, reported the Zoroastrian Association of Iran. The ceremonies will commence at 9 a. m. Friday, December 26, 1980 at Khosrani Hall, Mirza Kuchek Khan Street. A similar program will also be held at Qasre Piroze in the afternoon. [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 23 Dec 80 p 2]

LITERACY MOVEMENT PRAISED--Tehran, Dec. 21, Pars--On the eve of the first anniversary of the formation of the Literacy Movement, the Head of the Movement, Dr. Salavati explained the measures taken and programs carried out by the movement during one year. He said that following the instructions issued by Imam Khomeini on December 28th 1979 the faithful and responsible people and the devoted clergy sincerely cooperated with the movement in holding classes, and the activities continued mostly with the people's help. He added that over 200,000 people have benefited from the facilities provided by the movement during the past 8 months. He called on all the people to cooperate with the organization since there were 13 million illiterate people throughout the country. [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 22 Dec 80 p 4]

EXPANSION OF UNIVERSITIES--Tehran, Dec. 22 (Pars)--The Minister of Education Dr. Mohammad Javad Bahonar in an interview with the Arabic Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran yesterday said it had been decided that all universities and higher educational institutes and a number of faculties that provide courses in literature, and philosophy should be expanded and cooperate closely with the Ministry of

Education. He added that they would try to have about 30,000 to 40,000 students take teachers training courses. Referring to military training in schools, the Minister said it was welcomed by the schools, and that it had been reported that a number of high-school students and teachers were now fighting the enemy at the front. [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 23 Dec 80 p 2]

POWER FOR BORUJERD AREA--The work for the supply of electricity to the villages in the vicinity of Borujerd has been completed by the Construction Crusade in this town. The villages benefiting from the project are: Rahim Abad, Velancho, Sial, Pahlavan Kol, Cholan and Dah Sheikh Khan. [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 23 Dec 80 p 4]

LOANS FOR HARVESTING--In order to help the fall harvesting and expenses of the region's farmers, 1,800 million rials in loans have been extended to the villages of Western Azarbaijan by the rural cooperative department in the province. [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 23 Dec 80 p 4]

AUTOMATIC TELEPHONE NETWORK--The utilization of the automatic telephone network in Basmenj has started. The telephone network will allow the people of Basmenj to establish direct contact with the entire country. [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 23 Dec 80 p 4]

COTTON HARVEST--The Public Relations office of the Ministry of Agriculture announced that 136 thousand tons of cotton have been harvested throughout the country. Of this figure, 75 thousand tons were harvested in Gorgan and Gonbad. The Public Relations office added that the 36 plants for processing cotton have received 100 thousand tons of cotton, of which 74 thousand tons were forwarded to plants in Gorgan and Gonbad. [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 23 Dec 80 p 4]

GAS FOR HOSPITAL--At a ceremony, with the presence of Hojjatoleslam Tabassi and the director of Mashad University, the utilization of natural gas supply for Imam Reza Medical Center began. The project cost 10 million rials. With the utilization of this project, 1,000 kilograms of liquid gas, 270 thousand liters of gas oil and 12 thousand liters of kerosene will be economized. [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 22 Dec 80 p 4]

WATER PIPELINE FOR VILLAGES--The work for pipe laying and drinking water supply for the villages of Hossein Bag and Kindelak has been completed by the Ministry of Health in Eastern Azarbaijan Province. The budget for these projects consisted of 50 million rials, provided with government credits and donations by the villagers. Also two public baths in villages of Diza] Aliah and Ahmad Abad have been constructed by the Health Ministry of this province. [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 22 Dec 80 p 4]

LOANS FOR ANIMAL BREEDERS--The director of the rural cooperative department in the Province of Isfahan stated that during the current year, 9 tribal companies with a staff of 3,219 workers and a budget of 9,548,000 rials have been formed in the province. 100 million rials in loans have been considered in order to aid the animal breeders. He added that out of the nine companies, six have been formed in Samiran and the other three in Faridan. [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 23 Dec 80 p 4]

**CONSTRUCTION CRUSADE AID**--The activities of the medical and first-aid department of the Construction Crusade in the last six months have been: 78 villages in the vicinity of Salmas have benefited from medical and first-aid treatment, 667 patients have been checked and referred to doctors, 159 patients have been sent to hospitals in Urumieh, Khoy, Tabriz and Tehran, check-ups for 1,039 pupils and 1,047 people in the villages, availability of first-aid treatment for twenty village schools and the construction of 35 drinking water reservoirs. Members of the medical and first-aid department of the Construction Crusade in Salmas have provided 9 families with water, 17 families with electricity, 645 kilograms of rice, 470 kilograms of cooking oil, 210 kilograms of dates, 18 kilos of sugar, 490 kilograms of flour and 78,500 rials in cash among the people of Salmas. [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 22 Dec 80 p 4]

**TORTURE PROBE**--The Torture Probe Commission, comprising Messrs Sheikh Mohammad Montazeri, Dadgar, A'bedi, Alimohammad Basharat and Dr Eftekhari Jahromi visited Evin Prison for seven hours and discussed the matter of torture with each prisoner, it was reported in the third announcement of the Commission. The announcement further added that a comprehensive report on their different visits to the prisons of Iran and the complaints received on the subject would be presented to the leader of the Islamic Revolution, Imam Khomeini. [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 22 Dec 80 p 2]

**SUPPORT FROM INDIAN SHI'ITES**--In a letter to the Office of the Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran in New Delhi, the Shi'ite Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir have announced their preparedness to sacrifice their lives for the cause of the Islamic Revolution led by Imam Khomeini. The letter said, "...No doubt, by the grace of God, Iran is enjoying more peace, order and security in comparison to other warstricken countries, but the world should know that lives and properties that we Shi'ite Muslims possess are at the disposal of our beloved leader, Imam Khomeini... Meanwhile we impatiently await the permission of our Great Leader Imam Khomeini to participate in the war against the pseudo-Muslim infidels and thus to fulfill one of our wishes, that is, the annihilation of the satrap Ba'athist regime of Iraq or martyrdom for the cause of Allah..." [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 13 Dec 80 p 2]

**PAKISTAN RELIEF FUND**--Reports received here from Pakistan indicate that since Iraq's aggression against the Islamic country of Iran, the people of Baltistan in northern Pakistan, are praying for Iran's victory. These deprived people who live very simply, have donated whatever they had to the war-stricken Iranians who will certainly never forget the aid of their Muslim brothers. Also, children of a family in Pakistan have contributed \$1,000 towards the Relief Fund for the war-stricken people, and have expressed that thousands of Pakistanis are willing to sacrifice their lives in the war against the infidel Iraqis. In another report, Iranians living in Holland have donated 33 kg. of medicine for the war injured persons. Other donations are ten ambulances and 800 blankets from Qatar and 8,000 Qatar rials from Doha. [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 23 Dec 80 p 2]

**AID FOR WAR VICTIMS**--The Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran (Majlis) yesterday agreed to take up a bill for coordinating aid to the war-victims with a double



urgency clause. The bill says there are several aid centres for the war-stricken which might create disorder. A commission should therefore be formed to supervise the aid. The commission will be composed of a representative appointed by the Imam, a Cabinet Minister, a representative of the Moutawafin Foundation, one from the Martyrs Foundation, one from the Reconstruction Crusade, one from the Red Crescent, and two from the Majlis (one from the south and the other from west Iran). The commission will collect donations and deposit them in a special account to deal with the problems of the war stricken areas, and supervise the activities of all other institutions working in this field. [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 23 Dec 80 p 2]

EX-MINISTER ON TRIAL--The Revolutionary Court of the Islamic Republic of Iran announced in a statement yesterday that the court is investigating the charges brought against Dr Rostam Pirasteh, a former Managing Director of the International Bank, and Minister of Economic and Financial Affairs during Shahpour Bakhtiar's cabinet (the last Prime Minister in the former regime). The court called on all the people who had any complaints against him to refer to the court. [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 22 Dec 80 p 2]

AFGHAN MARTYRED IN WAR--The body of one of our Afghan brothers, martyred in the fight against the Iraqi infidels on the Ilam front on Friday evening, was buried yesterday, and thousands of the people of Ilam attended his funeral. The Afghan, Hossein Nazaer, had recently volunteered to fight against Iraq. [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 23 Dec 80 p 2]

LOANS FOR COOPERATIVES--The Agricultural Bank in Zabol, from the beginning of the current year up to the end of Aban, has extended 840 million rials in loans to the cooperative stores of this township. This figure represents a 60 million rials increase in comparison to figures for the same period last year. During this time another 350 million rials in loans, for the purchase of tractors, orchard farming and other agricultural machinery, have been extended to the farmers of Zabol. [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 22 Dec 80 p 4]



## COMMENTARY ON ANNIVERSARY OF BALFOUR DECLARATION

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 3 Nov 80 p 1

[Text] Sixty three years ago the British foreign minister announced his infamous promise to the International Zionist Movement for the creation of a racial state for them in Palestine. The Zionist Movement had already taken advantage of this promise as a cover for consolidating its emigration and colonization efforts as much as it was possible. With the assistance of the great colonial powers in making its colonial creation a reality the UN was led to approve the declaration of the resolution to partition Palestine in 1948. It was a resolution that was tantamount to a preparatory step for announcing officially the creation of the Zionist state in May 1948. It is without a doubt that the Balfour declaration and the measures and plots that succeeded it were part of a comprehensive colonial plan which aimed at dividing the Arab homeland and ruining the national liberation movement that was nascent there.

The consequences of this infamous plan still afflict the Arab nation in every venue; especially by the reality of the partition, the artificial borders, and the political, economic and geographical disruption it has caused. Today when we recall this infamous promise we see it in the light of its being a link in a chain of Zionist colonialist designs meant to challenge the will of the Arab nation. The Arab peoples and their progressive revolutionary movement must break the results of this initial link of the chain and all of the following links, such as the Camp David accords, the al-Sadat-Zionist peace treaty, and all such conspiratorial, capitulatory acts of treachery: acts which aimed to derail Arab national unity and its continuous struggle to fully realize the noble humane goals of that unity. This infamous memory must be transformed into a nationalist and national incentive to defend Arab sovereignty and the national soil, to convict and lay bare all capitulating powers regimes and agency that propagates capitulation. Likewise it should be the suitable occasion to call on all honorable Arab powers to unite their ranks and their abilities, to raise into being and into common action, in every field, in preparation for the day of the complete liberation of every inch of this despoiled Arab land. Saddam's own al-Qadisiya [Note: the battle in 635 A.D. in Iraq where the Arabs defeated the Sasanian Persian army], which has been enjoined by the soldiers of Saddam Husayn, Iraq and the Ba'th in bloody heroic fights on the eastern flank of the Arab homeland, is the greatest proof that will, resolution, might, and faith are the most direct, most preferable roads toward achieving truth and retrieving the land, driving out the invader and opposing their plots, intrigues, and treacherous schemes against Arab land and national aspirations. The liberation of Iraq and the triumph over the racist Persian is the natural prelude to the liberation of Palestine and the triumph over the racist Zionist. The sacred road of Saddam is the road toward liberation of Jerusalem and every inch of our despoiled Arab land. Forward march!...

## VOTER INDECISIVENESS ANALYZED

Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 7 Oct 80 p 3

[Article by Dov Bar-Niv: "How is the Alignment Preferable"]

[Text] Let's not deny it: the nation is in a state of distress and depression. Still, all public opinion polsters show us the same paradox: 40 percent of the sample (some say 50 percent) haven't completely turned their backs on the present government, don't spontaneously support the opposition's calls, have not decided how they will vote in the coming elections. What is the reason for this indecisiveness?

The answer is obvious: the extreme, terrible isolation of Israel among the nations, to the point of its being threatened with expulsion from the United Nations; inflation so rampant that we are faced with national economic collapse; the disgrace of emigration of native born Israelis seeking new homelands; the curse of the high drop-out rate of Russian immigrants to Israel; widespread revelations of bribery and corruption; crimes and organized crime. There are calls for strong government intervention, for change, for fighting these trends and for first class leadership. Why has this 40 percent stopped at the crossroads. Why don't they rise up against the Likud regime?

Until we solve this riddle our explanation won't solve anything. Of course, the Alignment still has to regain the public's confidence, but this doesn't explain the fact that the Likud hasn't been discredited by the people. It seems to me that the reason for this lies in the depression itself, the feeling of gloom which has overcome the people. Many ascribe our terrible situation to "acts of God," to objective factors which cannot be altered: we are isolated because the world conspires against us, because of oil, because of continuing anti-semitism. We are being choked by inflation because of our tremendous national debt, because defense expenditures are beyond our means, because immigrant absorption is sapping our strength. As to emigration, drop-outs, bribery and corruption, they are caused by human refuse, the "dregs" about which Yitzhaq Rabin once spoke at length. In short, if all these things are in God's hands (or as we say today, are objective criteria) and beyond human control, of what help could it be if the Alignment replaced the Likud? Thus, this (temporary) situation, where large numbers of people are uncommitted, is deeply perplexing because it frees the Likud government from its historical responsibility. Again the question becomes: How can we explain this situation, start to melt this iceberg and use it to our advantage.

If our explanation is to succeed, we must be armed and ready with answers to the questions regularly asked: What do you offer? This applies both to internal and foreign policy, according to degree either is emphasized by the public or the Likud propaganda strategists themselves. If we falter, if our answers are unclear or ambiguous, we will disappoint those who listen. Whichever way, either we offer an alternative or we don't. It is on this basis that we will be judged. If we don't offer any change, what advantage is there in the Alignment over the Likud?

Let us begin with foreign policy, which is not a problem for experts, but rather concerns large segments of the population and affects their very existence. Everyone realizes that the autonomy plan is reaching a dead end, that the Palestinians detest the plan, that the gap between Israel and Egypt remains unchanged. One might ask: What is your alternative? Let it be forgotten: This alternative must be concrete. It must take into consideration that Hussein, the Palestinians and the future Alignment government under the Labor Party all have declared positions, interests and limitations. Are we ready to up-date our political positions so that we will have realistic possibilities and make real progress? Since 1967 we have assumed that the territories were a trump card for obtaining a secure peace. We have been waiting, but, in light of our international situation, which may be aptly described as "suffocating," we must realize that time is running out and that we must relinquish Palestinian population capture within a fixed period of time and with fixed security arrangements. We must free ourselves of this Palestinian problem. A new interpretation of the so-called "Jordanian option" must be made: It is correct to assume that we have no common platform with King Husayn, neither as regards a permanent peace nor lasting boundaries between the two countries. Despite this, the possibility of another agreement with him must be thoroughly investigated. An agreement which, unfortunately, still won't be a permanent solution but which will offer security and guarantee non-belligerency between us, will free us of the 1.2 million Palestinians who have become a heavy burden and are the foremost cause of our suffocating isolation among the nations.

Let it be noted that I am not proposing a miracle-cure for a prolonged conflict. Still, we must harness all of our intelligence in order to find a political solution. Firstly, we must prepare a more convincing answer to the question: What do you propose?

The same holds true as regards our economic situation: Some time ago an aid of Francois Mitterand, leader of the French Socialist Party, visited Israel. [Ataly], the name of the young activist who is regarded as an economic prodigy in his country, said on our radio network that the galloping inflation weakening us is not an act of God: It is symptomatic of underdeveloped economies in South America in which an oppressive bourgeoisie, decorated with the plumes of "neo-liberalism," makes huge profits in a modernized economic jungle. In his opinion, there would be no great difficulty inherent in Israel's return to a more or less "normal" rate of inflation, perhaps a bit higher than the rates common in Western Europe. Moreover, in a poor country such redirection requires faithful control over the nation's wealth, a planned economy, equal sacrifice, a productive policy and exports. In brief, not rationing, heaven forbid, but not stock exchange fever or a paradise for black market capital either. Here too, we are summoned to clear and convincing actualization. All of our economic brains must be joined together in this endeavor: How can it be

stated in clear terms to the people, many of whom have been caught in the temptations of "liberalism," that inflation can be slowed while maintaining reasonable profits, wage differentials and most important, adopting measures which the public can endure.

There is some disagreement about the "DAHAF"-Prize slogan: "To Save the Country." Some regard it as a manifestation of the prevailing mood, entirely pessimistic, even defeatist. I myself would alter the slogan to read: "To Save the Country From the Likud." Still, the question is posed: Are we being mournful and thereby also spreading despair, or rather, even if our criticism remains piercing, will it lead to a brighter future? It appears to me that the two must be combined. It is a fact that this country must not be "normal," with the whole Pandora's box of crime that goes along with "normalcy," so long as it is still in a stage of material and human building. Israel will not attract immigrants and will not enchant its citizens by just being there, or by its tenuous standard of living. Israel will prosper only if it ennobles its children and Diaspora Jewry spiritually. Israel must bind itself to concrete utopia and must excite the imagination, draw itself a plan of humane brotherhood, social reform capable of serving as an example and a marvel for other nations. In short, we must offer the Israeli voter a future society of beauty and justice. Many elements are already in our grasp: industrial democracy, community democracy, an affluent society with solutions to problems of education, ethnic mixing, housing, cooperative life styles, geographic dispersal for higher quality of life in the beautiful landscape of our country. We must get out of this distress and take advantage of the dormant potential of the good will and pioneering spirit in the hearts of many among us.

In brief: Think-tanks should be started to deal with the cardinal issue: how we explain our positions.

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CSO: 4805



## REPUBLIC VICTORY SEEN ADVANTAGEOUS TO LABOR PARTY POLICY

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 7 Nov 90 pp 13, 20

[Article by Daniel Block: "No Reason for a Party"]

[Text] Menahem Begin derived deep pleasure and praised democracy in action. "Many millions of citizens go out, cast a ballot, and say to the resident in the White House: You have to leave, and someone else will replace you." Begin also believes that the president-elect will keep all his promises on the Israeli issue... Begin's words were not said the day before yesterday but 4 years ago when Jimmy Carter evicted Gerald Ford from the White House. Begin's reaction at that time expressed a wish (which was fulfilled several months later). Today he would probably not repeat these comments for fear of an evil eye.

There is more than a little similarity between Israel's situation then and today. Except for the then Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin and most of his ministers, most of the Israelis were opposed to Ford's administration and his secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, and they hoped for the best from the replacement of the Ford administration by the Carter administration. Jimmy Carter himself made many promises to Israel, and Menahem Begin, Arik Sharon, and Moshe Dayan were enthusiastic about his election. Sharon and Dayan did not hesitate to criticize Rabin sharply for his sympathy for Ford. Sharon, who met with Carter during his election campaign (as Ezer Weizman did in this campaign), claimed that the Ford administration changed the State of Israel "from an independent state to a client state." Although Dayan foresaw American pressures for the achievement of a peace settlement in exchange for substantive Israeli concessions, he preferred this to the interim agreement of Rabin and Kissinger. Dayan contended that "there was a kind of 'look out for me and I will look out for you' in the relations between Rabin and Ford, and if we came to a situation in which Carter did not want to see Yigal Allon, there were reasons for it."

For appearance purposes, the government of today displays happiness over the Reagan victory, however, inside itself, it knows that it bet on the wrong card. While this was not done as foolishly as what Ezer Weizman did, it still managed to anger Reagan's people and significant segments of the American Jewish community. Some of the factors were unavoidable: the government of Israel could not be ungrateful to an administration which on most issues--financial, military, and political aid--was good to it. Carter also indirectly helped elect Begin in light of the report about his difficult meeting with Rabin (a reciprocation for Rabin's support of Ford?) and his comments about a homeland for the Palestinians, which negated one of the most important claims of the Labor Party regarding its special relations with the United States. Carter put heavy pressure on the Begin government to support him openly. Begin refused to do this, but he was unable to avoid indirect support. Nevertheless, Begin lacked foresight, and in all his past trips



to the United States as prime minister he did not bother to meet with the potential Republican candidates and not with Ronald Reagan whose election prospects were scoffed at by the government advisers.

In terms of long-term Israeli action, it is important to learn a double lesson both from the Carter election in 1976 and the Reagan election now: No potential candidate must be disparaged at the outset, all the eggs must not be put in one basket, and extensive ties must be created with politicians who are first setting out, a kind of "cast thy bread upon the waters." Israel's representatives in the United States will now have to work hard both to create special ties with the new president and his administration and also with the new forces in the Senate and the House of Representatives in light of the defeat and departure of many of Israel's traditional friends in Congress.

For Israel there is a special seriousness in the results of the Senate elections. It can be assumed that after a certain learning period every rational president and reasonable administration will arrive at that system of relations and policy in the Middle East which are being pushed by the various forces and pressures: the pro-Israel lobby, the Jewish community, the international reality, the American strategic interest, the oil companies, the energy requirements, and the need for balance in the relations between Israel and the pro-Western Arab countries. One of the pressure-balancing factors in Israel's favor can be found among Israel's friends in the Senate, the Foreign Relations Committee, the Appropriations Committee, and the House of Representatives. The loss of friends on whom it was possible to depend almost blindly and the loss of the large Democratic majority which for the most part was pro-Israel will make it very difficult for Israel, at least during the first period of the new administration and of the Congress, most members of which are new on Capitol Hill. It will be very difficult for Israel to organize 76 senators against the president as was done during the previous Republican administration of Ford. If Henry Jackson moves from the Senate to the Cabinet, it will be even more difficult for Israel to act in the upper House.

It is difficult to know if Reagan and his people will hold a grudge against the Begin government, as Jimmy Carter did against the Rabin government or if they will rise above it and not forget that in several key states they received important Jewish support, even though it was not the main factor which tipped the scales in favor of the Republicans in the White House and the Senate.

The Republicans' Jewish commitment is much less than that of the Carter administration although there are several important Jews among Reagan's supporters--Al Spiegel, Ted Cummings, and Max Fisher. On the other hand, Reagan's camp and his most important advisers also include people who are anti-Israel and anti-Jewish and who are influenced by pressure from the oil barons, and not only John Connally. The extent of influence of the various parties will only become known when Reagan announces the senior officials in his administration.

In the meantime, however, it is worthwhile to refute the myth which had been created to the effect that the recent Republican administrations of Nixon and Ford were better for Israel than Carter. There is an optical mistake in this claim which has been heard in recent days: There were several levels of important support for Israel during the days of Nixon and Ford. However, it can be assumed that any Democratic administration would have helped us to the same extent, and even more, in the situation which was created in the Yom Kippur War. As for the memorandum of

understanding with the Ford administration after the Sinai interim agreement of August 1975, it was more the result of the bargaining ability of the Rabin-Peres-Allon government than the generosity of the administration, and a similar team would have achieved no less an understanding with Carter, as the Begin-Weizman-Dayan team did.

However, we had many more difficult periods during the Nixon-Ford days than during any period in Carter's time: The days of the Rogers plans and the "reassessment." During the days of the Rogers plans, there was unprecedented brutal pressure, as bad as that during the Eisenhower-Dulles days, especially after Operation Kadesh, when there was a Republican majority in the Senate, and the nostalgia for these periods of time is inappropriate.

There are those who believe that Reagan's "hawkish" anti-Soviet attitude will benefit Israel. The historical experience since the days of the Cold War does not necessarily lead to such a conclusion. Every American administration takes Israel for granted as a pro-Western stronghold because Israel today has no neutralist or pro-Soviet option. Israel cannot "sit on the fence" in the Middle East because there is no one on the other side of the fence who wants her. Therefore, every American administration is required to cultivate Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Gulf emirates and wait for an opportunity to acquire additional friends in the region--perhaps Iraq, perhaps Syria after a change of government, perhaps one of the Yemens, who knows? Therefore, even if the declarations of relations with the other Arab countries are not at Israel's expense, the chasing after the Arabs must lower the profile of relations with Israel. No American president will support the vision of the completeness of the Land of Israel or the settlements--and also not the Jerusalem Law and not the annexation of the Golan Heights. The differences can only be in the order of priorities and in nuance.

It is reasonable to assume that the real difference between Carter and Reagan will be only in the timetable: While Carter, had he been elected, would have already accelerated the negotiating process, with Reagan we will have to wait for him to enter office, the filling of the positions in the administration, the learning of the problems, the understanding of the factors, and the preparation of practical plans. If Reagan assigns the Middle East to someone like Henry Kissinger, who is an expert in the problems, there will be a more measured timetable, one which is not beneficial to the Likud government. Kissinger and Reagan are not advocates of Begin's autonomy but rather the Jordanian option. Reagan's attitude towards the heads of the Labor Party is unknown although he did meet with several of them in the past. Kissinger, however, is an old friend of Peres, Rabin, Eban, Dinitz, Avineri, and others, and in one way or another, he will influence the actions of the Reagan administration in the Middle East.

Therefore, it is a complete paradox that the victory of the conservative Republicans is more advantageous to the political policy of the Labor Party while the defeat of the left-of-center liberal Democrats is disadvantageous to the Likud because of Carter's commitment to the Camp David process.

There is only one advantage in Reagan's victory to both the Likud and Labor Party schools: Reagan's total opposition to any negotiations with the PLO. All the other issues, even though Reagan's statements leaned more toward the Israeli consensus (on those issues where there is a consensus), it is doubtful if in daily practice there will be a substantive difference. I am not sure if we will yearn for the days of Carter. However, looking ahead to the next election, we will be praying for a Mondale or Kennedy victory.

DIALOGUE WITH PALESTINIAN LEADERS NECESSARY

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 31 Oct 80 p 13

[Article by Mordekhay Gur: "To Speak With Palestinian Arabs; Question of Expelled Mayors Requires Dealing With Entire Palestinian Problem; Our Conception of Palestinian Entity and Unwillingness To Confront Its Logic Caused Many Mistakes; First Step Is Continuing Dialogue; Discuss Problems With Any Receptive Palestinian Leader"]

[Text] After the Yom Kippur War everyone attacked the misleading concept according to which the Arabs were not going to attack us even if there was no progress made in solving our conflict with them through political means. This concept was based on our faith in our military power which could maintain the status quo. It was also based on the military analysis of our strategic logic which supposedly our enemies were bound by. We became accustomed to seeing ourselves as perfectly logical while our neighbors in the Middle East were seen by us as devoid of all logic.

To highlight the lack of logic in our region we used to tell the story of the camel and the scorpion, who wanted to cross the Suez Canal. The scorpion asked the camel to carry him on his back. "What will I do if you sting me in the middle of the canal?" the camel rightfully asked. "What's the logic?" the scorpion protested, "if you drown I will also drown." "Correct," said the camel. "You are right"[he said] agreeing to carry the scorpion on his back. While in deep water the scorpion stung the camel. While the camel was drowning he managed to take a last look at the scorpion and asked him in amazement, where is the logic? According to one version, the scorpion answered: once a scorpion always a scorpion. According to another version the scorpion said: you are looking for logic in the Middle East?

Hiding behind this fatalistic approach frees one from studying the logic of the other side and from responsibility for one's own actions. It amounts to surrender to fate or to a situation one has no control over. Such an approach eases one's conscience when it comes to mistakes and fiascos, but it certainly does not help one see the problems and look for possible solutions.

A similar concept has developed in relation to the Palestinian entity. Because of our unwillingness to deal with the logic of this entity we have erred and failed many times, and we have yet to see the light at the end of the tunnel. Since our neighbors have also been blessed with many misconceptions and have made numerous mistakes, we have together arrived at a most intricate maze from which it is most

difficult to extricate ourselves. The only way may be for both parties to put aside their prejudices and their emotions and begin to talk to each other in an attempt to chart a new way.

The original sin of the Palestinian Arabs and their supporters was their unwillingness to coexist with Zionism and share fairly the paradise built by joint efforts in a land flowing with milk and honey. Their terrible mistake was the carrying out of the threat to declare a genocidal war on the about-to-be-born Jewish-Zionist state. Their intention of annihilating that part of the Jewish people which survived the Holocaust in Europe showed a callousness which prompted the Jewish population to fight a desperate and glorious war of defense which resulted in victory. At the end of the war the Palestinian Arabs left the land and became refugees in other lands, carrying the sign of Cain and hoping to return some day. Adam and Eve who left paradise did not go back, and Cain remained an eternal wanderer. The Palestinian refugees remained exiled in the camps and in the hearts of Israelis remained a scar of wariness and mistrust.

If the Palestinians after the 1948 War had given up the idea of destroying Israel as a precondition of Palestinian nationalism, the conflict might have been solved in the beginning of its torturous way. But history on both sides of the conflict acted differently and the enmity deepened. Infiltration of terrorists on one side and reprisals on the other increased the sense of the fatefulness of the conflict. The active participation of regular armies from across the border in the attempts to destroy Israel gave Palestinian Arabs a backing in the present and a basis for their apocalyptic designs on Israel for the future.

The founding of Al Fatah and the issuing of the Palestinian Covenant which posits the liquidation of Israel as a national objective and a precondition of Palestinian national fulfillment had put a near-insurmountable obstacle between the parties. It was difficult for Israelis to understand why the Palestinian Arabs did not establish their own state in territories ruled by Jordan and Egypt, if political independence rather than the destruction of Israel was their objective. Until 1968 the Palestinian Arabs and their supporters had had 19 years to establish a sovereign Palestinian state without Israel's being willing or able to prevent them. The fact that this process did not take place deepened the feeling among Israelis, to my regret and rightfully so, that it was more important for the Arabs to deny Israelis a national expression than to have their own. This, understandably, also gave rise to the Israeli concept of there being no separate Palestinian entity.

The Al Fatah Covenant was received among Israelis more as an expression of an existing situation than a platform of a modern movement with a future which holds the possibility of national liberation. The operative military conclusion from this view was that the early operations of Al Fatah against Israel were a continuation of the terrorist tradition of mercenaries rather than a national-military body of a different character. The logic of many of us judged all national movements according to our subjective yardsticks, and since Fatah was different from our liberation movements by being Arab and not Jewish, we made the mistake of looking down on it. Any attempt to see it as a liberation movement with an ideological background rooted in logic and possessing deep subjective feelings was received by many Israelis with a shrug. The justified indignation toward the dark and murderous side in their



Ideology overshadowed other sides, which conveyed national and human logic. Hence our concept erred both politically and militarily. Politically, we did not accept or recognize a national Palestinian entity, and militarily we believed we could destroy it by hitting many of its followers and thus deterring others and causing the demise of this phenomenon.

As in any subject, it would be a mistake to argue that these Israeli concepts by themselves account for the present situation. If this were the case then we could change the situation all by ourselves, and despite our self-criticism I believe we would have done it. Palestinian aggression in particular and Arab aggression in general destroyed from the start attempts at rapprochement and reconciliation, and often pushed even moderate Israelis to an extreme and made them despair of the chances for mutual understanding.

The truth is that if we sincerely searched our souls we would find out that our own behavior must have awakened more than once similar feelings of frustration among the Palestinians and the Arab states. I have felt it personally more than once. But even when I did not justify all our actions, I did not forget that in this conflict from its inception to the present moment we are the ones who are facing an ultimate danger and we have the right to defend ourselves against it.

To defend--yes; to shut our eyes and ignore what takes place around us--no. The concept of the nonexistence of a Palestinian entity was destroyed and has almost disappeared. In the Camp David accords Palestinian rights are mentioned and the autonomy plan stems from a recognition of them as a living human body. Even those who for many years did not see the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the root of the overall Arab-Israeli conflict are changing their minds and are willing to accept the historical necessity of resolving the conflict directly and not as a by-product of agreements between us and sovereign neighboring Arab states. Thinkers and leaders who hoped and believed that the agreement with Egypt was going to resolve the Palestinian problem or make it disappear now realize that this is not so, and that it needs to be dealt with in its own right. Some are even willing to admit that the resolution of this problem is what will help overcome the opposition of sovereign Arab states.

This recognition on our part is not enough. To our regret, there still exists among the PLO and its supporters a basic hostility against us and a belief that the Middle East will not quiet down until our disappearance from the political map. In face of such reality we can either dig in and keep the status quo or try to break the ice and build new bridges of understanding which will hopefully be followed by actions.

Any political solution for a stable peace with Egypt, and even more so with Jordan and Syria, will have to include the resolution of the Palestinian problem, at least of the Palestinians who have lived during the years of the conflict in the West Bank and Gaza. Whether it is a territorial compromise with Jordan or an autonomy, the Palestinian Arabs will have to make it a living reality. Even someone like myself, who is totally opposed to a Palestinian state in those territories, cannot and should not refrain from discussing with them the implications and the options for the character of their public life. Anyone who understands the need for this kind of a dialogue must be prepared to say and hear unpleasant things, which seem to be inevitable.



As great as the problem is so is the gravity of dealing with it. Just as no Israeli leader wishes to appear to be selling out to the Arabs, no Israeli should expect respectable Arab leaders to appear to be selling out to us. Great as the obstacle between the two nations is, so is the need for broadmindedness on the part of those who attempt to overcome it.

The first step is continuous and multifaceted dialogue. The two mayors who incited their people against Israel were expelled, and in my opinion rightly so. Just as fairly we need to discuss the problems with any Palestinian leader who is willing to do so, as equals who recognize each other's right to secure existence.

It will be the right move for any Israeli government which functions properly to create the organizational tools to conduct such a dialogue, gather the information and use it in the decision making process.

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CSO: 4805

# ACTING NABLUS MAYOR SEEKS PEACEFUL SOLUTION

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 21 Nov 80 pp 12-13

[Article by Ya'akov Havaquq: "Success on Both Sides of the Jordan: Visiting Card of Zafir al-Masri Who Replaces Bassam al-Shak'a As Nablus Mayor: Son of Rich Family and Brother of Former Chairman of Jordanian Parliament Who Is Considered the 'Bitter Pill the PLO Must Swallow To Keep Peace With Hashemite Court'"]

[Text] Zafir al-Masri, chairman of the Nablus chamber of commerce, vice mayor of Nablus and, for the past several months, Bassam al-Shak'a's substitute, is one of those people whom people used to single out a young age for greatness. One of Zafir's acquaintances, who is not necessarily one of his ardent supporters, says: "Zafir was very lucky. He knew how to get born to the right family. He was born with a silver spoon in his mouth. They paved the road for him and all he had to do was walk in the safe path. Under such conditions you can't fail."

Zafir al-Masri, one of the commercial-economic-political leaders in the West Bank, owes undoubtedly much of his success to his family and to his older brother, Hikmat al-Masri. The brother, one of the activists of the National Socialist Party which started in the mid 50's, was the chairman of the Jordanian parliament, and is today the chairman of the board of directors of Al-Najat University in Nablus. Zafir's acquaintances, both his supporters and rivals, point out the similar track of the two al-Masri brothers: both started in commerce and industry, both turned to politics, and both were able to combine their success in economics and politics on both sides of the Jordans. While Hikmat is now in the twilight of his career, his younger brother is now taking his big steps.

Zafir does not want to be seen or referred to as "Hikmat al-Masri's brother." As for the role of the family in his career he prefers to say: "The time of family politics is dead and gone. In the past one could climb on his family's shoulders. Today this is no longer possible. A public person is no longer measured by his family, but by his personal capabilities, by his ability to get things done. People today look for someone who can best represent them. Someone who will fight their battle, work for them. One who cannot do this, even if he has an important family behind him--has no future!"

He was born in Nablus in 1941. He was educated in his home town, where he graduated from Al-Najat University. He went to Beirut, where he studied business administration at the American University. Upon his return to Nablus he took charge of a good part of the family business. After he proved himself as a good manager he replaced

his brother Hikmat as manager of the match factory, the soap factory, and the seed business which his brother had managed for years. Zafir sees this trust in him as natural, since he was the youngest son and had both theoretical and practical experience as a business administrator.

But managing the family business was not the end of the line for Zafir. It was only the beginning. As a manager of important local enterprises, due in great part to the groundwork done by his brother Hikmat, Zafir became the chairman of the Nablus chamber of commerce. The city elders do not recall when a man his age (39) last served as chairman. As businessman and manufacturer he frequently went to Jordan to take care of his products. Now, as chairman of the chamber of commerce, his travels between Nablus and Amman became routine. In Amman he was well received, since his family was known as good friends of the Hashemite regime. The regime, having cultivated Hikmat and other members of the family, realized that Zafir was worth cultivating as a good investment for the Hashemite crown in the Nablus area.

Zafir began to call on Jordanian leaders who listened to him and responded to his needs. As his exports grew and he was able to secure more and more export authorizations for Nablus merchants and manufacturers, his position in the city and environs became stronger. The local business community, which represents the backbone of industry in the West Bank, depends on Jordanian authorization to market its products in the Hashemite kingdom and in the rest of the Arab world. This community soon learned that Zafir was the funnel to the Jordanian capital. Zafir himself quickly learned the rules of the game in Amman. He knows that his line must follow that of the east bank of the Jordan, or else the valve will be closed and he would feel the effect in his pocket, in his status, his success, his future.

Zafir al-Masri expanded his activities beyond the family business and the Nablus chamber of commerce. In the spring of 1976, not without family pressure, he turned to politics, putting himself at the head of an independent party which entered the race for the city council. Supported by his family and by commerce and industry (which was not free of self-interest), he became deputy mayor. While Bassam al-Shak'a, who assumed the position of mayor, was being swept by the currents of Palestinian nationalism beyond the confines of the Nablus municipality, his deputy, Zafir al-Masri, remained outside the limelight. While al-Shak'a's name became a household word, his deputy's name was hardly known. He continued to divide his time between his office in city hall and his business activities. He did not cut back on his trips to Jordan, instead, he began to travel to Europe as well, strictly for his private business.

Zafir is a hard worker. He plans his day carefully. While doing business, he is pursued with the chamber of commerce affairs, and while working for the city the chamber affairs interfere. He spends several hours a day on the telephone. He speaks briefly and emphatically. He considers himself a man of action, a doer. He admits he is not one given to making statements, certainly not the kind which produces headlines. He leaves this to others. He is an unknown to people outside the West Bank, including the Israeli public. He is pragmatic, and he speaks in meticulous yet complex sentences, as if dictating to a secretary. He is uneasy with a direct question, speaks faster and longer and says nothing.

## Moderation and Extremism

Al-Maari, tall, bespectacled, balding, diligent and dedicated, took al-Shak'a's place after the mayor was wounded. He runs the 80,000 inhabitant city as if he has done it for years. He starts early in the morning, goes over several hundreds of documents each day, incessantly signing forms handed to him by a guard or a secretary. He keeps making decisions and issuing orders as if he is running a private business. The city council meetings, which used to run for hours, he conducts efficiently. Projects which lay dormant in file cabinets have been taken out and gone over. Council members, many of them considerably older than he, have learned to respect his approach. "Zafir has brought to the city council his private business practices. As a merchant and an industrialist he knows how to make quick decisions, sometimes under pressure. In business time is money, and Zafir does not like to waste time. As in business, the attitude toward the customer determines the success of the deal, which is Zafir's policy in city hall. He gives al-Shak'a's people their due respect. He makes them feel they are partners, when in reality he does what he thinks is right for the city. Yes, "Zafir is a technocrat, not a politician," someone in the Nablus council says.

As any senior official Zafir has his supporters and detractors. Yet both admit he is a talented man who made it because of his capabilities. He has an excellent memory, great concentration, abundant energy, and flexibility. His flexibility has enabled him to deal with militants like al-Shak'a on one hand, and with those who are considered pro-Jordanian on the other. He has become known as an independent thinker, although here and there he may stretch a point.

In the human and political landscape of the West Bank Zafir al-Maari is considered a moderate, a pro-Jordanian. Skilled in walking a political mine field, and aware of the fact that everything he says is interpreted in different ways, he prefers to hide behind a smokescreen.

"All the talk about me being 'moderate' and 'pro-Jordanian' is due to misrepresentation by people and media. I see myself first and foremost as a Palestinian who wants to live on his land, in his free country. Secondly, the label 'pro-Jordanian' may be due to my frequent trips to Jordan. True, I go there often, but only on business. Third, I don't think that ties with Jordan are contrary to Palestinian interests. It should be made clear to all that our special relations with Jordan are not new. They have been going on for years. Until 1967 we were one country, and as a result of the war we came under Israeli military occupation. Yet the 1967 war did not end our relations and ties with Jordan. Jordan was and is our gateway to everywhere. We market our goods through Jordan, and we receive important aid from that country. We carry Jordanian passports. Should all of this be taken lightly?

He reacts against the label 'moderate' which has clung to him. It has a negative, suspicious connotation. "In our special circumstances, living under a military occupation which often treats us harshly and punishes us, there is no room for such definitions as 'moderate' or 'extreme.' There are no moderates or extremists among us. All of us, all Palestinians in and out of the territories, have one unified goal and one aspiration: we want to put an end to the military occupation and establish our independent state. This is our common goal, which none of us is willing to compromise or give up. True, we may differ as to how we accomplish this goal. Some believe in terror and armed struggle and some prefer direct talks. But they should not be labeled moderate and extremist, since both aspire to the same goal."



Zafir al-Masri, who is considered one of the outstanding young leaders in the West Bank, is not a militant nationalist. He believes in direct talks between the two people. Violent armed struggle, bloodshed and fanaticism will not in his opinion bring about a solution to this complicated problem. He paints the solution as follows: "Israel, which rules more than one million Palestinians, should sit down with the Palestinians to find an agreed solution. Israel should not worry about its prestige by sitting down to the same table with the Palestinians. It should give in a little. We have lost everything, our country, our rights, our land, our property. Yes, we have paid a heavy price. Israel, which has everything, cannot ask us to give up more! We have nothing! I say, the only solution is direct talks between Israel and the Palestinians. Not negotiations among Israel, the U.S. and Egypt. Sadat cannot speak for us, since no one has authorized him to speak for us!" Zafir is quite cautious. He talks about direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, without coming out with whom he has in mind when he speaks about Palestinians.

Referring to the autonomy and the Camp David accords, Zafir says that there is a universal consensus in and out of the territories which rejects them. The autonomy is tendentious, he argues. It is designed to perpetuate Israeli rule in the territories, which no one will agree to. "Israel must realize that the autonomy plan is unworkable. The fact of the matter is, that even Sadat, who agreed to it in the past, has come to his senses and stopped the negotiations."

Zafir, who initially supported Sadat's initiative and the Camp David accords, is most cautious now when he speaks about the peace process. He speaks about peace in generalities, without going into details. He maintains he represents a proud Palestinian position. "Unlike many who are swayed by their emotions, I am a realist, and I speak logically, standing with both feet on the ground." He believes that the suffering of the population and the Israeli occupation will come to an end. The solutions will be found by both sides together. "When both sides sit across the table from each other they will forget national pride, they will put aside prejudice and overreaction and will discuss matters in the spirit of mutual understanding and will look for a reasonable solution which I am sure they will find."

When asked about the chances of the Jordanian option, which according to those who know him he supports, his eloquence ebbs and he stops to think. He realizes his answer will be put under a magnifying glass on both sides of the river. "I believe," he starts after long reflection, "that what is referred to as the Jordanian option is an old proposal, which is designed to put obstacles on the road to a solution. The future link between Jordan or any other state and our independent state is secondary. As Palestinians, we have absolute faith in Palestinian nationalism, which does not stop us from having ties with Jordan. Yet, on the other hand, one should not cause conflicts between the Palestinian and the Jordanian people. We are brothers, we are bound by social, family, economic, and cultural ties. Yes, our ties cannot be overlooked."

A source in the city hall of Nablus reacts to the above as follows: "he tries to cloud his opinions, as his first sentence shows. This sentence is meant for the PLO, to keep them quiet. The rest of his answer shows where the wind blows."

The deputy mayor of Nablus believes in quiet, low key work, away from the limelight. He meets with American and European representatives who come to Israel. He does



not boycott them, because, he says they give him the opportunity to present his arguments, to persuade, to work for the interests of the Palestinian people as he understands them. He believes that such meetings create a congenial public opinion towards the Palestinians more than a public show in the territories or in Europe.

### Walking a Tightrope

His somewhat independent way and his determination to fight for his principles have not escaped the militant leaders in and outside the territories. They have begun to follow his actions and his statements. They carefully check every word he says. In his personal file they have recorded the fact that he has never been at odds with the Israeli military government. The fact that his relations with the military government are correct and that more than once he has criticized it are not counted in his favor. Three years ago he said in an interview for the AL FAJR newspaper that the military government tries to undercut the authority of the Nablus chamber of commerce which he headed. A year ago, when the expulsion order was issued against Bassam al-Shak'a, he sent a cable to the minister of defense to persuade him to change the decree. Six months ago, when the military government began its strong hand policy, Zafir protested it by arguing that "this is a shameful policy which you cannot be proud of." His opponents, who follow his statements, say that they don't mean anything. "From time to time he has to play the nationalist game. His protests against the military government and its policy, and his cable to the minister of defense are part of his game."

Zafir al-Masri is quite aware of his situation. He is not concerned about the commentaries of his actions and statements. He has a good understanding of the game. He often changes his strategy, according to circumstances. Thus, our interview went on peacefully for a long time when the word got out that "Abu Hisham" is being interviewed by Israeli journalists. Consequently, a chubby, bespectacled little man with a mustache came in, took a newspaper from the desk and sat in one of the chairs and pretended to be reading. It was not hard to guess why he chose the office of the mayor as a reading room. Zafir got the message. He started talking in sharp nationalistic language, throwing looks at the stranger (who later on turned out to be one of al-Shak'a people).

Zafir and al-Shak'a have had their ups and downs. But at this moment, with the stranger hiding behind the newspaper listening carefully to al-Masri, the latter defines his relations with Shakia as good. The stranger lowers the newspaper and gives the deputy mayor an approving look.

When Zafir was asked how he saw the role of the mayor in light of his recent experience as al-Shak'a's replacement, the stranger broke into the conversation. He cut Zafir short on the first sentence and gave a long lecture pointing out that Zafir was only the deputy and could only answer the question as such. Al-Masri, who must have expected the interference of the "observer," nodded in consent and started again by saying, "As deputy mayor of Nablus and sitting in for brother al-Shak'a, during his absence because of his hospitalization, I think..." The stranger was beaming.

He sees the role of the mayor on two levels. The first is strictly municipal. The second is nationalist political activity. He says the two cannot be separated. "It seems that no one disagrees that some of the important decisions reached by

mayors in the territories, as well as by the military government, were political. The role of the mayor is at once municipal and political. It cannot be expected of the mayor to stand by and watch the actions of the military government, if such actions have political implications. He must protest, react, he is expected to defend his constituents."

Nablus' acting mayor is not a conformist. His stand which condemns terror and bloodshed does not help him make friends among the militants in the territories. He admits he is not in favor of polarization, which has swept most of the West Bank towns in recent years. He maintains that the strikes, demonstrations, stone throwing, tire burning and other manifestations of protest are not the only way for people to express their opinions. Isn't he concerned about the PLO's reaction to his views?

"The PLO problem is an inseparable part of our daily life," he says, "At the Rabat conference it was determined that the PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Am I personally afraid? No, I have no reason to be afraid. Who is afraid? Only he who has collaborated with the authorities, who has sold his land to Jews or who knows down deep he has done something wrong. He who believes he works for his people has no reason to worry. Personally, I believe in peace, in understanding and direct talks, in persuasion, therefore I am not afraid. I did not commit any crime."

One person who knows Zafir well sheds some light on his relations with the PLO. "It is no secret that Zafir is considered a pro-Jordanian. He controls a vital area which is the Nablus chamber of commerce, which is the most important in the West Bank. Jordan will not overlook an attempt against him, and the PLO knows it. The PLO knows that Zafir is the bitter pill they have to swallow in order not to aggravate their relations with Jordan. Zafir, for his part, knows the delicate rules of the game. He walks a tightrope like an experienced acrobat. He is careful not to be reckless and maintains a balance between the two."

Be it as it may, Zafir al-Masri, father of two daughters, leads a simple life and does not flaunt his position. He is careful and calculating. He realizes that he is privileged to be a public figure and a favorite of Amman. He takes advantage of his delicate position to this day. He continues to maneuver between the economic field of commerce, industry and agriculture, and the wild fields of politics. He treads gingerly alongside the PLO, he talks about Palestinians as a vague term, and does not make friends with the military government. It should be said on his behalf that he is being quite successful. He is admired by both friends and rivals. He is referred to as "great talent," "most brilliant," but in the same breath he is called a "bad boy," and independent who is not willing to conform.

But he sticks to his guns, sure of his way. His support in the Jordanian capital--some say also in Saudi Arabia--is an important card now and in the future. He is uneasy with his young age and prefers to avoid mentioning it. He wants to be judged not by the date in his birth certificate but by his actions, stands, and successes.

"The time he has spent in the office of Bassam al-Shak'a as substitute mayor," one of his close associates says, "is a learning period for him, an investment in the future." Zafir himself prefers to keep quiet. He is not one to give his opponents any ammunition.

## ARAB COMMUNITIES ON BOTH SIDES OF GREEN LINE SURVEYED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 1 Aug, 3 Aug, 5 Aug 80

[1 Aug 80 p 16]

[Article by 'Atallah Mansur: "From Part I of Both Sides of the Green Line"]

[Text] The jealousy of the Israeli Arabs towards the Arabs in the territories has speeded up the broadening of primary and advanced education. Despite normalization in the area of personal ties on both sides of the green line, there is no corresponding normalization in the area of cultural relations.

Many factors have had an influence on the Arab population since the Six-Day War. It is doubtful, therefore, whether we can pinpoint these and determine what effect renewed contacts between the Arabs of the Galilee and of the Triangle and Arabs of Nablus, East Jerusalem or Hebron has had. The factor of time has undoubtedly made a substantial contribution. The fact that the size of the Israeli Arab population since the Six-Day War has grown from 320,000 to more than 500,000, not counting East Jerusalem, certainly affects the atmosphere for this group. Also, during this period, the number of Arab students has increased from hundred to thousands, and the number of graduates has increased many-fold.

In the '60's, high school graduates, the majority of whom had failed their matriculation exams, used to complain that the government wasn't making sure that the "intellectuals" were being employed. Today, one doesn't hear such complaints. Graduates of these high schools turn to academic studies as a matter of course. Those whose test results or economic situations prevent them from studies in higher educational institutions turn to building trades or vocational courses in order to save money to finance their academic studies. For them, work is just a transition period during which they improve their chances of being accepted by desirable departments, often in Italian or French studies as a preparation for studies abroad.

## From the Elite to the Masses

The increase in the number of youths who have turned to high school education has cancelled out the status of the "intelligentsia." By the mid-60's, the percentage of Arab youth in high school had already risen to about 20 percent of the total

population of 14-17 year olds. By the beginning of the '70's, their numbers had increased to 294,000 (among the Christians 550,000 were studying, among the Moslems 234,000, and among the Druze 209,000). At present, about half of the Arab youth are studying in high schools. Again, the internal divisions differ: Christians, more than 70 percent, Moslems more than 40 percent, and Druze more than 30 percent in the 14-17 age range. The social elite of the '60's has expanded its ranks to include, today, half the age group. The academic group has taken their place as a cultural elite.

Has this process been influenced by contact with residents on the other side of the green line? Certainly not on a practical level. The broadening and deepening of education among the Israeli Arabs began right after the founding of the state of Israel. The money which Arab parents invested in their children's high school education came from their earnings, and some were helped by a sliding scale system established by the Department of Education and Culture (until two years ago). But there seems to be truth to the argument that the renewal of ties between Taiba and Tul-Karem, between Um al-Fahm and Janin, and between the Arabs of the Galilee and of the Triangle and the population of the territories—especially between members of the same families on opposite sides of the green line—has given new energy to the subject of education among the Israeli Arabs.

It was a bitter surprise for the members of that family to find out that the one who remained in his home in Israel was lagging behind with respect to his children's education in contrast to his refugee brother in Gaza or in Jericho. How did this gap develop? For the refugee, there were academic institutions, especially in Egypt. And, for many, academic training represented their only chance to escape the life of degeneracy and hunger in the refugee camps. And, most important, the education was free. Higher education (in high school and in the university) for the Israeli Arabs cost a fortune, and this education was not essential to them.

The reasons for these developments were no consolation to many. Quite the opposite. In the last dozen or so years, the following refrain has been heard: "Even the refugees in Gaza and in Jericho are given many more opportunities to educate their children and to keep them from having to experience the 'humiliation' of manual labor." This jealousy, along with the economic prosperity of the Israeli Arabs since 1968 (with the end of moderation and with the enterprising actions) has hurried the process of deepening and broadening of their post-primary and academic training. Today, the number of Arab physicians in the country is estimated at about 300, and the number of medical students at about 500.

#### Marital Ties

It appears that imitation of family members in the territories has speeded up the process somewhat. There are those who point to the students (the few!) who left their villages in the Triangle for colleges in Nablus and Hebron or went from Nazareth to Bir-Zayt, as proof of how strong the pull of the territories is on the Israeli Arabs. A more substantial point of those who argue that the Israeli Arabs are influenced by what is happening among the Arabs in the territories comes from quite a different area. The universities in the territories represent a place of employment for about 20 Arab Israeli academicians. Residents



of Nablus and of East Jerusalem, being Jordanian citizens, can move freely among dozens of universities within the Arab League. This path is closed to the Arabs who are Israeli citizens. Arabs from Nazareth, Araba, Lod and Taiba, who are unable to find positions in universities in Israel, find work at universities in Nablus, Bethlehem, and, especially, in Bir-Zayt (which employed 17 lecturers from Israel last year, including a distinguished employee of the Department of Agriculture).

It seems to me, however, that apart from these limited areas, the rusty iron bars of the old border are still in force. The newspapers appearing in East Jerusalem are practically not circulated among the Israeli Arabs. Aside from Nazareth, and a few other places where they are sold, there is no demand for East Jerusalem newspapers. And these newspapers copy on almost every page from the newspaper AL-ITTIHAD, the mouthpiece of Rakah published in Haifa. The opposite almost never happens. Writers and poets from Nablus and Ramallah almost never come to the Galilee, except for those isolated examples like the poetess, Fadū Tukan, from Nablus, who has been famous since before the establishment of the State of Israel.

In the area of personal ties, there are islands of full normalization between the Arabs on both sides of the green line. Hundreds of couples have married in the last decade (in most cases, the husband is Israeli and the wife Jordanian--and the couple goes to Israel to live). But there are no signs that cultural relations, in the broadest sense, have arrived at full normalization as might have been expected for people who belonged to the same nation until 1948.

[3 Aug 80 p 10]

[Part II of article by 'Atallah Mansur: "They and Us"]

[Text] The green line, especially from the time it was simply the border between Israel and Jordan, constitutes a deep gap between the Arabs in Israel. The border broke off ties almost completely between brothers, fathers and sons, and friends. In two places (Bet Tsafafa and Birta'ah), it split villages in two. It follows that there was a joyful attitude about its chances of disappearing.

After the Six-Day War, it seemed that one could bless the opening of the border. But I see no factual basis for the claim that the border has disappeared. In Birta'ah, things are still divided. Bet Tsafafa was "united" within the framework of the unification of Jerusalem.

Whoever tries to understand the internal moods will be surprised. The concepts of "they" and "us" still exist. What is even more noticeable, the "Jordanians" still direct their actions, their children, towards life in an Arab framework, and they are sending them to Jordanian schools which teach according to Jordanian study plans. Residents of the Israeli half of the village still behave as they did before 1967. Every group prepared its children according to the possibilities open to them. In the absence of chances for being absorbed in Israel, the East Jerusalem Arabs turn eastward to the Arab world. And since those markets are closed to the Israeli Arab, he continues to cling to what is open to him in Israel.



In another realm, it is, perhaps, possible to examine the degree of national solidarity and unity on the two sides of the green line. I refer to the violent opposition to Israeli rule in the territories conquered in 1967, and perhaps also to the very existence of the State. It would seem that in this area, all the Arabs have a free choice. But a look at the actual facts reveals some interesting findings.

The part played by Arabs who are Israeli citizens in the acts of terrorism and sabotage is minimal. The over-all number of saboteurs who were involved in war with Israel amounts to tens of thousands. The role played by Israeli Arabs doesn't exceed a few hundred. Despite the increase in talk about extremism in recent years, the numbers of those caught in acts of sabotage have decreased. Furthermore, and perhaps not without some connection, there is nothing corresponding to the violent confrontations in the occupied territories among the Israeli Arabs.

In Nazareth, Shefaram and Um-al-Fahm, there are no signs of solidarity when there are strikes in East Jerusalem or when there are demonstration in Ramallah, apart from organized forms of expression within legal and public frameworks. The strike on "Earth Day," which was initiated by Arabs in Israel, did get a response of solidarity from Gaza and cities on the West Bank in the form of strikes. And the memorial days for the six who were killed in the confrontations on "Earth Day" gets nominal expression each year in the urban centers on the other side of the green line. But in the rural and urban centers of Israeli Arabs, there is no corresponding sense of solidarity.

The only expression of national solidarity with the population of the territories came after the attacks on the mayors of Nablus, Ramallah, and Al-Bira. Only about half of the mayors and local councils responded to the call of their committees and met in Nazareth for a conference. No demonstration was organized.

From all this, we conclude that national solidarity between Arabs on the two sides of the green line is, to a large extent, one-sided.

Dr. Sammy Samuha from the University of Haifa explains this phenomenon, which he compares to the failure of the British in Northern Ireland to maintain law and order in contrast to Israel's success in the same area among Israeli Arabs, as stemming, for the most part, from the effectiveness of the intelligence service in Israel. But this argument has no basis. If Dr. Samuha were to draw a comparison between the Israeli Arabs and the Arabs of the territories, all of whom are subject to the same security forces, I suspect that he would have to come to the opposite conclusion. In addition, the military rule in the territories uses more severe methods than the punitive measures applied in Israel (destruction of homes of suspects' families, deportations, exiles, and the imposition of curfews on entire towns for extended periods). Despite this, the military rule is not successful in reducing the level and scope of the threatening activity in the Galilee and the Triangle.

It is likely that part of the explanation for this phenomenon comes from the existence of open bridges which allow the recruiting officers of Fatah and the Popular Front free contact and almost unlimited opportunities for influencing the population of the territories who leave to go to neighboring countries. On

the other hand, it seems to me that another part of the explanation can be found in the lack of trust which many Israeli Arabs feel towards the PLO leadership which appears split among loyalists of Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and even non-Arab countries. This invalidates their image as Palestinian leaders and makes them agents of Arab nations who are fighting for this party of officers or against another in order to win seats.

Only a few people are prepared to endanger their lives for such goals as long as they are able to choose and decide. And the fact that the PLO has not yet set forth, in an unambiguous way, a goal which seems attainable for a young nationalist Arab in Israel has not encouraged such a youth to join the struggle, not even to organize a demonstration in Nazareth in support of political prisoners who are conducting a hunger strike.

European and Israeli Leftists argue that it is possible to interpret several pronouncements made by PLO leaders that they are basically prepared for peace with Israel on the basis of establishing a Palestinian state in the territories conquered in 1967 as meaning that they accept Israel. But those pointing to the various expressions of the organizations affiliated with the PLO are no less persuasive, a fact which upsets anyone who is seeking peace.

The words of the hijacker Leila Khaled at the Women's Congress in Copenhagen and her refusal to meet with MK Shulamit Aloni ("We will carry on a conversation with the Israelis only with rifles") angered even the editor of the mouthpiece for TAKAH in Arabic, Amil Havivi. In a lead article published last Tuesday, he said that Leila Khaled has "volunteered without being asked to help those Israeli leaders who announce their readiness to meet with the Palestinians only on the battlefield." The author of the article also rails against the attack on Jewish children from Agudat Israel in Antwerp as "acts of illogical ugly crime, damaging to the rights of the Palestinians and to their struggle."

Mr Havivi, who has been an Israeli citizen and a member of the Knesset for about 20 years, would like the PLO to formulate a goal which he could help to achieve. I believe that many Israeli Arabs feel the same way. But as long as the PLO adopts extremist positions and methods, there is little danger that many Israeli Arabs will join them. The "green line" will continue to separate the activists (in the territories) from the passivists (in Israel).

It would be a mistake, however, to think that the opening of the border has not influenced the mood of Israeli Arabs. More about that in the next article.

[5 Aug 80 p 12]

[Part III of article by 'Atallah Mansur: "Illusionary Agreement"]

[Text] In the official statistics and in terms of political facts, it is hard to find decisive proof of the existence of a definite influence on the part of the Arabs in the territories on their brothers in Israel or vice versa. The half million Arabs in Israel and the 1.2 million Arabs in the territories continue to live separate lives. The political subordination, the opportunities and the patterns of everyday life which have developed during the twenty years of being cut off (1948-1967), have prevented an identification from forming between the two populations. It seems, however, that if one looks for them, one can find many and varied areas of mutual influence.

The very existence of an Arab minority among Israeli citizens represented an encouraging factor for the population of the occupied territories after the Six Days' War. (Incidentally, the existence of this minority appears even today as a source of encouragement to the Egyptian journalist, Al-Sathar Tawili, from the "Rose of Joseph." The journalist, a moderate Leftist, published, a week ago, one of the most interesting articles to appear in the Egyptian press since the signing of the peace agreements. In his opinion, the Arabs in Israel represent, from the Arabs' perspective, a kind of "column of cypresses" which can moderate Israeli extremism, and vice versa. The existence of Arabs in Israel will temper the Arab extremists in their dealings with Israel.) But the fact that in Israel (1967), not a single Arab held a responsible position in the government, in the foreign service, in the security branches, in economic life, or in the judicial system (above the level of magistrate), allowed the dignitaries of the territories to discount those Israeli Arabs who defended the positions of the Alignment governments as ones which gave equal rights to Arab citizens.

The attempts of the Israeli government to improve the position of the Israeli Arabs by appointing an Arab judge to the district court in Nazareth (the lawyer Mohammed Namar El-Hawari, one of the only Palestinian communal workers who remained and who fit himself into Israel after it became a state), and later, by appointments of Deputy Ministers (in the ministries of Health and Communication) and of Arab members of Knesset from the Alignment to the posts of vice-chairmen of the Knesset, were seen as steps taken too late and too little to improve the deflated image of the Arab workers in Israeli institutions. The Israeli government's lack of success in presenting an acceptable solution for the occupied territories, and the failure of its Arab spokesmen to bring this about, caused the break in the brief dialogue that was taking place between the leaders of the "moderates" or the "pro-Jordanians" from among the West Bank workers and the dignitaries of the Galilee and the Triangle. The fact that Sheikh Jebry, the late mayor of Hebron, and Mr. Hemdi Canaan, the past mayor of Nablus, were objects of a pilgrimage by public leaders in Israel, aroused the envy of those who, until 1967, had hosted the foreign ministry - the Arab Knesset members of MAPAI (the workers' party).

The failure of the Israeli government to bring about a settlement with the population of the occupied territories established the radical forces in the territories and in Israel. PLO followers controlled most of the city councils on the West Bank. On that same wave, Rakah also succeeded with the help of the Democratic Front for Equality and Peace, in controlling a substantial part of the Arab councils in Israel. At present, a dialogue exists between the new powers on both sides of the "green line." And the first impression one gets is that a general agreement exists between them. But this is a false impression. Rakah has put forth for several years a clear and unequivocal position, namely, that it wants a "Palestinian state alongside of Israel." Spokesmen for Rakah repeat this statement often and at every opportunity. In fact, this statement has become the hallmark of a Rakah man.

Mayors of Nablus, Hebron and Ramallah recite only the first part of the sentence. As to the future of Israel, they only relate to it when pressed. Even then, their answer is not unequivocal. ("Israel doesn't need our recognition. We need recognition." That is a standard response.) Besides this, Mr. Bassam Shaka,

the mayor of Nablus, took the trouble more than once to go to the borders of the "green line" to bless and encourage the activity of the "villagers" of Um-el-Feham, the extremist opponents of Rakah who declare openly that their desire is to "establish within the borders of Palestine a secular democratic state which would give equal rights and opportunities to all its citizens—Jews, Moslems and Christians." These radical mayors even find interest in the "Association for the Prisoner" and in the "Scholarship Fund in memory of Dr. Annis Kardush," which are not seen by Rakah as institutions deserving of special encouragement. "Al Fajr," the mouthpiece for the mayors of Nablus, Tul Karem, Al-Bira and Ramallah, does not cooperate with the mouthpiece of Rakah, which tries to avoid opponents of the party as much as possible. "Al Fajr" (which is not circulated in most of the Arab centers in Israel) is especially interested in what is taking place in radical circles, particularly those of the Left.

The religious Moslem Right has also come to life in Israel, to a large extent since the opening of the borders between Israel and the territories (and through them—the Arab Moslem world). The Moslems, who represent close to 70 percent of the Arabs in Israel, have lacked, till recently, accepted religious leadership. The state did appoint Kadim (judges) and directors of the holy places and also funded (in the form of grants) religious services in the mosques. But, since they were not able to establish vital religious institutions and independent financing, those appointed to these positions remained merely functionaries. The Temple Treasury is still managed, for the most part, by the State Treasury, and Moslems in Israel do not have a single school for religious training. After the establishment of the State, about a dozen students went to institutions for religious education in Nablus and Hebron. Some of them, when they returned to their villages in the Triangle, brought back with them a militant religious spirit. Their appearance preceded Khomeini's victory in Iran, but the rise of the militant wave in Tehran and in Syria (against the Ba'ath regime) gave the local wave a great deal of energy.

The situation at present is the following: The villages of the Triangle, during the month of Ramadan, are virtually closed during the day and open at night (the believers start to eat in the evening and stop at daybreak). In Um-el-Feham, one shopkeeper from the family of the secretary of the local Rakah chapter, tried to open his store. He was beaten, and the local council which officially controls the Rakah Front, accepted the proposal that citizens close their grocery stores, coffeehouses, and restaurants during the day. Rakah members and the villagers voted against this, but the traditional dignitaries, including members of Rakah Front, adopted the proposal.

The proposal for the "auxiliary law," which has not yet been made into law, is practiced today as if it were law. In other villages in the Galilee, auxiliary laws have been adopted forbidding the sale of alcoholic beverages and opening restaurants during the month of Ramadan. In contrast, in Nazareth (which is half Christian), the foreigner would not know that we was in the middle of the Moslem month of fasting. But even in Nazareth, a struggle is going on between the Moslem zealots and their brothers who are indifferent to matters of religion. Rakah members, the first target of the zealots, tried at first to react actively to the provocations of the zealots, but, recently, they retreated and began to dismiss their opponents as transient phenomenon without basis or justification.



Only the future will tell how long the zealous Moslem wave, which came to Israel largely via the territories, will last. Meanwhile, we can see daily, on the outskirts of Nazareth, groups of people from Gaza waiting for an employer to offer them some kind of menial work. These people sleep in Nazareth in poor quarters, just as they do in Tel Aviv or Haifa. Their presence and their readiness to do any menial job, has brought a new concept into spoken Arabic. A Gaza man is someone who will do any menial job in a slovenly way, and who will take bribes. (This concept is similar to one familiar to many Jews—that of Arab's work.)

In other words, it is easy to see the feelings of superiority that many Arabs experience in relation to their brothers from the other side of the "green line." This feeling is directed, especially, at people from Gaza, but also towards West Bank residents who have made it possible for many Israeli Arabs to move up a rung among the construction workers and to become overseers or sub-contractors (who carry out contracting work under a Jewish contractor, for the most part). To members of the underworld, the Arabs and Jews in Israel are in similar territories, concerned mainly with marketing the booty (at times by way of bridges). Even in the underworld there exists, generally, a hierarchy of Jewish and Arab Israeli thieves. But the Arab Israelis are found more often among those mediating for the establishment of communication with the marketeers in Nablus and Jenin. But, of course, there are also exceptions. Recently, a "merchant" was found from one of the villages near Nazareth who hired several Jewish burglars to steal from him from Jewish Yeshivot (religious schools) and synagogues.

In summary; the transformation of the borders with Jordan and Egypt in 1967 to the "green line" brought about changes in almost all sectors of the Arab population on both sides of the green line. But these changes have not reached the point of canceling out the differences or even reducing them significantly.

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## ARAB LEADER VIEWS COOPERATION BETWEEN ARABS, JEWS

Tel Aviv 'AL HANISHMAR in Hebrew 15 Aug 80 p 8

[Article by Kassem Z.D.: "Our Part in the National Pie was Too Small: The Red Line for Israeli Arabs"]

[Text] In order to keep to the purpose of this series, namely, to bring a variety of views presented by varied personalities with differing political approaches, we went to Nawaf Massalha this week. He is a member of the central committee of the Histadrut General Federation of Labor and asked to hear his views on subjects concerning the Israeli Arabs.

We wanted to hear his evaluation of the condition of Israeli Arabs in recent days. Massalha, who is an experienced and polished politician, believes as follows: "The situation is critical. I once wrote that the situation was fluid. Today I say that it is critical and that we are at a turning point.

"The Likud government has hardly touched the basic problems of the Israeli Arabs. There has been no basic solution to the problems of education. On the contrary, instead of raising the standards, they have been frozen. Despite the fact that the education committee was shaken by the situation in the territories, nothing has been done. I admit that even the Labor movement has not done enough in this area."

## Political Solutions

According to Massalha, "there have been no political or social solutions. There were not even any humanitarian solutions. A humanitarian problem like Iqrit and Bir'an was not solved despite the personal assurances of the Prime Minister when he was still the leader of the opposition. The gradual annexation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip brought about a complete identification between the Israeli Arabs and their brothers in the territories. As a result of the behavior of the government and of the majority of the Knesset, the green line cannot serve any longer as a barrier to this identification."

What has brought about this critical situation? "Leftist movements and use of the new political frameworks by Rakah, establishment of the Democratic Front for Equality and Peace in local Arab councils, the election of many of the council heads who speak for the Democratic Front with the financial and political power

of the councils, oversights of all the previous governments, and, especially, of the present government, and the behavior of various Jewish nationalist groups on campuses and in West Bank towns—all these have brought about the current critical situation."

Despite all this, Massalha did not seem pessimistic. "I believe that we are close to a change of government, and I believe that in the Labor movement, there are large groups of Knesset members, members of the coordinating committee of the Histadrut and other public figures who believe in a joint future. These, along with Jewish public movements will bring us to a peace agreement with the Palestinian nation and with the other Arab states."

#### A National Program

Massalha believes that "the lessons of the past have been learned, in part, and Jews and Arabs in the Labor movement and outside of it can find an atmosphere for meaningful change in a policy—for the good of Israeli Arabs—for greater equalities, political culture, not on the basis of the stick and the carrot or by means of intimidation or persuasion of the Israeli Arabs. I fully believe that we will attain equality by means of a struggle within the system."

Massalha does not engage in speculation about what will happen if the hoped for change does not come about. "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof. We will worry about what to do when the time comes."

Is the national program of the Labor Party responsive to the needs and wishes of its Arab members? "I don't know of a written national program. Perhaps there is an oral tradition. I admit that our part in the national pie has been too small. In the future, there will have to be a change for the better, even by revolutionary means. I can believe and accept what the head of the Labor Party, MK Shimon Peres, once said to us: "We have established a state over the past 30 years. In the coming years, we will solidify it and rule it together in partnership, Jews and Arabs."

Massalha explains what he understands of Peres' words. "He refers to partnership in decisions—and not in personal responsibilities and the granting of special favors to this or that group. It means, rather, a just and fully equal division."

#### The Joint Involvement is Just Beginning

Our discussant says of the involvement of Arab members of the Histadrut, "The cooperation is not yet completed. It has only begun. The true fit is not simply in a change of the name of the Arab division in the Histadrut to the joint division. I was among those who presented the program for merging. I am at peace with myself. This joining together is expressed on several planes. First of all, it is expressed in the establishment of independent workers' committees, subordinate to the organization, the development of norms, and the establishment of new structures for the institutions of the Histadrut in the Arab sector."

Massalha presented us with a detailed plan and a list of villages which will have workers' committees by the end of the year. According to Massalha, Aharon Haral's program is being carried out to the letter. Three Arab members have been appointed to the central committee of the Histadrut. Two Arab members have been appointed to the administration of the workers' association. An Arab member was fit into the secretariat of [NA'AMAT] [a women's organization], and four Arabs were chosen to belong to the workers' committee of the Histadrut. (It should be noted that MAPAM (United Workers Party) initiated this change some time ago.) Also, several Arab members have been appointed to the Histadrut council, and there are several others in the organization. "Representation has been fully realized. In other areas as well, there has been far-reaching change. This demonstrates a change in goals on the road to full cooperation. There are Jews and Arabs who will continue to pursue this process until it is completed,

"And it is unwise to think that the change in the Arab division is in name only. The change is substantive." Massalha enumerates further achievements in the process of cooperation. "Arab members have entered the agricultural sector, and I believe that within the next five years, all the Arab members in the Histadrut will be able to choose and be chosen for independent workers' councils."

#### The Change -- Within the Parties

What is Massalha's opinion of the "Arab Haloubi?"

"Haloubi is a nice name. We are living in a democratic state, where representation takes place within parties. If the Jews are represented in at least 20 parties, I am not fooling myself to think that the Israeli Arabs must and can be represented by a single party. I believe that it is possible to make changes within the framework of the Labor movement and of the Alinement. And if the people representing the Arabs in those parties, along with independent public figures, want to set up a forum to deal with the special problems of the Israeli Arabs, I would certainly participate in such a forum.

"The choice in the Arab sector is between the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality and the Labor Movement. I see no political future or influence for yet another framework which argues that it shares the same principles as the Labor movement but is unwilling to participate in it. Furthermore, once the Labor Party has 12,000 Arab members who have chosen their representatives, I cannot believe that any other group can claim that it represents the Arabs in a more democratic manner.

"If the leaders of the Labor Party refused to join the faction of the Alinement, which included vacillating MKs, even when they could have overthrown the government, I don't believe that they would agree to advice and demands from people who are apparently close to the Labor movement but who are unwilling to work within it.

"From my experience in the Alinement, I can say that there are many elected officials, especially in the Knesset, who believe in a true peace with the Palestinians and who have fought in the past and will again in the future to correct the injustices that have been perpetrated against the Israeli Arabs. They would be willing to fight to the point of demanding the abolition of laws which are unfair to the Israeli Arabs. They would work to carve out a policy for the next four years which would contain within it guarantees for a true peace. Perhaps, then, they would extricate us from the critical state that we are in today."

What guarantee is there that Massalha's wish will be fulfilled when the majority of the Knesset members in the Labor Party have supported anti-democratic laws which mainly affect Israeli Arabs?

"I think that at times there are internal political forces and fears affecting the voter, as though he would not restore the Alignment to power because of the image painted by the Likud, as if the Alignment would establish a Palestinian state. Apparently, it is this fear which brought about such behavior during the vote. I don't want you to misunderstand me. I don't accept this explanation, just as there are many Jewish and Arab members who do not accept this."

#### Against the Approach of the "Arabists"

The cooperating group (read: the Arab section in the Histadrut—K.A.), in conjunction with the office of the Prime Minister's advisor for Arab affairs, are initiating the establishment of a team to respond, among other things, to "extremist" phenomena in the Arab sector.

We asked Massalha his opinion about this team. "I told those who initiated this team that I am against any consensus of "Arabists" or of the Arab groups--whether in the government or outside of it--directed against the Israeli Arabs. During the years when the Alignment was in the opposition, the Jewish and Arab peoples saw the Likud government as failing miserably.

"Nevertheless, there is no reason for the representatives of the Alignment to appear united in this area or any other. I oppose any cooperation with the office of the Prime Minister who represents Likud. I am opposed to an apologetic attitude on the part of Arabs towards the government. There must be a change in the conception of a peaceful coexistence between Jews and Arabs. This will take place by means of personal education and not through vague and sterile decisions.

"If someone thinks that the 'Arabists,' by means of such an initiative, can solve problems, he is mistaken. I can also promise that the power of the 'Arabists' will not increase as a result of this ridiculous initiative."

Massalha becomes more serious. "If the Histadrut joins in partnership with the office of the Prime Minister and the Likud, I will bring this issue before the central committee of the Histadrut, and I will fight publicly to bring about its defeat."

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## RELIGIOUS SCHOOL ENROLLMENTS SHOW DECLINE

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 2 Nov 80 p 17

[Article by Roni Eshel: "Decline in the Number of Students in the Religious Educational System"]

[Text] A decline in the number of students in the State Religious Educational System has recently become evident. Persons in the Religious Education Department who are now completing a statistical study of the student population have not yet summarized their findings. However, it seems that the decline is only in the State Religious Educational System and not in the post-primary religious educational system.

This is a process which runs counter to the efforts and resources which have been invested in recent years in religious education since Minister Zevulun Hammer assumed his position.

It is evident that the decline in the number of students is precisely among those who require special care in the settlements distant from the center of the country.

The people in the department attribute this phenomenon to two main reasons: A decline in the birth rate in the eastern communities and a process of impiety, that is to say, an abandonment of religion and a gradual shift to secularism.

However, the recent closure of religious educational institutions is not related to the decline in the number of students. People in the Religious Education Department explain this as an "effort to make the system more effective."

Religious education is still the Achilles' heel of the entire educational system. Of the 250,000 students in religious education, the proportion of those who require special care is about 65 percent. About half of the graduates of the primary educational system continue their studies along technological lines. However, this educational system involves the investment of enormous resources, and when the shortage of suitable equipment is combined with the level of the students, it does not advance the status and prestige of religious education.

The relatively large-scale replacement of school principals is explained by the Religious Department as an attempt to change the atmosphere and content of the educational institutions. However, the dimensions of the replacement are especially large, and at times the reason is precisely the deficiency of the principals. Of

the approximately 550 principals at all levels, every year about 17-20 percent are replaced.

The heads of the Religious Education Department vigorously reject the integration of religious and secular educational institutions. Their reason is that it is necessary to equip the religious youth with "suitable antibodies which will permit them to live in a joint society with secular education."

People in the department identify today two main problems in religious education. One is the level of the technological education, and the other is the enormous gap between the established religious population and the nonestablished one. This gap is described by them as "explosive material," and they admit that to date significant steps have not been taken to bring the two segments of the population closer together.

In the matter of content it is evident that the heads of the department have not yet found a way to provide programs in Judaic studies to those who require special care in a form which would integrate various subjects, and not in the traditional way of studying a page of the Talmud, for example.

People in the department acknowledge that there was a significant change with Zevulun Hammer's assumption of his position. In the last 3 years, according to them, there has been a correction of some of the inequities including that which has been accomplished by an increase in the appropriations for the religious educational system.

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## PRISONERS GIVE VIEWS ON ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION

Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 3 Nov 80 p 5

[Article by Yehuda Conforts: "A Discriminatory Society Constitutes a Legitimization of Crime"]

[Text] Most of the studies done in Israel on the ethnic community gap have concluded that there is a connection between the ethnic origin of prison inmates in Israel and their criminal background. More than half of the prison inmates in Israel are what we call "members of the eastern communities." Over 95 percent of the inmates of Tel Mond prison, which houses prisoners up to the age of 21, are from North African and Asian families.

However, while most of the studies on this subject have been based primarily on conversations with young people from the eastern communities who are in various stages of their education, there was a recent interesting attempt in Tel Mond prison to find out what the young inmates think about ethnic community relations in Israel.

The attempt was made in the framework of a special study by Ms Brakha Rovnikov, of the School of Education of Tel Aviv University, as a thesis for an M.A. degree assisted by Drs Orit Ikhilov and Mikhael Hen, also from the School of Education. Of the prison inmates about 145 youths were selected, assembled in the rooms of the Vocational Training Institute of the prison, and asked to respond anonymously to a series of questions on the ethnic community gap. The main topics of the questions were the readiness to maintain any contact with members of the Ashkenazic communities, feelings of discrimination, social status, and their degree of identification with the ethnic community to which they belong. The responses of the interviewees were compared with the responses of high school students and intermediate groups [refers to groups of students from the kibbutzim and rural areas formed for the purpose of providing them with a high school-equivalent education] of the eastern communities which were given in the framework of earlier studies conducted in recent years. The most prominent of these are the studies of Dr Yohanan Peres and Dr Hen who also participated in this study as a moderator. The results of this study, which were first published a short time ago in the publication HEVRA U'REVAHA of the Ministry of Social Betterment, show interesting differences in the viewpoints of the youth of the eastern communities who are on the other side of the barricade and the connection between their being criminals and their attitude toward the Ashkenazim.

One of the main topics was the readiness to maintain close ties with members of the Ashkenazic communities in the various categories of closeness: marriage, friendship, and neighborliness. The research team estimated on the basis of earlier studies that it would be the inmates who would show a much greater readiness for ties with the Ashkenazim than the other youths who were not in prison. However, a slightly different picture emerges from an examination of the inmates' responses: 32 percent of the 144 interviewees gave a definitely negative response to the question, "Are you ready for marriage?" Only 10 percent responded affirmatively and selected the answer: "Definitely ready," 15 percent were only "ready," and 33 percent responded, "It makes no difference to me." Dr Yohanan Peres' study, conducted in 1968 with 11th grade students, showed a different order of priorities: Of the 195 interviewees, 29 percent said that they were "definitely ready," 50 percent answered that they were "ready," and only 2 percent responded, "Not ready."

Another question put to the inmates was how they believed the Ashkenazim would respond if they were asked if they were ready to marry members of the eastern communities. The results: 55 percent believed that the Ashkenazim dissociate themselves from them and from members of the eastern communities in general and 22 percent believed that the Ashkenazim were ready for ties with members of the eastern communities, however not under any conditions.

Similar responses were also obtained to questions about their readiness for close ties such as friendship or neighborliness. The researchers' conclusion on this subject was that the more the inmate feels that the Ashkenazim reject the members of his ethnic community the more he will reject them and vice versa. The estimate that the inmates would display a readiness for compromises and try to get closer to the members of the other ethnic community more than the latter would want to get closer to them was incorrect, and any discussion of the problem of the ethnic community gap in any framework should take this into account.

The inmates were shown to be more loyal to their ethnic community, and public opinions of each ethnic community were more important to them than other youths of their age. One of the questions put to them on this topic was: "When they praise someone from your ethnic community, do you feel as if they have praised you?" Thirty percent of the inmates responded that they do have such a feeling "always," 22 percent claimed that it does not affect them, and the rest selected responses of "never" or "infrequently." In Peres' study of this subject, 33 percent of the students responded that flattering comments made about members of their ethnic community caused them to have a special feeling only infrequently whereas 25 percent responded, "Never." The conclusions from these responses indicate, according to the researchers, that prison inmates develop a closer relationship to members of their ethnic community than other youths of their age. According to the researchers, high school students of the eastern communities try to become involved in the "Ashkenazic" society and for this purpose, they are ready to compromise on closeness to home, tradition, and ethnic community. In this study the researchers did not ignore, of course, the fact of the respondents' being inmates despite the questions not being oriented toward this subject.

It is evident from an examination of the responses to the questions regarding personal discrimination and prospects for advancement in society that the inmates



answered that in their opinion the prospects of members of the eastern communities attaining key positions in Israel are less than those of the Ashkenazic [Text missing] 91 percent of the students of the intermediate groups of the eastern communities, in Dr Hen's study, that their prospects are the same or even better than those of the Ashkenazim. It is evident from this that the more extended the contact that the inmate has with the law authorities, the stronger are his feelings of personal and social discrimination.

Another subject which they were asked to comment on was their opinion of the Ashkenazim by characteristics such as brave, clever, intelligent, cultured, successful, and so forth. Also available on this subject to the researchers was Peres' study which explicitly determined that students of the eastern communities have a higher regard for members of their ethnic community than the Ashkenazim with respect to all the characteristics, personal and social. From the questionnaire submitted to the inmates [Text missing] in their opinion, members of the eastern communities are braver, stronger, and better looking than the Ashkenazim. In contrast, the Ashkenazim are smarter, richer, and more modern than members of the eastern communities. The effect of the inmates' criminality was also examined, and the results showed that those studied who had spent time in institutions for young criminals had a lower opinion of members of their community than their counterparts who had not spent time in their youth in these institutions.

This study did not examine the views of the Ashkenazim on this subject. According to the researchers, it shows that the inmates from the eastern communities do not internalize their image of society. They have a clear attitude toward the members of the other communities--an attitude which they probably will express [Text missing] their belonging to the criminal group constitutes for them a kind of alternate channel to the legitimate ways of achieving a position and place in life. This actually has a double effect: One is expressed when these inmates leave prison and continue to go around with feelings of discrimination. On the other hand, these feelings constitute a basis for committing various criminal acts or in the academic language of the researchers: "It is not possible to determine with certainty that the criminals' feelings were a factor in their criminality, however there is reason to assume that a view of society as discriminatory is a legitimization for a criminal group."

There is apparently nothing new in this conclusion, however it can be a significant argument in a discussion of the rehabilitation of inmates [Text missing].

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CSO: 4805

RESEARCHERS DEVELOP PROCESS TO PROTECT WHEAT CROP

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 5 Oct 80 p 4

[Article by Aharon Pri'el: "A New Process Will Permit Growth of High-Yield Wheat in Arid Regions"]

[Text] A new system for locating and sorting wheat strains resistant to drought has been developed by a group of Israeli researchers. This system will allow high-yield wheat to be grown in arid areas without irrigation. It is based upon use of an infra-red heat measuring instrument developed by the American space program with which earth-orbiting satellites are equipped.

The new system was developed by a group of researchers under the direction of Abraham Blum at the Field Crop Department of the Bet-Dagan Volcanic Research Center.

Dr Blum noted that special importance is placed on the development of drought-resistant wheat strains in Israel, since most of the wheat in Israel is grown under very warm conditions without irrigation. Excessive drought is likely to cause complete or partial loss of the crop. High-yield drought-resistant wheat will contribute to development and enlargement of wheat-growing areas under non-irrigated arid conditions.

According to Dr. Blum, the researchers found that drought-resistant wheat strains have a special characteristic not present in ordinary wheat strains. This feature allows the plant to use all the water available in the ground to stay alive. Non-drought-resistant strains apparently lack this special mechanism.

The researchers found that the drought-resistant wheat strains maintain a lower leaf temperature than other strains. Dr Blum explains that by measuring the temperature of the leaves, it is now possible to sort and locate drought-resistant wheat strains.

The infra-red thermometer is used for measuring the plants' temperature. These researchers were the first to succeed in applying the "space thermometer" to distinguish drought-resistant wheat.

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## ISRAEL

### BRIEFS

**ARAB EDUCATION**--Nationalistic extremism and delinquency in the Arab community stem from the fact that Arab education is devoid of any content, Arab Justice of the Peace Rasm Nashaf of Jerusalem argued yesterday at the Knesset Education and Culture Subcommittee. He said that students refuse to study, teachers refuse to teach, and the authorities take no interest in what goes on in Arab schools. He cited incidents in which principals and inspectors break the rules and help cheat on final exams. He maintains that senior employees need to be replaced in the Arab education system. Judge Nashaf believes that the goals of Jewish and Arab education cannot be separated. He asked, for example, why Jewish schools teach "The Arab-Israeli Conflict," while Arab institutions teach the same subject under the title of "Arab-Jewish Relations." [Text] [Tel Aviv MAARIV in Hebrew 29 Oct 80 p 2] 9565

CSO: 4805

JORDANIAN VIEW OF PLO

LD060807 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 3 Jan 81 p 3

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT exclusive report: "Questions About the Dimensions and Meaning of the Cancellation of Kissinger's Visit to Amman: Jordan Remains Loyal to the PLO"]

[Text] Amman--During his current visit to a number of Middle Eastern capitals former U.S. Secretary of State Dr Henry Kissinger expressed his hope that Jordan would join the peace process soon. However, Kissinger is not expected to visit Amman--a matter which made observers show little interest in his statements in this connection since Jordan itself cancelled his visit.

Jordan continues to adhere to its stand of demanding complete Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967 and calling for guarantees of the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people represented by the PLO.

King Husayn has often rejected the Camp David peace formula. During his recent visit to Cairo this week Kissinger expressed his support for this formula. King Husayn is not likely to back down from the commitment he made to the PLO at the 1974 Rabat summit conference.

However, American diplomatic sources in the Jordanian capital are not too sure about this on the grounds that the PLO's boycott of last month's Amman summit conference is bound to weaken the existing relations between the PLO and the Jordanian Government.

The summit conference itself has often emphasized its support for the PLO's stand. Meanwhile, government officials in Amman reject all notions connected with the "Jordanian option" as well as any peace initiative that does not include the PLO.

Jordanian Minister for Occupied Territories Affairs Hasan Ibrahim has stated: "There is no Jordanian option: there is only an Israeli option. This option began with the Alon plan. The Israelis contemplate reaching a settlement with Jordan--a settlement that ignores the Palestinians."

In the wake of the 1967 war former Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Alon proposed that Israel effect a partial withdrawal from the occupied territories and keep a chain of Israeli settlements along the Jordan Valley for defense purposes.

It is known that Hasan Ibrahim himself is a Palestinian citizen from the town of Ya'bud near Nabulus in the West Bank. He was compelled to emigrate after the June



1967 war and has not been able to return since. As far as he is concerned, return signifies recognition of the occupation authorities.

It is worth noting that a section of the Palestinians regard with suspicion the ministry headed by Hasan Ibrahim. The minister recognizes this fact and says: "A residue of bitterness remains in people's hearts since the September 1970 incidents and the blow the Jordanian Army dealt to the Palestinian resistance forces in the country." But he adds emphatically: "Everybody feels that when an Israeli withdrawal becomes possible, Jordan and Palestine have a common future."

He says: "It is not impossible that they will not come together. I am not saying that they will merge but that there will be a formula that will bring them together. The Palestinians are saying that they want their own state but they are always saying also that it is impossible for them not to have a special relationship with Jordan."

The Jordanian minister says that the Israeli authorities do not stop raising obstacles in the way of the efforts his ministry is making to provide services and care for the inhabitants of the occupied territories.

The universities are considered as a particular source of friction. Bir Zayt University is now closed. The Israeli authorities are claiming that the universities are a source of constant "unrest."

Local Palestinian entities, however, believe that the Israelis are trying to weaken the educational capabilities available to the Palestinian people.

Minister Ibrahim expresses his conviction that the occupation authorities are pursuing a deliberate provocative policy in order to foment division and "unrest" and then create a suitable atmosphere for the Palestinians to emigrate.

Hasan Ibrahim recognizes that Palestinians are emigrating from the occupied territories in large numbers, particularly Palestinians who have graduated from universities or have received education abroad and find it difficult to find work in their country.

Despite the fact that he is a Palestinian, the Jordanian minister emphasizes the legality of the Jordanian authority over the whole West Bank on the grounds that the West Bank was part of Jordan up till the June 1967 war. However, he cautions: we must not confuse this with a "Jordanian option."

In 1974, Jordan recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Hasan Ibrahim then says: "When the matter becomes one of an option, it must be perfectly clear that the PLO is the representatives of the Palestinian people and it is impossible to disregard it. Jordan, however, can play a positive role."

The Jordanian minister did not wish to elaborate on the nature of this role but he emphasized that "it is a role and not an option."

**TWO EGYPTIANS ARRESTED FOR FORGERY, EMBEZZLEMENT**

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 7 Nov 80 p 3

[Article by Ibrahim al-Barghuthi: "Two Brothers Arrested in Biggest Forgery and Embezzlement Operation; Activity of Two Brothers Covers Four Arab Capitals; Gang Leader Is Bank Employee Who Disguises Under Wig' Forged Degrees From Universities of 'Ayn Shams, Alexandria and Cairo; Tens of Forgeries and Victims and Gains in Millions; Seals and Documents of Banks, Embassies, Ministries and Companies Forged"]

[Text] The public prosecution is currently interrogating defendant Tariq J. and his brother 'Umar, two Egyptians, on the charge of forging and using official documents.

The intelligence investigations have shown that Tariq went to a bank to collect a promisory note issued by one of the bank's clients to Hisham M., an Egyptian carrying passport No 25601 (the note's value was \$150,000). But the bank officials suspected the authenticity of the signature on the promisory note and contacted the intelligence men who arrested Tariq.

When questioned, the accused said that the passport he had was forged and that he had acquired it through his brother Haytham who lives in Cairo.

He added that he was able to stick his own photograph on the passport and to stamp pages 4-9 with forged seals, including the seal of arrival in Kuwait at the invitation of the client whose signature he forged on the promisory note that he was to collect. He also admitted that he committed the forgery to collect the value of the note.

It has become evident from the investigations that the accused has worked as a clerk in the bills of exchange section of the said bank for 2 years, that his job enabled him to know the clients' accounts and that he was able through it to obtain the account number of the victim. He then obtained a blank promisory note and typed on it the particulars, using a typewriter belonging to the bank.

It has also become evident that the defendant was in possession of a number of forged seals, passports and documents and that he kept the documents at his home in al-Sulaybikhat. Tariq also admitted that his brother 'Umar, the second defendant, helped and cooperated with him in his forgeries.

### Disguising Under Wig

On inspecting the defendant's home, two wigs and a pair of sunglasses were seized and the defendant admitted that he used them while collecting checks in order to change his appearance, disguise and conceal his personality from his colleagues at the bank.

He also said that he forged several Egyptian passports, using in one of them the name of Muhammad, a student at the Engineering College of Cairo University. He added that he also forged a Jordanian passport belonging to Eduwar Y. After stealing the passport from its owner who lives in al-Shuwaykh, Tariq removed the photograph of the original owner and replaced it with his own, adding to and changing the details on the passport, including the place of residence and the name which he changed to Ahmad. Tariq also said that he acquired through forgery a number of checkbooks under various names, several work identities under different vocations, including accountant and food inspector, and several forms for opening bank accounts. He added that he kept the photograph of a collected check with the purpose of forging the issuer's name in future acts of embezzlement.

### Forged University Degree

He also said that he acquired a forged copy of a degree issued under the name of Tariq from the 'Ayn Shams University's School of Arts. He also acquired a copy of the seal of the Kuwaiti Embassy in Cairo undersigned by the undersecretary of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the purpose of using it to forge two B.A. degrees issued by the 'Ayn Shams University, the first by the university's School of Arts and the second by its Law School. This is in addition to forging a third degree issued by the Alexandria University's School of Medicine and fourth degree issued by the 'Ayn Shams School of Commerce.

### Bill of Exchange for More Than One Million Dinars

Tariq added that he used in his forgeries a certificate issued by the Egyptian Ministry of Health, bank seals, certificates issued to whomever is concerned, bills of exchange, including a bill for the sum of 1,135,000 Kuwaiti dinars, banking papers issued by a company in the UAE from which the defendant forged a letter to the passports department of the said fraternal state [UAE] asking the department to facilitate the defendant's entry to the state's territories under the guarantee of the said company, medical reports and the stamps of hospitals and doctors.

### Activity Reaches Baghdad

Tariq also said that he used official papers issued by the Egyptian Embassy in Baghdad to facilitate his entry to Kuwait, forged papers transferring to the bank, the salaries of a male and a female nurse working in a hospital, blank loan applications from the bank, seals of the Naturalization, Passports and Residence Department, forms for the collection of confidential bills of exchange under the name of several clients of the bank in which he worked and for enormous sums.

The investigation has also proven that Tariq has been in possession of (printing plates) and typesetters, papers, ink and dry clay for use in forgery. The plates included imitations of the stamps of the bank's computer section and cash deposit sections and an imitation of the Kuwaiti residence seal.

As for 'Umar, it has become evident that he took part with his brother, who has a criminal record, in several criminal acts. Moreover, there is a circular for his arrest stating that he carries the false name of Hassan A. and that he is wanted by the Egyptian authorities, according to a letter he received from his brother Haytham who lives in Cairo.

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CSO: 4802

## BRIEFS

**CENTRAL BANK ANNUAL REPORT**—The Central Bank of Kuwait provided the local money market with the equivalent of \$1.7 billion in the fiscal year with ended on June 30 in a bid to maintain local liquidity, according to the bank's annual report which was issued last week. The report added that the money supply increased by 29 per cent during the same period and included disbursements by the government due to a speed-up in economic activity, notably in construction and for development projects. Government spending was increased by 20 per cent during the fiscal year as part of a deliberate effort to expand local liquidity and to counter the effect of large-scale outflows of capital. The outflows were large during the first nine months of the fiscal year but there was a slowdown in private sector capital transfers out of Kuwait during the first six months of 1980 and this helped reduce the strain on liquidity, the report noted. It attributed this fall to several factors, including a drop in foreign interest rates, in particular for the dollar, which was faster than for local interest rates; other factors cited by the report were the restrictions on establishing Gulf companies and reduced demand for gold. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & Memo in English 8 Dec 80 p 7]

**OSLO LOAN**—Kuwait International Investment Company has announced that it is co-managing with the Spare Banken Oslo Akershus, a Norwegian bank, the issuance of a loan to the city of Oslo. The issue amounts to 100 million kroner (\$20 million). Its duration is five years and is repayable by 1986 at an annual interest rate of 9-3/4 per cent. The issue will be registered in Oslo and Luxembourg's stock exchange markets. The client is a distinguished borrower. A number of European, Japanese and Arab banks share in running the issue including the Kuwait Foreign Trading, Contracting and Investment company.—Kuna [Text] [Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 11 Dec 80 p 3]

CSO: 4820



# MIXED REACTIONS TO NEW CABINET CITED

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 27 Oct 80 p 4

[Article: "Parliamentary and Political Reactions to Cabinet Formation; Some Deputies Welcome and Others Open Fire; Paramount Shaykh Expresses Support and Amal Movement Warns"]

[Text] The quality of support has been predominant in the parliamentary and political reactions to the formation of the new cabinet. However, some deputies have not waited for the cabinet to appear before the Chamber of Deputies to give it or withhold from it their support but have hastened to open fire on it for various considerations.

Deputy August Bakhus has said: "We welcome this formation because it includes capable and honorable elements, especially since the current conditions do not permit a formation that represents all the inclinations. We have been represented in this cabinet in the best manner possible."

Deputy Farid Jubran: "I had been demanding a cabinet of armed government of activists [fa'aliyat musallahah] [sic] so that it may be able to gather the weapons and to establish security quickly. But due to the impossibility of the formation of such a cabinet, we have accepted mixed parliamentary and extra-parliamentary cabinet, provided that the Struggle Front be represented in it by two ministers. Acceptance or rejection of this cabinet is up to the National Struggle Front.

"As for me as a representative of the people and of the minorities, including the Catholic Armenians, the Protestants, the Catholics, the Syrians and the Chaldeans, it is surprising that these sects which are represented by three deputies in the Chamber of Deputies are not represented [in the cabinet] for the first time since independence. This is in violation of the traditions.

"My position will be in conflict with that of the front if the front considers itself represented in the cabinet. My initial inclination is to withhold confidence from it."

Deputy Rafiq Shahin: "This cabinet is like a magic box. When we were young, we used to be told: 'Come and have a look at the wonders of the world.'"

Deputy Jubran Tawq: "Prime Minister al-Wazzan's statement that his cabinet is a cabinet for all of Lebanon does not apply to the reality and is incompatible with the structure of the cabinet which he has announced. There are areas of Lebanon that

that have not been represented, including the area of Bahirri which has played an important and historic role in the distant and near past, which has spared no efforts, which has made all kinds of sacrifices for the sake of Lebanon and which has been the shield protecting Lebanon's independence and supporting its legitimacy. The area lacks no leaders, whether parliamentary or extra-parliamentary." Deputy Tawq has expressed surprise at the officials' constant disregard for this reality in order to appease some sides which have vetoed any participation in the cabinet by Bahirri representatives. "This is unacceptable to us or to the Bahirri people who refuse to have representation of the northern province confined to Zgharta, al-Batrun or some adjacent areas."

However, Tawq finds it unlikely that he will withhold his vote of confidence "because we consider that the Maronite deputies grouping is represented by Minister Ilyas al-Harawi, in addition to several friends whom we respect and appreciate and for whom we wish every success."

Deputy Michel Sasin has criticized "the method to which the regime still resorts to form cabinets. This method seeks to exclude from government the sincere and effective Lebanese forces. This is one of the reasons that have allowed the tragic conditions to continue until now. The people concerned have found that such cabinets devoid government of its meaning and, consequently, shackle its ability to solve Lebanon's problems and to restore to Lebanon its unity and tranquility."

Deputy Sasin wondered: "How can the regime consider the removal of some ministers who are political failures but who are imposed by their popularity something that undermines the personal prestige of the regime's head whereas [it believes that] this prestige is not affected by the exclusion of all the effective and sincere Christian and Muslim Lebanese forces? What is worst in the matter is that disdain among the officials has reached the extent of their asking the Lebanese forces to confine their role to attending the Chamber of Deputies session and to giving their confidence to this cabinet which is formed of friends and companions. It is as if the regime thus wants the effective Lebanese forces to establish by themselves and against themselves the veto imposed on their presence in the government."

"Persistence in excluding the sincere Lebanese forces from the government and in devoiding the government of its capabilities to deal with the situation is a crime that must not be condoned or accepted. I cannot but consider this a part of the premeditated plan to partition the country and to devoid it of its capabilities. After an experience of 4 years with the regime, the people feel disappointed in the regime and in the rulers."

Deputy Shafiq Badr: "Considering that this government has been called an ordinary government to dispose of affairs, it would have been better for us to retain the previous government and not to embroil ourselves in cabinet crises. New extra-parliamentary personalities whom we do not know and of whom we have not heard have been appointed. Is the task of these new personalities to rescue Lebanon? We have demanded a parliamentary cabinet that can adopt political decisions with a spirit of responsibility and have been surprised by a cabinet formed of a parliamentary minority and an extra-parliamentary majority. This majority is not even technocratic in nature, and you know how the cabinets of technocrats failed."

"In line with the demands which we expressed to Prime Minister al-Wassan during the consultations, we cannot but oppose this cabinet strongly and resolutely, especially

when we see that five ministers of state have been appointed just to collect salaries and without having anything specific to do."

Deputy Emile Ruhana Saqr: "The cabinet has come contrary to what we and the people had wished. We expected a cabinet of national detente or a cabinet that rules only to be surprised by a cabinet which will lead us only God knows where, not to mention the correspondence and the intricacies which preceded its formation and which the regime should have avoided out of concern for its prestige and its dignity."

Deputy Fu'ad Lahhud: "The new cabinet represents nothing and cannot face the developments or deal with the crisis in which Lebanon is groping. Therefore, it is not the cabinet needed in this circumstance. The regime's formation of a cabinet which is incapable as of the moment of its birth constitutes a leap into the unknown and a historical responsibility whose consequences this regime must shoulder."

Deputy Hassan al-Rifa'i: "The new cabinet and its head have come without consultations. It is considered an unconstitutional and illegitimate cabinet."

#### Paramount Shaykh

Muhammad Abu-Shaqra, the paramount shaykh [shaykh al-'aql] of the Druze sect, has said: "We have not been concerned with whom the cabinet is formed of and how it is formed. What has been of concern to us is that legitimacy survive and that there be in our country a government that rules. Now that the cabinet has been formed, we wish it success and hope that it will prove its presence and will work to serve the country and to lighten the tragedies and the suffering experienced by the citizens day after day. We hope that the new cabinet will rise up to the level of its responsibilities, will feel its duties toward the homeland and will be helped by the circumstances to improve the situation and to overcome the vicious circle."

On his opinion regarding the distribution of the ministerial portfolios, the shaykh said: "We had hoped that our sect's lot of the ministerial portfolios would be better, considering that we had been denied ministerial representation for almost a year. But out of our concern for the smooth running of government, we do not wish to put in the face of the new cabinet obstacles that would hamper its march. We again underline our wishes for the government to do all that can serve Lebanon's good and serve the interest of its citizens."

#### Amal Movement

Nabih Barri, the chairman of Amal Movement Command Council, believes that the "cabinet which has been born by a Caesarean has not taken into consideration the principle of eliminating discrimination in the distribution of portfolios but has created a superficially equal number of portfolios for the Shi'ite sect--portfolios with no ministerial meaning through which one can say that a realistic and sound representation has been established for a sect whose membership counts one half Lebanon's population or more."

Barri has criticized the persistence in injustice, saying: "The patriotic sect which carries Lebanon in its heart and mind and carries Lebanon's burdens in the number of lives it has sacrificed and in the heavier price it has paid for the Israeli aggressions than all the other sects together should not be punished in these crooked

and sectarian ways. It is unbelievable that a city like Zahlah is represented by three ministers whereas the entire al-Biqa', including Ba'labakk-al-Hirmil, is not represented even by a single minister. It is as if the women of al-Biqa' give birth to no ministers. Therefore, top-level meetings will be held in succession in the coming days and will be crowned by a meeting of the Amal Movement leadership to adopt the appropriate position toward the regime and the cabinet."

Lawyer Nur-al-Din Nur-al-Din, the chairman of the National Grouping, has expressed the belief that announcement of the formation of the new cabinet is a very secondary step insofar as the southerners are concerned "because the important thing is the actions and not the men." He has demanded a clear foreign policy based on clear principles that can be understood by whoever is concerned with the issue of the south in particular and of Lebanon in general "otherwise the south will remain as it is. But we, the southerners, will not remain as we are."

In the name of the Popular Committees and Leagues, Bisharah Murhij believes that "the aim of the cabinet is to establish firmly in the country the rule of the one head [president] who totally disregards all kinds and forms of balance while the cabinet gets to have two heads: A declared head, represented in Sahfiq al-Wassan, and a real head, represented in Fu'ad Butrus. The goal of the cabinet crisis has been to punish al-Huss who wanted to be a partner in government and not an employee."

Hayil Taha, the secretary general of the Unionist Nasirist Movement, has called for ousting the cabinet.

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CSO: 4802



## AMAL MOVEMENT REJECTS AL-WAZZAN'S CABINET

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 31 Oct 80 p 4

[Article: "Amal Rejects al-Wazzan's Cabinet and Calls for Boycotting It and Withholding Confidence From It; Shi'ite Ministers Should Respond to Wishes of Underprivileged Masses"]

[Text] Amal Movement has declared its absolute rejection of Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan's cabinet, has underlined this cabinet's disregard for the Shi'ite sect's rights and has urged the Shi'ite ministers to refrain from performing their ministerial tasks. Amal Movement has also urged the deputies not to give this cabinet their vote of confidence.

Amal Movement Command Council had held a meeting yesterday evening under the chairmanship of Nabih Barri, the council chairman, in which it discussed the circumstances involving the cabinet formation. The council then declared its position in a statement which says:

"Amal Movement, after studying all the circumstances involving the assignment of Prime Minister al-Wazzan and the formation of the new cabinet and after studying all the secrets accompanying the assignment and the formation;

"And in the light of what has happened as a result of this [assignment and formation], asserts to its masses its absolute rejection of this cabinet for the following reasons:

"First, Prime Minister al-Wazzan has been assigned without observation, for the first time ever, of the parliamentary traditions prevalent in Lebanon since its independence. Thus, the assignment has come without prior parliamentary consultations, even though the time passing between ex-Prime Minister Taqi-al-Din al-Sulh's refusal to form the cabinet and the assignment of Prime Minister al-Wazzan amounted to 137 days during which numerous given facts have changed and others have developed at both the domestic and foreign levels.

"Amal Movement believes, formally, that what has happened is enough in itself for rejecting this cabinet.

"Second, the present cabinet does not rely on a clear basis that makes it possible to be reassured of the honorability of the goal, which is the first requirement for confidence. It is not a parliamentary cabinet, a cabinet of technocrats or of



specialists. It is not, generally, a cabinet of leaderships nor a cabinet of civil servants. It is a composition imposed by hands and interests that do not represent the Lebanese people's opinion.

"Third, some of what we find from a reading of the names [forming the cabinet] is that the major sects and the sectarian or partisan leaderships have actually been represented and that the names of their representatives have been given secretly. However, these names can be secret to nobody. At the same time, we find that the Shi'ite sect has been the only sect excluded by the regime which has considered itself deputized to make the decision for this sect. The regime has not been content with selecting all this sect's representatives from the Chamber of Deputies, as if Shi'ite capabilities are nonexistent on the Lebanese arena, but has also persisted in disregarding representation for the Ba'labakk-al-Hirmil area which comprises one third of Lebanon's area and which has not been represented in any cabinet for more than 7 years. Meanwhile, a single city has been represented by three ministers.

"For all these reasons, the Amal Movement Command Council has unanimously decided to:

"A. Urge all the brother Shi'ite ministers in the current cabinet to respond to the wishes of the underprivileged masses whom they are supposed to be representing and to refrain from reporting to their assigned ministries until the regime backs down on this challenge which is totally rejected by our masses. We hope that the brother ministers will appreciate this wish properly because the masses have no mercy for those who tamper with their feelings.

"B. Urge all the members of the esteemed Chamber of Deputies, especially the deputies of the other honorable sects, not to give their vote of confidence to this cabinet in its present structure because Lebanon's supreme interest requires that justice be done to all individuals, sects and effective forces so that we may all be able to lay down the foundations of the unity of the homeland's soil, people and institutions and because it is the duty of a deputy, every deputy--who is a representative of the people--to take into consideration the Lebanese people's interest and not just the interest of the faction that has brought him to his seat.

"Amal Movement will preserve for whoever supports it in its rightful national demand the position that he deserves.

"C. In view of the fact that the cabinet issue is no transient issue at present, especially since the situation in the south is serious, since Israel has begun to drink from al-Wazzani springhead and since the situation in 'Ayn al-Rummanah is also serious, not only because of the armed conflict between two organizations but also because this conflict has erupted in the actual presence of the Lebanese army, the movement's Command Council has decided to keep its sessions open in order to keep up with whatever developments occur in the south and Beirut and until the format of the rejected government of defiance is altered."

AL-MURABITUN LEADER DISCUSSES ORGANIZATION'S LEBANESE, PAN-ARAB POSITIONS

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 5 Sep 80 pp 12-14

[Interview With Ibrahim Qulaylat, Leader of Independent Nasirists Movement, by Farid al-Khatib; "AL-HAWADITH Confronts Ibrahim Qulaylat With the Logic of Legitimacy and of Other Side; We are Ready to Meet With Lebanese Front Parties Over Detente Formula Acknowledging Our Ideas; We Will not Discuss Bases of Building Army and of Its Tasks Before Difference Between Sarkis and al-Huss Over Decree Organizing Army Is Settled; Our Reservation Was not Against Ba'th's Accession to National Movement But in Interest of Unified Political Course"]

[Text] The Independent Nasirists Movement's role has been prominent in foiling the plan for a "cabinet of leaderships" which ex-Prime Minister Taqi-al-Din al-Sulh was entrusted to form. The lights were also focused on this movement in the wake of the reservations it expressed over the recent changes in the Lebanese National Movement and during the internal battles which took place in West Beirut in the month before last. At present, the movement chairman's office forms a center for comprehensive official and partisan contacts.

Ibrahim Qulaylat, the chairman of al-Murabitun [Independent Nasirists] Command Council and the outwardly calm and shy man but inwardly strong man, still lives in his office near Corniche al-Mazra'ah--an office which he used during the Lebanese war and during the 1958 events--after new floors were added to the building in which the office is located. This building has become the movement's main headquarters.

The picture and slogans of Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir are still raised in this office and Qulaylat still pursues, despite the five-year war, a national policy side by side with a pan-Arab policy and refuses to adopt a purely Lebanese policy. At this office, we had the following interview:

[Question] What are the most important results of the works of the first session of the Central Committee of the Independent Nasirists--al-Murabitun--Movement?

[Answer] The general ordinary session of the Central Committee which convened from 8-9 August 1980 was the first session after the organizational and political measures adopted at the General Congress and declared at that congress on 22 March 1980. The convocation of this session under the emergency conditions exerting pressure on our organization from top to bottom provide the indication of the degree of the ability of our organizational partisan action to absorb and confront all the major strategic issues.

The session's agenda was confined to two important issues: The first was the reservation expressed by the movement vis-a-vis the organizational measures taken by the National Movement and "it was left up to the session to make the final decision on the formula, volume and role of the continued presence of the Independent Nasirists (al-Murabitun) in the National Movement." The second issue was that of discussing the political report presented to the Central Committee on all the national and pan-Arab dimensions of the political phase, especially the part of the report concerning the firm bases on which we relied in our decision to confront the small political game beginning with the "de facto" issue, passing through the designation and the formation and ending with elimination of the traces of the "de facto" and with the apology. Resolutions were issued by the Central Committee on both issues and were announced at the time.

[Question] What have you decided regarding your previous reservations over the accession of the Ba'th Party Organization and the Arab Socialist Union to the Lebanese National Movement?

[Answer] Our clear and specific reservation was not an objection to the organizational measures taken or to the Ba'th Party Organization's accession or to the elevation of the Socialist Union to the Executive Committee. We based our reservation on the goal of emerging with a fundamental definition of the political course, especially since we are suffering in the national position from the absence of a programmed political course binding to all parties, so as to prevent the use of interpretation on principled strategic and political issues--interpretations which almost governed our course and conduct in confronting formation of the recent government.

[Question] How can this [presumably emerging with programmed political course] be realized practically?

[Answer] The principled issues must be organized within a working program based on confronting the issues that have been clear to the national forces during the course of the struggle on the Lebanese arena. The brothers and comrades in the Lebanese National Movement have acknowledged the positive character of our stance in expressing our reservation in this manner. It has been decided that after the government confrontation [sic], formulation of a framework for the political course and unification of the visualizations will constitute one of the main tasks of the [National Movement's] Executive Committee and of the other echelons of the National Movement.

[Question] You are not inside the National Movement and not outside. So where do you stand?

[Answer] We have an advanced and vanguard position and role in the National Movement. We are one of the parties which, along with martyr Kamal Junblatt, founded this movement at the outset, even before, the all-out war on 13 April 1975. Brother Walid Junblatt, the chairman of the Socialist Progressive Party at present, and the leaders of the main parties in the National Movement are aware of this fact. At the same time, this role is not in conflict with the characteristics of our position and role as representatives of the national Islamic line. The value of our role in both positions lies in the fact that we have elevated ourselves with a positive equation that reflects the positive aspects on both positions.

[Question] Where have the works of the trilateral committee formed of the National Movement, the Palestinian resistance and Amal Organization reached and what is the future of this committee?

[Answer] We hope that the joint national and pan-Arab action on the Lebanese arena will have a role and will take a position that rises above the level of reactions to the events facing us. This committee is present and its forces are serious in their efforts to reach an effective and lasting formula. However, our national and pan-Arab duties are based on the principles that there should be no committees to deal with the negative incidents occurring among the parties of the National and Pan-Arab Movement but to organize the positive aspects among them in order to confront all the hostile schemes.

[Question] Is it true that there is a plan to form a front that includes ex-Prime Minister Rashid Karami, Walid Jumblatt, ex-President Sulayman Franjiyah, Raymond Iddih and ex-President Camille Sham'un?

[Answer] It is a plan, as you say, and we are in a phase in which plans, formulas and projections from known and visible sources, as well as unknown and secret sources, are numerous. As for what is actually on the arena, it is well-known that there are steps to unify the national line. The latest of these practical steps is what has been done in the wake of the Ihdin-Tripoli meeting and the joint communique issued by the leaderships attending that meeting.

[Question] Ex-Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam says that the resistance has to open up to the "Islamic society" and not to the Muslim man-in-the-street because the former is the party that opened its bosom for the resistance when it entered Lebanon. What is your opinion?

[Answer] I do not believe in what is said by a member of the club of the mentality and of the course which fell with the fall of the 1943 formula--a formula which has been superceded by the daily political, national and Islamic facts. The Palestinian revolution's rifles, leaderships and daily struggle actions prove that the practical and viable fateful alliance is outside the societies that belong to Islam in name only and that have lived in Beirut for only a short time throughout the course of the war of national and pan-Arab confrontation. During this time, these societies and their leadership symbols have been living in Europe's resorts and in other places abroad.

[Question] Bashir al-Jumayyil has offered to meet with you repeatedly but you have not agreed. What are your conditions for holding a meeting with the Phalanges?

[Answer] All the offers that he has made have included no practical plan providing a base for emerging from such a meeting with positive results. At present, the problem between us and the Lebanese Front or the Phalanges is not a personal problem of bilateral social relations. This problem is the result of a fundamental conflict in the national concept of each of us. On our part, our relationship with the Arab cause, spearheaded by the Palestinian people's cause, is a fateful relationship. We are prepared to meet with the Lebanese Front and its parties in any form or manner when acknowledgement is made in advance of the concepts to which our course is committed and which deal with common fateful national and pan-Arab causes,



provided that this acknowledgement is coupled with serious readiness for dialogue, because we are not about to discuss concepts in order to deal with social or job issues or with a plan to divide the state institutions [among Christians and Muslims] in the future.

[Question] In the sphere of comparisons, it is said that your present movement is similar to al-Najjadah [Lebanese Islamic party] movement in the 1940's and that Bashir al-Jumayyil is the Pierre al-Jumayyil of the 1980's. There are those who call for your meeting in a cabinet or your working [together] outside the cabinet to rescue Lebanon. What is your opinion of this call?

[Answer] This comparison is binding to those who make it. In our movement's view, all the formulas and mentality established on the country's soil from 1943 up to the 1970's have fallen and have been dropped. If our view of our position and our role emanated from this perspective, we would have confronted the problem of forming the latest cabinet and would have dealt with this problem through a different course and with a different conduct and at the level in which issues were dealt with in the country in the 1940's.

We are an ideological revolutionary movement that believes in fundamental solutions and that does not capitulate to the principle of moral theorization and intimidation through interpretations intended for submitting to circumstantial and incidental solutions. All know that during the 10-day period of the "de facto" phase we were subjected to all forms of temptations and enticements to adopt the mentality of the 1940's and to get involved in the glitter of the small daily political game. Our movement's modest role and position is for the sake of a major fateful cause. Any individual, party or organization that lowers its position from the sea of major causes to the window of small issues capitulates willingly to the defunct course and logic.

[Question] Since the Phalanges signed the detente charter drawn up by the president of the republic and calling for refrainment from dealing with Israel, haven't you felt the need to reward the two sides for this position?

[Answer] As a result of the given facts of detente with all their national and pan-Arab dimensions and in the wake of al-Mukhtarah retreat, the National Movement has taken the initiative to present a complete detente plan as a proof of the goodwill of the national and Islamic forces in regard to reaching a complete national detente plan aimed at ending the country's continuing crisis and the citizen's tribulation. We hold the Phalanges Party, its course and its conduct responsible for the conflict, the clash and the striking of the detente procession--a course and conduct which were crowned with the 7 July incidents, not to mention the stance of the legitimate authority toward those incidents that are in conflict with its 14 slogans of detente. What detente are they calling for when the Phalanges Party still fails to respect any detente even with its Maronite ally? We are waiting for a final decision and determination of the detente formula among the Lebanese Front's parties. We will then study the means to overcome the dilemma of the obstacles facing the national detente--obstacles created in the country by the Lebanese Front under the direction of the Phalanges Party and the tolerance of the legitimate authority.



[Question] The policy of demanding the "ideal" and the failure to deal with the "possible" may lead Lebanon to disintegration. How do you should your responsibility in this regard toward safeguarding the homeland?

[Answer] The equation of the ideal and of the possible can be dealt with when ordinary subsidiary issues are concerned whereas we are now dealing with fateful issues concerning the homeland's soil and people. On the basis of the principles of true national affiliation, this requires us not to minimize the dimensions of the fateful national issues through the theorization accepted in this period of time.

The logic of having the possible constitute an alternative to the complete ideal issue or solution is a logic in which we do not believe and upon which we do not act, especially when the issues are involved in an equation pertaining to the essence of the question of the homeland and of the value of the citizen. Despite this understanding, we do not demand that the ideal solution be produced all at once. However, we do demand that this solution be acknowledged all at once. As for the solutions, they are subject to the practical and objective nature of the circumstances that also serves the objective given facts concerning these solutions.

[Question] You have declared your readiness to counter the setting up of a Phalangist colored television with another colored television. On what basis have you founded your decision in this regard?

[Answer] The legitimate authority is acting tolerantly and is contributing to the success of what is being said about a Phalangist colored television project. The kidnapping of Dr Charles Riza, the circumstances surrounding the kidnapping and the manner in which the president of the republic is dealing with the issue confirm this fact. This is something that our citizens know, especially in view of the sharp contradiction between the two heads of the legitimate government on this issue. So that our confrontation vis-a-vis this issue may not be verbal, we have decided to counter this partitionist information establishment with all the tests [presumably meaning options] if the legitimate government fails to do so. I doubt that this legitimate government will perform its role in this regard, a role stipulated in the constitution.

We support democracy and the freedom of expression in information. If the television planned to be built proceeded from the premise of uniting the country, we would support it because we support the creation of tens of television and information establishments that serve the unity of the homeland and of its people. But this television proceeds on the basis of the partitionist view of the forces that started to establish the partitionist situation in the land after 7 July.

We have decided to counter this partitionist television with two options: First, jam it--and we have relatively large resources in this sphere--or, second, transmit colored television programs from a unifying television station that exposes the goals of the partitionist television and mini-states.

[Question] Have you excluded the decision of military retaliation?

[Answer] No. We hold the legitimate government and its executive agencies, especially the army, which is paraded on occasions, and the internal security forces, responsible for such retaliation by virtue of its being one of their duties.

[Question] In the statement in which he declined to form the new cabinet, ex-Prime Minister Taqi-al-Din al-Sulh has said that the National Movement and the Phalanges have agreed to take part in a cabinet under his chairmanship. So, why has it been impossible to form the cabinet?

[Answer] If this were true, the man would not have issued his statement declining to form the cabinet. This apology has come about as the result of the triumph of a will capable of absorbing the developments and the changes in the leadership of the national political action. It is a will with a mentality that has high aspirations which have superseded the school, mentality and course of the declining ex-prime minister.

[Question] Ex-Prime Minister al-Sulh and you have told AL-HAWADITH that the international go-ahead signal has not been given for forming that cabinet.

[Answer] This confirms that the declining ex-prime minister entered the game accidentally when the traffic light was amber. How invaluable was our stance and how capable have we been in our analysis, evaluation and assessment of the dimensions of the phase which formulated our position during 10 days of confrontation to liquidate the "de facto," and even the mixed amber light school! [sic]

[Question] Do you agree to the deployment of the army in the western area in return for Amin al-Jumayyil's agreement to its deployment in al-Matn area?

[Answer] We all know what tasks were entrusted to those armies which were assigned missions in numerous areas and which acted as false witness from the coast to the massacre of Ihdin, from Mount Lebanon to al-Safra massacre and from the interior to the massacres of 'Ayn al-Rummanah and Fum al-Shubbak.

This is not what is important. We do not view any role for the army at present and we are not considering the bases on which the army tasks must be founded before the legitimate government, with both its heads [president and prime minister], settles its conflict regarding the organization of this army. For the time being, we will leave the answer to the trumpets that advocate the army innovation and we leave the security tasks and the flawed and lax security to the legitimate government with both its heads, particularly the main issue that has touched off the conflict between the president of the republic and Dr Al-Huss over the decree organizing the army. When the legitimate government overcomes this major obstacle, the bases of building the army establishment and the role and tasks of this establishment will be considered carefully.

[Question] Is your relationship strategic and at the same level with both the Palestinian cause and the Palestinian resistance leadership?

[Answer] The Palestinian revolution and its leadership are strategically inseparable from the Palestinian cause. Our relationship with the Palestinian cause is strategic and it has risen to this level of alliance as a result of the obvious commitment of the Palestinian revolution leadership to the strategic goals of the Palestinian cause. The revolution and the alliance with this revolution cannot last on the foundation of contradiction between the essence and the strategy of the Palestinian cause.

[Question] What is your position vis-a-vis the possibility of resettling the Palestinians in a "canton" extending from al-Awza'i to the Litani River?

[Answer] On the basis of our national position of alliance with the Palestinian national cause, we ridicule these illusions in the projected plans because the cause of the Palestinian people is clear and because their leadership is firm in fostering their goals and their sovereignty. Moreover, the principles of liberation and of repatriation in Palestine are clear in the alliance with the Palestinian revolution, otherwise the Palestinian people and the national [sic] Lebanese people would not have chosen the rifle as the basis for the armed struggle and for their joint alliance. The committed and politicized revolutionary rifle is in conflict with surrender and capitulation to the partition and resettlement schemes. The revolutionary intellect of the Palestinian revolution leadership and of the Palestinian people cannot be in accord with this logic and this scheme. We and the Palestinian revolution are fully aware of the background of these projections that serve the isolationist scheme to prevail and to have weapons to be used by the hostile forces for domestic and international blackmail.

[Question] Is your coordination with Syria strategic?

[Answer] Our coordination with the Arab role emanates from the principled strategic basis of our role, position and relationship with the Arab cause and with all the strategic and fateful issues facing us. Whenever there is a united and common view with Syria toward these causes and issues, we are with Syria in the same position, the same confrontation and the same political and military struggle.

[Question] In the light of your recent visit to Libya, are you a part of the Syrian-Libyan-South Yemen-Palestinian-Iranian axis versus the Saudi-Iraqi-Jordanian-Gulf axis?

[Answer] In this fateful phase of our Arab nation's history, we do not believe in axes. The axis in which we choose our position is the one with a clear definition of the plan to confront and counter the dangers facing the Arab cause. So far, the meetings of all [sic] the Arab states with a relatively advanced form of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front states have not assumed firm frameworks yet. But there is an indeterminate mixture of plans for the creation of axes in the Arab world.

[Question] After having proven that al-Murabitun is a movement that cannot be penetrated, did your decision not to take part in the new cabinet emanate from the democratic or centralist nature of the leadership?

[Answer] The democracy and centralism of leadership are not contradictory but complementary, especially in a partisan organization with clear principles, with a firmly defined political position and not subject to theorization and interpretation to justify wavering in its political course and position. The value of the Independent Nasirists (al-Murabitun) Movement emerged when this movement decided the argument by overcoming the most serious political obstacle appearing throughout the Lebanese war and when it proved the clarity and firmness of its principled political and strategic position. The Independent Nasirists (al-Murabitun) Movement is not the product of chance. It is a movement that has

lived with 'Abd-al-Nasir's history and has belonged to his doctrine and leadership. This movement has also proven its firm ability to safeguard and strengthen its partisan and organizational position. All these factors form the deterring position that counters all the forces that seek to penetrate our movement with their various means and formulas with the aim of muddling and distorting our principled political and ideological position. We face our responsibilities and our duties in our capacity as an organized partisan establishment in which there is no place for gaps, for small souls or for selfish growth and rise from bottom to top. What grows and expands is the political and ideological position with all its national, progressive and pan-Arab dimensions. What grows is the role of the organizational partisan action because our constant aspiration is to enhance the organizational establishment of the Independent Nasirists (al-Murabitun) Movement. We aspire to form for the future a pioneer and unique format for the progressive Nasirist partisan action--a format that puts an end to the laxity in the pan-Arab struggle and in the Nasirist action.

This was how the interview proceeded with Ibrahim Qulaylat at his office on al-Tariq al-Jadidah [new road] in the presence of al-Murabitun Command Council member Semir Subh. On conclusion of the interview, other command members, led by Dr Samir Sabbagh, entered the office. The purpose of the interview was to present the logic of the other side to Ibrahim Qulaylat and to conclude the extent of his acceptance of this logic. But is this the phase of moderation?

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CSO: 4802



PHALANGIST REPORT ON POLITICAL SITUATION PUBLISHED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 18-24 Aug 80 pp 12-13

[Article: "Amin al-Jumayyil Asks His Party: Where Is Phalangist Wager; Lebanon Approaching Tension; Liquidations and Sifting of Positions and Lebanon's Problem Is Connected With Area's Issue Which Will not Be Settled Before 1985"]

[Text] Amin al-Jumayyil has submitted to the Phalanges Party Political Bureau several reports dealing with the situation and with its expected developments.

AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI publishes here the most important contents of latest of these reports.

The cabinet crisis through which Lebanon has passed in recent weeks has demonstrated that the formation of any detente cabinet or government of activists [fa'aliyat] cannot see the light unless the new cabinet includes representatives of the Phalanges Party, the Liberal Party, the Islamic Grouping, the National Movement, Amal Movement, ex-President Sulayman Franjiyah and a number of moderate and independents in both the Islamic and the Christian factions.

Prime Minister designate Taqi-al-Din al-Sulh made several attempts to realize this balance. He did succeed, according to what he has said in his letter in which he asked to be relieved of the assignment, in getting the approval of the chairman of the National Movement, the representatives of the Phalanges and other parties. However, the insurmountable obstacle which motivated al-Sulh to ask to be excused has lain in ex-President Sulayman Franjiyah's refusal to take part in any cabinet in which the Phalanges Party is represented for the well-known reasons. The stance of the ex-president has urged Damascus to instruct Engineer 'Asim Qansuh, its representative [sic] who is a candidate to enter the cabinet, to decline to take part in the cabinet. Representatives of the National Movement have acted in solidarity with Qansuh and al-Murabitun had beaten everybody else to declining to participate. Thus, the chain of detente, which has had a better opportunity this time than ever before, has fallen apart again.

Without knowing whether Damascus' position is intended to please Franjiyah and his friends or is due to other reasons connected with the general situation in Lebanon and in the area and with the expected developments, it must be noted that the Lebanese regime still believes that the failure to include the Phalanges in any detente cabinet or government of activists will not solve the problem but will rather

complicate it further because the isolation of a party with the weight of the Phalanges Party, with its base, representation and military movement, will foil all the endeavors seeking to realize detente among the Lebanese. A number of political parties have become aware of this fact and have developed the belief that any disregard for the Phalanges' role in detente would be tantamount to acting like the ostrich that buries its head in the sand. These parties believe that the Phalanges Party holds many positions that can bring a dialogue with this party closer, especially a dialogue with Deputy Amin al-Jumayyil who leads the moderate line within the party and who is considered one of the people working hardest to realize detente among the Lebanese. To realize this goal, Amin al-Jumayyil has taken numerous initiatives that had been expected to meet a more positive response from the other side if it weren't for the tensions and the pressures exerted.

#### Amin al-Jumayyil's Reports

Well-informed sources say that Deputy al-Jumayyil submitted to the Phalanges Party Political Bureau a few months ago a number of reports painting a picture of the political situation and its interactions--a picture which had predicted certain events that have actually taken place since then and that have had an impact on the course of Lebanon's political and security life.

AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI has acquired the latest report submitted by al-Jumayyil to the Political Bureau last Monday (11 August)--perhaps the most important and significant report. This report urges the party to engage in a self-review of all the positions and wagers so as to find the real cure and the true salvation "because we should not continue to live under the pressure of the unknown destiny," according to the report.

The report adds: "What is most painful when sifting the reports that I have submitted to the Political Bureau is the feeling that it is as if the reports were written today and after all that has happened. We have been warning with utter responsibility throughout the first 6 months of this year of what is lurking for us. We have been deriving from the vision of the supreme chairman (Pierre al-Jumayyil) the bright lines and it behooves us to pause before the most important of these lines. Since March, we have been warning: Will the 1980's bring up the fate of the Sykes-Picot entities and will the solution take place at the expense of Lebanon? After explaining in detail the detente we want, we stated verbatim: 'If detente does not succeed, Lebanon will approach a phase of liquidation of forces in every area.' We also pointed out that the Arabs have not been far from this fate that has befallen Lebanon. On 4 March 1980, Colonel al-Qadhdhafi pledged that the Jordanians 'will pay the price of betraying the Arab nationalism, and so will the Lebanese people who have begun to turn into a homeless people, exactly like the Palestinian people.'"

The report added: "We pointed out in a previous report that we would commit a mistake if we consider all that has been witnessed by the Lebanese arena as mere incidents. In our opinion, these incidents constitute indicators for major events to which the country will be exposed, regardless of whether these events will seek to touch off the situation in Lebanon or to liquidate the Lebanese capabilities and leadership symbols. We finally explained the nature of the coming phase, wondering if it will be just a phase of pressures or one of due payments. The Lebanese arena

is witnessing a number of internal and external movements in a manner that urges us to conclude that we are approaching a decisive and extraordinary phase--a phase which has motivated King Husayn to call Lebanon 'the timed bomb.'

#### "Will not Pass Without Price"

Deputy al-Jumayyil believes that "Lebanon will not pass through the war without a price. The war must have its major objectives also. We have warned that these objectives may be at the expense of this small homeland and warned that the Lebanese may be used as instruments for these objectives."

The report further adds: "We have pointed out that the 1970's formed the phase of Lebanon's demise [ihtidar], pushing the country from the war of all of Lebanon against the Palestinian violations in 1973 to the war of the entire area on the Lebanese soil in 1975 and then to the fragmentation of the Lebanese territory into Palestinian territory, Syrian territory, Israeli territory and U.N. territory. As if all of this was not enough, the 1970's added the following developments to Lebanon:

"Internally, the focus on striking the Lebanese army and on nurturing the bloody conflicts among the various areas. It is as if there was a call for drawing separating boundaries between the various areas, as in Beirut (east and west) and between the north and the south, and for obstructing any efforts for a political or national meeting among the main leaderships in Lebanon.

"At the Arab level, the Arab disinterest in the Lebanese issue and the military withdrawal of the Arab states from the Arab Deterrence Forces one state after the other and their political withdrawal from serious commitments to Lebanon in the Arab summit conferences.

"Internationally, the utmost international attention received by Lebanon has amounted to no more than exploratory visits by delegations and envoys.

"These developments have caused Lebanon to fall captive to the paralysis in the international movement and to the failure of the Arab approaches."

Al-Jumayyil's report asserts that "there will be no fundamental solution for the Lebanese situation from abroad as long as Europe (President Giscard d'Estaing has been most explicit in this regard) says that there will be no solution for Lebanon before a comprehensive solution for the area. From the provisions of the Camp David [accords], we can see no decision for the area before 1985, i.e. before passage of the 5 years set by the Camp David plan for handing over the Bank and Gaza to the Palestinians, when the fate of the 'tension bow,' according to Brzezinski, will be known."

#### Three Possibilities

Al-Jumayyil has also reminded of a previous report submitted in March 1980 in which he had said that Lebanon would be exposed to three explosive possibilities:

"1. The possibility of the development of a large-scale security vacuum in Beirut and of the inability to find security alternatives, which means an explosion beginning in the capital. This is the possibility that has begun to grow since Syria suddenly decided to assemble its forces.

"2. The possibility of intensified tension in the south, i.e. of an explosion in the south. This is the possibility which the Palestinians like to propagate periodically.

"3. The possibility of intensifying the assassination and liquidation attempts that are capable of leaving behind serious reverberations."

The report points out that it is possible for the "plotters" to follow two courses toward the explosion, the first being the course of "letting Lebanon go through a period of disintegration so that the Palestinians may take their place and then give the legitimate authority the opportunity to put the country back together anew and the second course is that of fanning the conflicts between the Palestinians and the Shi'ites to exhaust both sides."

The report adds: "What has actually happened is that implementation of the resettlement phase has acted to devoid Lebanon of three fundamental elements:

"1. Devoiding the south of the legitimate authority after devoiding it of its population (June 1980). What is occurring at present is meant to devoid Beirut and other areas of the legitimate authority.

"2. Devoiding the Lebanese arena of its main leaderships that are responsible for Lebanon's destiny through touching off explosions in every area to break up, exhaust and preoccupy the main forces or to put these forces in a position whereby they cannot confront the suspect schemes. This is evident in the current action to sift the forces and to control the positions after shuffling the cards.

"3. Depriving the legitimate authority of its role through the action to create a political crisis whose least significant manifestation would be 'a government vacuum.'"

#### No Cabinet of Leaderships

Deputy al-Jumayyil then proceeds to talk in his report about the possible new cabinet, saying: "We have been warning since June that the next 6 months are part of the process of preparing for the phase following the U.S. elections. Therefore, any efforts to form a so-called cabinet of leaderships will not succeed under these circumstances and conditions. The utmost that the political arena can witness is the formation of a cabinet similar to the outgoing cabinet or an extra-parliamentary cabinet whose task will be to lead the country to a special period of (immobility). Extending the stay of the U.N. forces can only mean extending the crisis of the south and renewing the stay of the Deterrence [Forces] means keeping the present freeze under control and preventing the major explosion.

"Therefore, we believe that the atmosphere of the next 6 months will be preoccupied with tension, attrition and liquidation operations and with the sifting of positions,



especially since the political struggle of the Arab axes has become inclined toward assuming a bloody character. Will the start of the new Jordanian turn in the direction of peace lead to the complications experienced by the Lebanese arena--complications that we have witnessed since the start of the Egyptian initiative? Will all this be translated into a Shi'ite-Palestinian confrontation which will preoccupy the western area and its extensions to the southern arena?"

#### Among Intelligence Agencies

After posing these questions, Amin [sic] al-Jumayyil expresses in his report the belief that what occurred last July "was not remote from this framework but that it ignited the Lebanese arena with a war of internal liquidations most of which reflect one of the aspects of the inter-liquidations among the Mideastern intelligence agencies."

The report adds: "What is coming may be even graver. The explosions touched off in the western area seem to be leading to the full paralysis of the [legitimate] authority and perhaps to creating the justifications for the Palestinians to replace the state under disguise or openly, especially since Fatah declared full mobilization in the wake of the 7 July operations and since it has been talking a lot recently about its large-scale preparations with its allies to regain the positions that Fatah and these allies evacuated in 1976. Moreover, the chain of assassinations has caused the national unity government to fall. The events which the eastern area witnessed in the wake of the 7 July operation underline an important demographic phenomenon."

The report points out that many observers "have linked these facts on the one hand and, on the other hand, the plan propagated during President Sarkis' visit to France--a plan talking about dividing Lebanon into three areas--mini-states--after an imminent Israeli operation in the south. These mini-states--areas--are: The Christian area, the Sunni area and the Shi'ite area."

The report concludes by asking: "If this is true, we must ask profoundly: Where is the Phalanges' wager and where is the Lebanese destiny?"

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CSO: 4802

POSITIVE, NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF IRAQ-IRAN WAR REVIEWED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 18 Oct 80 p 47

[Article: "Where Has Lebanon Benefited From and Where Has It Been Hurt by Iraq-Iran War; Some Funds Fleeing Gulf Reach Lebanese Banks But Exporting Sectors Suffer from Drop in Their Operations"]

[Text] Since the eruption of the Iraq-Iran war, some Lebanese have been wondering about the effects of this war on Lebanon and analyzing its potential negative or positive effects on every sector of Lebanon's political and economic life.

Proceeding on the premise of the common saying that the "misfortunes of some are blessings to others," some Lebanese have been inclined since the first day of the war to believe that its effects on the Lebanese economic level may be positive.

Not a long time passed before some of these people found that the war developments and results have come to prove their belief. Iraq's announcement of its wish to resume oil pumping through the pipeline extending from Kirkuk to the Tripoli refinery and passing through the Syrian territory has come to prove that that which is harmful to your brother may be beneficial to you. But it soon became evident that this possibility, thought to be likely to develop as a result of the drop in the ability of Iraq to export oil through its ports on Shatt al-'Arab, is no longer likely because of the war developments which have put a halt to the production (and, consequently exportation) of oil from Kirkuk.

With this disappointment, those among the Lebanese hanging on to any saving straw or any source of optimism began to wager on the possibility of Lebanon's benefiting from the troubled and concerned Gulf monies fearing an extension of the war and its consequences and seeking security and stability.

The Lebanese have found in the various reports published by the Gulf press itself (see AL-MUSTAQBAL No 190, pp 45-48) and in the reports circulated in European information and banking circles about an outflow in the Gulf funds something to please the heart at a time when reports from all kinds of sources, including Lebanese sources, have referred to new Gulf funds reaching the Lebanese banks or the banks operating in Lebanon.

The fact is that the outflow movement of Gulf funds passed through two phases in the 20 days following the eruption of the Iraq-Iran war: The first phase is the one which witnessed a relative outflow of such funds as a result of the fear of

expansion and escalation in the war--a fear interacting with the rise in the discount rate for the U.S. dollar and for the industrial currencies generally which widened the gap between the interest rates paid for local currencies and those paid for foreign currencies.

The observing circles felt this movement in the decline in the demand to deal with the Kuwait stock market (the only market [in the Gulf]) and in the decline of the stock market exchange volume on the one hand and, on the other hand, in the rise of the interest rates paid for local currencies generally in such a manner that made it possible to talk about a liquidity crisis in some Gulf markets.

The second phase is the phase which witnessed a drop in the outflow of Gulf funds, perhaps due to the end of the first leap in this outflow which absorbed most of the worried funds that cannot withstand the smell of fire, regardless of how remote it is. Perhaps this drop has also been the result of what has become apparent, namely that the fires of the Iraq-Iran war, even if prolonged, will remain confined within certain limits that do not reach the [Gulf] oilwells and that do not expose the funds to danger.

The fact is that many of the official and private Gulf circles that were strongly concerned in the first days of the war have now become much less concerned after the developments indicating the presence of western "signals" to the combatants not to expand the war and after the United States sent its AWAC's to Saudi Arabia. The Gulf people have found in these developments, separately and collectively, a lot to reassure them that the jesting [al-mizah] in the oil area may touch anything, except the oil.

With this reassurance, the outflowing Gulf funds have dropped steeply.

But where does Lebanon stand insofar as the developments in both phases are concerned?

The official banking circles possess no accurate data on how Lebanon and its banks have been really affected by this movement. This is perhaps due to the lack of complete information at the disposal of these circles or due to the fact that the new funds transferred to the Lebanese banks as a result of the war are mixed with the funds transferred regularly to these banks from the Gulf--a transfer which never stopped (though it did fluctuate) even at the peak of the Lebanese crisis in 1976.

However, the official banking circles indicate that the Lebanese banks have recorded a rise in the flow of funds from the Gulf during the Iraq-Iran war. But this indication requires, according to what the banking circles say, observing the following:

First, most of the increase in the fund movement is due to an increase in the volume of the remittances made by the Lebanese and Palestinians working in the Gulf to their accounts in the banks operating in Lebanon.

Second, the funds coming from native Gulf people, i.e. not from the Lebanese and the Palestinians working in the Gulf, are very small and belong to Gulf citizens who have been dealing regularly with the Lebanese banks and who have a constant economic presence in Lebanon and not to new Gulf citizens.

Third, what confirms that the funds received within this framework are very small in volume and not as large as some optimists had expected is the fact that the dollar exchange rate (and consequently the exchange rate of most of the foreign currencies calculated on the basis of a dollar cover) in Lebanon has risen relatively. Some of the rise in this rate may be in harmony with the increased discount rate paid for the dollar. However, the rise shows that there has been no big flow of funds from abroad because a big flow would mean either a drop in the dollar exchange rate or a stability in this rate emanating from the balance between the new flow and the demand for the dollar as a result of the high interest rate paid for it.

According to a manager in one of the major joint banks in Lebanon, those who had expected the movement of Gulf funds to Lebanon to be big these days were wrong in the first place. Though the relative movement recorded by the Lebanese banks at this level has once again reflected the ability of the Lebanese banking apparatus which never stopped working to attract customers and win their trust even in the darkest hours of the war, the Gulf citizens--who are now equipped with complete banks in the Gulf that are in contact with the international markets or with private or joint Gulf banks in all of the European countries and which have direct relations with the financial centers and with the headquarters of the various banks--are able to bypass many of the conventional operational channels with which the banks operating in Lebanon used to provide them. The Lebanese banks themselves have helped the Gulf citizens to bypass the channels that they used to provide by making available to these citizens similar channels that are always ready in most of the western capitals--channels embodied in the branches and subsidiary companies of the Lebanese banks in these capitals.

Added to all this is a general observation on which many regional merchants, general representatives for the area and industrialists exporting to the Gulf agree, namely that the war which has brought about a relative rise in the flow of Gulf funds to Lebanon has also thrown its weight on the Lebanese market which has begun to suffer from a big drop in its exports to Iraq and Iran and from a considerable drop in its exports to other Gulf countries, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia which tops the list of countries importing from Lebanon. This drop has become evident in some of the exporting industrial sectors and in the business of the merchants who import for triangular (presumably meaning re-export) trade. Some of these merchants are now talking about some transactions which had started before the war and that have stopped since its eruption, pointing out transactions for which the importers had paid in part and which they froze as soon as the war erupted. Meanwhile, some contracting companies have been talking about the halt in the contract works they have in Iraq and about the impossibility of wagering on a specific time for resuming these works--all of which will saddle these companies with additional burdens and the companies are discussing as of this time the means that they will use to make up for these burdens.

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CSO: 4802



# RECONSTRUCTION, ARAB AID DISCUSSED

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 21 Oct 80 p 6

[Article: "'Attallah: We Have Received Only 153 Million out of 400 Million Approved by Tunis Summit for Lebanon; We Urge Lebanese Brains to Participate in Reconstruction"]

[Text] Dr Muhammad 'Atallah, the chairman of the Development and Reconstruction Board, has announced that Lebanon has received only 153 million dollars out of the sum of 400 million dollars allocated for it for 1980 by the Arab Tunis summit and that the international aid for Lebanon is not at all compatible with the country's needs.

In an interview with the LEBANESE NEWS AGENCY, Dr 'Atallah has said that the board has already put into action the idea of inviting the Lebanese brains and expertise that have emigrated from the country to perform their role in the process of rebuilding the homeland.

Following are excerpts from the interview:

"The days of clear security, if we may use the expression, have been very few and have not given the Development and Reconstruction Board the opportunity to realize the visualizations that we had drawn up and the hopes that we had held. Yet, the board has been able to produce the best results that could be attained under the shadow of the available resources and of the current conditions.

"The days of clear security did not exceed a few months in 1977. In 1978, the problems started. We had drawn up our action plan but it encountered what 1978 witnessed. However, the determination to continue implementation has overcome all the difficulties possible to overcome. The example to this determination is the fact that works in the port have not stopped despite all that has happened and despite all the pressures to which those engaged in the construction works have been subjected. This is the proof of vitality and of the will to survive.

"Briefly, I will review the matter as follows:

"In the wake of the Riyadh and Cairo [summit] conferences, the state was given reassurances on the restoration of security and stability to Lebanon. It was natural for the authority to think as of that time of the ways capable of rebuilding what the two-year war had destroyed. On the basis of those promises and

reassurances, the Development and Reconstruction Board was set up to act as the state's thinktank. But regrettably, the honeymoon did not last more than 5 or 6 months. The fact is that the board is most like a big contractor whose work came to a halt after he had been told that big undertakings were awaiting him and after he had arranged to start the work with enormous preparations and broad hopes for the promised undertakings which did not materialize.

"Yet, the board has been able to draw up plans for what should be done so that the development and reconstruction process may resume its march. The board has also been able to give an idea on how the work should be carried out, how to overcome the redtape and how to introduce the element of production into management. The board has also organized the relations with the foreign financing sources. All that we have done is compatible with the available resources.

"Security is not the only barrier. We have, as already pointed out, overcome this barrier and started implementing what can be implemented. But there are two conditions, besides security, which must be present. The first is the availability of the necessary funds and the second is the availability of the capabilities to implement.

"The international response to the appeal for loans has not at all been compatible with Lebanon's needs and with the requirements of the development and reconstruction projects, keeping in mind that we have been able to make the foreign aid sources, be they regional or international organizations or states, partners with us in the implementation of projects. Even though we have been honest to this partnership and even though we have followed up the implementation operations with utter seriousness and sincerity, the financing sources have sent nobody to watch or supervise, not even for the sake of appearances, the projects under implementation. Despite all this, the foreign financial aid is not at all compatible with Lebanon's needs. All the international financing resources are comprised of the Arab aid to Lebanon.

"As for this Arab aid for Lebanon, it also has a similar story. The Tunis summit resolutions allocated for Lebanon a sum of 2 billion dollars divided into 400 million dollars annually, with payment starting in 1980 and lasting for 5 consecutive years. The fact is that this is a good sum. This sum, in addition to the Lebanese intrinsic efforts and to what aid may be secured from other sources, can meet our need and help us to implement the development and reconstruction projects. But what is important is that these resolutions be implemented. Out of a sum of 400 million dollars for 1980, Lebanon has received only 153 millions so far whereas most of the sum of 400 millions is supposed to have been already paid. Some Arab countries have paid all their commitments whereas others have not. What we hope for is that the flow of Arab aid to Lebanon will begin so that the plans may be coupled with serious and rapid implementation and so that we may not be like the contractor who had prepared himself for the implementation of big projects and was then surprised to find that the promises made were not being fulfilled.

"For example, we have prepared our plans this year on the basis that 1.5 billion dollars will be available. But it seems that our plans always encounter the broken promises made to us. I do not want to wade here into the political reasons for the delay of the flow of Arab aid to Lebanon because this is another matter. All I want to say is that if the aid determined by the Tunis summit is paid

according to the set annual installments (400 million dollars a year), then this aid will form a strong support for launching the development and reconstruction march in Lebanon with firm strides.

"The third condition is the need for the presence of the capabilities to implement through the availability of the technical expertise needed. Here we must acknowledge the painful reality, namely that the crisis years have witnessed a concentrated Lebanese braindrain. As for the qualified people who have remained in Lebanon, they--to be very frank--lack reassurance and are like a shackled person who cannot move forth and give vent to his creative capabilities. Here again, I do not want to embark on the political aspects of the issue.

"However, the Development and Reconstruction Board has not and will not succumb to the status quo. I will be divulging no secret when I say that we have started the idea of inviting Lebanese brains and experts from abroad to some sort of conference so that they may take part in rebuilding the homeland. We have had some encouraging response. But moving forth with these steps requires the flow of foreign funds and aid and the presence of security domestically."

8494

CSO: 4802

## POTENTIAL FOR ESTABLISHING REGIONAL MONEY MARKET DISCUSSED

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 18 Oct 80 p 13

[Article by Salman Abu-Dhiyab: "On Possibility of Establishing Regional Money Market in Lebanon"]

[Text] Since it started in 1919, the Lebanese financial experience has been characterized by total openness to the outside world in terms of legislations, relations and activities. This characteristic has led to the growth and expansion of the banking apparatus, especially in terms of local and foreign resources and investments.

Despite the violent upheavals and setbacks, the banking sector has continued to perform the role of the shield protecting the Lebanese economy.

The famous INTRA [Bank] crisis which led to the bankruptcy and collapse of a number of major and minor banking establishments amounted ultimately to no more than a harsh test of the Lebanese economy's ability to resurge and constituted, consequently, a motive for developing the legislations and the methods of banking activities.

The 2-year war, whose consequences are still leaving their impact on the Lebanese economy as a whole, has had no less impact on the banking sector than the INTRA crisis because of the sensitivity of monies to security.

At the outset, this war urged wealthy people and the western financial establishments to seek other capitals to play the financial role of the alternative to Beirut. So the financial activities were split among Amman (Jordan), Manama (Bahrain), Kuwait and Dubai because these cities have relatively flexible legal facilities and economic legislations, a general atmosphere and speedy communications that make them partially capable of replacing Beirut, keeping in mind that among these capitals, Bahrain is characterized by extensive telecommunication facilities and by speedy decisions on economic matters. In view of this role of Bahrain's, we will confine our discussion to it, to the exclusion of the other cities and states in the area, for the purpose of later comparison with the role that Beirut has regained.

### 1. Signs of Competition in Bahrain

The Bahrain banking apparatus has grown rapidly since 1969 and has passed through a phase of big expansion since the free banking zone was established at the end of 1975, thus turning Bahrain into an international financial center.



The Bahrain banking apparatus is comprised of the Bahrain Currency Agency, the commercial banks and the free (offshore) banking zone.

The Bahrain Currency Agency was set up in accordance with law No 23 of 5 December 1972 which terminated decree No 6 of 1964 and its amendments on the Bahrain currency. Consequently, the Currency Agency became the authority responsible for regulating the banking apparatus in the State of Bahrain, including responsibility for control over banking operations and activities and for all duties pertaining to the issuance and circulation of currency in the State of Bahrain. This agency maintains a 100 percent cover comprised of foreign currencies for the banknotes in circulation and for the on-demand deposits placed with the agency by banks. Moreover, the agency's foreign currency assets are invested mainly in the form of convertible deposits and bonds covering a period of less than 5 years.

Bahrain has at present an advanced banking network comprised of 18 banks (3 local banks, 3 Arab banks and 12 foreign banks), in addition to 36 banks and 22 representative offices registered in the free banking zone. The budget of the free zone amounted in the middle of 1977 to nearly 11 billion dollars.

But Bahrain's financial position and future have continued to be tied to the area's security. Despite the big success realized by the free banking zone, Bahrain has continued to complain of the narrowness of the economic structure and of bottlenecks in some of its utilities, especially in housing, and of shortages in some skills and expertise needed for the various services. It also lacks legislations on banking secrecy and on deposit guarantees.

Yet, during the absence of Beirut's financial role Bahrain continued to be the first alternative performing this role in the area. However, the relative improvement in Lebanon's security conditions and the eruption of the situation between Iraq and Iran in what seems to be a prolonged war have restored to Beirut its well-known vanguard financial role.

## 2. Characteristics of Banking Situation in Lebanon

The Lebanese banking situation is distinguished by several characteristics that are evident through general and special legislations. Insofar as the general legislation is concerned, Lebanon has a liberal system and the Lebanese legislations respect the right of ownership and approve the freedom of agreements.

As for the taxes, they are relatively light and affect only a part of the profits made in Lebanon, excluding the capital. These legislations contain no discrimination against the foreigner. On the contrary, they encourage the resident foreigner.

As for the special legislation concerning the banks, it is characterized by the following:

### A. Banking Control Exercised by the [Central] Bank of Lebanon:

In the wake of the INTRA Bank crisis, the rules for control over the banks were amended and these rules produced their fruit after the 2-year war, enabling all the operating banks to meet their commitments despite the prolonged tragedy.

## B. Banking Secrecy:

The banking secrecy system goes as far as any other banking secrecy systems in other countries go. In our country, this secrecy is approved not only for individuals but also for the public tax, administrative and judiciary authorities.

Any Lebanese or foreigner can open a joint account in a bank and the signature of one partner in the account is enough to move it. Banking secrecy covers this type of account. When the purpose of a saving account is not profit, the banks can, under the slogan of secrecy, open an account for any natural or legal status person, whatever his nationality or his place of residence, without setting limits to the sums saved. Such an account is exempted from all taxes.

## C. Free Banking Zone in Lebanon:

(In accordance with the decree issued on 1 April 1975 and complemented by the degree issued on 5 February 1977) within the same banks [six], a free banking zone was set up in Lebanon in the interest of nonresidents. In this area, there is the so-called off limits system under which all deposits placed in foreign currencies are exempted from all taxes and fees.

## D. Deposit Guarantee:

In addition to all the abovementioned guarantees, the Lebanese legislation has set up the Banking Deposits Security Agency which has enhanced the confidence of those dealing with the banking establishments.

## 3. Modern Financial Regulations

These regulations are embodied in opening the door of licensing new banks, establishing the Lebanese Money Company and in some tax exemptions.

### A. Opening Door of Licensing:

After the 2-year war, the state found that one of the means of restoring confidence in Lebanon was in attracting foreign financial and banking establishments to it. The door of licensing was opened and the state entrusted the power of licensing to the Bank of Lebanon instead of the Council of Ministers. As a result, most of those who have applied for new banking licenses are Lebanese financiers working in the Arab oil countries and by financiers from the oil countries themselves. As for interest by foreign financiers, some people wager on this interest in case security is established in Lebanon.

### B. Lebanese Money Company:

The Bank of Lebanon approved at the end of last August the draft constitution of the Lebanese Money Company (has a capital of 10 million Lebanese pounds).

This company is, in fact, a market for the treasury bonds and other bonds. With the establishment of this company, the Lebanese banks will have made an important

stride in their march to establish a money market in Lebanon. This market [activity] is reflected in three aspects:

Deposit certificates issued by banks.

Bonds, stocks and various money papers issued by the various major or joint-stock companies for circulation among the public in the stock market.

Treasury bonds that can constitute the main instrument for setting up the money market. The idea of the money market actually dates back to 1974 when the Banks Association organized from 28-30 November 1974 a study seminar entitled "Developing Beirut as a Financial Center" at the lectures hall of the Bank of Lebanon.

#### C. Tax Exemptions Bill:

The Ministry of Finance has prepared an urgent bill calling for tax exemptions and containing rules seeking to develop the Lebanese money market. The bill has come in response to a request by the Banks Association for exemptions amounting to 10 percent for deposit certificates with the aim of spurring the Lebanese Money Company and revitalizing the market.

We find that these basic characteristics of the Lebanese banking apparatus are found in several legislations.

In addition to these fundamental factors and components, there is the individual factor embodied in the high technical capabilities and abilities gained by the Lebanese banks through their expansion outside the country, especially in France and Switzerland, and through training courses given to their employees on the modern methods of operation that lead to speeding up and mastering the financial operations and services.

These basic characteristics and objective factors, in addition to the element of war in the Gulf area and the element of the Iranian assets frozen in the United States in the wake of the events in Iran, have again pushed Arab and western funds in the direction of Lebanon, especially in recent weeks. This heralds Lebanon's resumption of its vanguard role as an important and developable financial center capable of becoming the area's money market, if given the opportunity to live in peace.

8494

CSO: 4802

CUSTOMS DUTIES COLLECTED IN 1980

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 27 Oct 80 p 7

[Article: "Customs Duties in 9 Months Amount to 536 Million Pounds of Which Beirut Port and Airport Share 74.5 Percent"]

[Text] The customs duties collected in the first 9 months of this year amounted to 536,447,263 Lebanese pounds compared to 485,385,024 Lebanese pounds for the corresponding period of last year, i.e. with an increase of 51,062,239 pounds or 10.5 percent.

The duties collected in the third quarter (July, August, September) recorded an increase of 2.8 percent in comparison to the corresponding period of 1977.

However, the duties collected in the third quarter declined in comparison to those collected in the second quarter of 1980 (April, May, June) by about five percent, amounting to 177,033,054 pounds compared to 186,788,018 pounds in the second quarter.

It is noticed from the development of the movement of the duties collected monthly that the first and second quarters were characterized by stability whereas the third quarter was characterized by a drop from 63 million pounds in July to 57 millions in August and to 55 millions in September.

As for the distribution of fees over the customs posts, it was as follows in the first 9 months: Beirut Port 64.8 percent, Beirut Airport 19.7 percent, Junyah 0.9 percent, Tripoli 8.5 percent, al-Masna' 5.1 percent and Sidon one percent.



	Beirut Port	Beirut Airport	Junyah	Tripoli	Al-Masna'	Sidon	Total
January	37,786,491	11,402,685	1,017,262	4,577,715	3,118,757	335,195	58,238,107
February	36,391,800	10,929,341	484,055	4,672,215	2,858,614	262,343	55,598,371
March	36,907,633	13,839,615	556,499	4,891,873	2,235,196	358,894	58,789,712
April	41,371,412	12,429,427	756,418	3,949,461	2,882,082	1,000,964	62,387,670
May	42,232,552	11,464,867	632,126	5,582,285	3,298,983	329,962	63,540,778
June	40,861,424	10,715,144	416,615	5,018,000	3,257,241	1,158,746	61,427,171
July	40,840,905	11,871,837	241,628	5,844,040	4,152,182	275,821	63,226,416
August	37,100,980	12,129,101	219,844	4,987,628	3,121,669	259,764	57,818,788
September	34,214,876	11,264,961	741,358	5,589,543	3,447,054	730,056	55,987,849
Grand Total	347,708,075	106,046,981	4,495,808	45,111,760	28,461,781	4,911,748	536,447,263

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## BRIEFS

**CULTIVATED LAND**--According to "Al Ard," the paper published by the Agricultural Vocational Union, an area of the 46 thousand hectares have been cultivated with wheat, barley and rye for the present agricultural season in the Jamahiriya. The tilling season is already in progress in the municipality of Ajdabea where hundreds of hectares are tilled and prepared for growing wheat and barley. The People's Committee for Agrarian reform and Land Reclamation provided the citizens with all the farming requirements they needed. [Text] [Valletta THE JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 22 Nov 80 p 3]

**BENGHAZI DIRECT TELEPHONE EXCHANGE**--Benghazi is now linked with the rest of the world by direct telephone exchanges and it is now possible for the locals of Benghazi and its suburbs to telephone any part of north and south America, Europe, Australia, Asia and Africa, excluding countries which are not subscribers in the telecommunication satellite. This was announced the Secretary of the People's Committee for communications and marine transport in Benghazi. [Text] [Valletta THE JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 15 Nov 80 p 6]

**SIRTE HOUSING PROJECTS**--Al-Mukhtar Insurance Company has signed a contract with an international firm to build 90 housing units and six blocks in Sirte as well as a shopping complex and housing estate in Misrata. The total cost of these projects is around 9,400,000 Libyan Dinars. They are expected to be completed in two years time. [Text] [Valletta THE JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 15 Nov 80 p 6]

CSO: 4820

PRIORITIES ESTABLISHED FOR NEW HEALTH PLAN

Aden 14 OCTOBER in Arabic 4 Nov 80 p 2

[Article by 'Ali Yaslim Bazris: "Health Problems in Democratic Yemen"]

[Text] The general assembly of the World Health Organization strongly recommends the use of the methods of programming and planning when setting up health policies in terms of the training of health care personnel, and when setting up the programs of health projects for the prevention of indigenous diseases. In the field of medicine our country has chosen the planning method as the sole method capable of meeting the health needs and demands of the society because the availability of all the elements that can solve our health problems; these offer a program of a) collecting the required data, b) studying and analyzing it, c) programming it, and d) assessing it.

A report entitled "The Health Problem: Ways to Solve it" was prepared and presented to the cabinet and the general union of workers of the republic. It pointed out the priorities which the new health plan should work on, according to what the centralized public allocations have stipulated. It was especially concerned with concentrating on the programs and activities that aim at 1) enhancing the healthy growth of Yemeni children; 2) safeguarding the health of pregnant mothers (these in particular since children comprise 45 percent of the total population), and 3) the necessary extension of health care to all Yemenis. The report specified that primary health care is the means capable of fulfilling these aspirations.

The team responsible for preparing the health plan relied on certain criterion by which the priorities of disease problems are recognized in order to achieve the maximum benefit of the health-development programs. It established a roster of the disease priorities as follows:

I. Widespread contagious children's diseases:

Health statistics of the ministry of health indicate that whooping cough, diphtheria, tetanus, poliomyelitis, measles, and tuberculosis are very widespread even though it is possible to control these by inoculation. The death rate that occurs amongst children as a result of these is 152 deaths per 1,000 children, in addition to the large number of children that are physically disabled as a result.

As a result of this the ministry in cooperation with the WHO and UNICEF decided to set up a project for a comprehensive healthy immunization. It hopes to cover at least 80 percent of the children of the republic that are less than 5 years old over a period of 5 years. It will use serum vaccine of childbearing women against tetanus.

## II. Malaria

Although there are no efforts to make a complete survey of the extent of malaria in our country it is nevertheless possible to say that it is indigenous to the coastal areas, the wadis, and to the island of Suqatra. It is recorded that malaria is most endemic in Suqatra where almost 48.8 percent of the total number of active cases are reported, followed then by Abyan province with 23.6 percent; Lahj, 7 to 20 percent; Hadramawt, 5 to 15 percent; and Aden, 6 percent.

As for parasite differentiation it has been established that almost 95 percent of the total number of malaria cases are of the *Plasmodium Falciparum* variety, 2 percent is of the *Plasmodium Vivax*, and 3 percent is of the *Plasmodium malariae*.

## III. Diseases causing diarrhea

The average incidence of these diseases in general amounts to almost 38 cases per 1,000 inhabitants. Here it is probable that the incidence of these diseases is much greater than what is reported.

## IV. Respiratory illness with the exception of TB

Health statistics record that large numbers are afflicted by these diseases and that they are the cause of admission of 13.9 percent of all hospital occupants. The most important of this group are bronchitis, tonsillitis, staphylococcal infections of the throat, influenza, and asthmatic bronchitis.

## V. Tuberculosis

The national program to control TB has undertaken a series of specific studies by means of saliva analysis. The results have given evidence that tuberculosis is one of the most significant disease problems in the country. The program is undertaking the inoculation of children under the age of 19 by the direct administration method, using an effective dry vaccine that is appropriate for hot climates.

## VI. Anemia and blood deficiencies

Numerous reports have made it clear that anemia results on the average in 1.2 deaths per 1,000 inhabitants, that is 1 percent of nursing babies and 1.4 percent of infants between the ages of 1 and 4.

## VII. Vitamin deficiencies and malnutrition

In 1976 the average incidence of these illnesses reached about 36 cases per 1,000 inhabitants. Of the total of 62,946 new cases surveyed the statistics showed that almost all of these occurred in Hadramawt province, while 18 percent occurred in Abyan, 16.1 percent in Aden, 12.4 percent in Lahj, 2.6 percent in Shabwah and 7 percent in Mahra. Nevertheless it is probable that the average incidence of these sicknesses is much greater than the cases actually reported.

## VIII. Bilharzia

In spite of the gaps in reporting from different provinces of the republic it is nevertheless possible to consider this disease as one of our health problems. There was reported to be 264 cases present in 1976 which makes the average incidence for



this 15 cases per 100,000 inhabitants. The widespread occurrence was recorded in Lahj, Abyan, and Hadramawt, but in any event it is possible to raise the average incidence of the disease considerably as a consequence of the spread of irrigation works that the rural areas of our country have witnessed.

#### IX. Contagious eye diseases

The survey that was taken in 1976 revealed that there were about 200,000 cases of trachoma in the country. The survey was completed in 14 urban and rural areas and amongst almost 3,000 inhabitants of the islands, the bedouins, nomads, the highlands, the wadis, and the coastal areas. The detailed breakdown of this survey is as follows:

Eyes infected with disease or other infirmity	31 percent
Blindness in one or both eyes	6 percent
Lid inflammations (conjunctiva)	7 percent
Inflammation by the microbe triftoma	9.5 percent
Trachoma	11.5 percent
Blindness as a result of trachoma	.8 percent

#### X. Diseases and mortalities of the fetus around and during delivery.

Even though there are certain gaps in the reporting of deaths in all regions of the country in addition to Aden, nevertheless according to the abundant records of death reports which have been registered in Aden it has been revealed that the most important primary causes of death of nursing infants were as a result of intestinal colds and diseases causing diarrhea which on the average occur in 12.6 of every 1,000 infants. Following these there are sicknesses causing the deaths of new born babies (infant death syndrome) with a 9/1,000 rate, and various asthmatic conditions, 6.2/1,000, meningitis 1.3/1,000, and blood deficiencies or anemia 1/1,000.

As a result of these, preventive health programs have been set up with the aim of eliminating or controlling these diseases so that the Yemeni people can be made free of them. This enable them to carry out the envisioned plans and partake positively in the developmental process which our land is witnessing under the auspices of a unifying democratic Yemen.

9587

CSO: 4802

# ANALYSIS OF BREZHNEV'S GULF SECURITY PROPOSALS

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 15 Dec 80 p 2

[Text]

Every dog, the saying goes, is entitled to one bite before being deemed a potential danger. Judging by repeated Western warnings last week to the Warsaw Pact to leave Poland alone, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan a year ago is seen as Mr Brezhnev's first serious bite - and once bitten, twice shy. The Soviet leader's proposal for an international "hands off" agreement for the security of the Gulf region cannot therefore be treated as a propaganda exercise. The question is: is this Mr Brezhnev's second bite?

It could well be so. Viewed in the worst possible light, Mr Brezhnev's five points can be interpreted as serving notice to the Gulf states and to the rest of the world that the Soviet Union, exploiting the strategic advantage it gained by occupying Afghanistan, now intends to play a leading role in a region where its influence hitherto was relatively small. Regardless of Mr Brezhnev's denials, there is an implied threat of a struggle for control of Arab oil and oil tanker routes if the Soviet proposal is spurned or ignored. When coupled with some rather ham-fisted and largely ineffective Western military activity around the Gulf, Mr Brezhnev's speech in New Delhi raises the spectre for the Gulf Arabs and the Iranians of a return to something closely resembling the "Great Game" of the 19th Century, when they were pawns in the struggle between an imperialist Britain and Tsarist Russia. This time, however, the stakes for both players and chessmen are immeasurably higher.

There are, of course, other and less fearsome interpretations that can be given to Mr Brezhnev's proposal. It could be seen as a confession of Soviet weakness. For all of their loud talk, the Soviet leaders are embarked upon a sea of troubles both at home and abroad. Poland, Afghanistan and Vietnam's troubles with China are

serious and costly foreign problems that could well be compounded by a Reagan administration; at home, a Politburo of geriatrics, food shortages, organisational shortcomings and the technological imbalance that favours overwhelmingly the military at the expense of the rest of Soviet society are persistent headaches that could mark the beginnings of an institutional crisis putting the very foundations of communist rule at risk. Mr Brezhnev may therefore be appealing for calm in the Gulf region to reduce the number of dangers he must face at one time.

The real problem for the rest of the world is that both of these interpretations are probably true: a salient feature of Soviet foreign policy has been its two-faced nature, exploiting strength while seeking to hide weakness, with circumstances dictating which of the faces is put on display. It has been a very difficult policy to counter.

The breadth of Mr Brezhnev's offer does, however, offer the rest of the world one advantage: it provides an opportunity to demand "linkage" of a number of aspects of Soviet policy which the Kremlin has always kept in separate compartments, something Mr Reagan has vowed to press for when he moves to the White House.

Linkage in this context can only be obtained through the Gulf states because they are the focal point of Mr Brezhnev's proposal. It is therefore very much to their advantage in their dealings with the two superpowers to see to it that the Soviet offer is kept alive long enough for it to be examined exhaustively. And if, in the end, it leads to a removal of military threats by both superpowers from the region, then the Gulf will be doubly advantaged.

CSO: 4820

#### ARAB WAR RISKS INSURANCE SYNDICATE FORMED

Beirut AL-BAYAN in Arabic Aug-80 p 84

[Article: "Arab War Risks Insurance Syndicate With Capital of 3 Billion of Which Founders Paid Five Percent; Iraqi [Company] Manages Syndicate for 5 Years"]

[Excerpt] Kuwait--The Iraqi Reinsurance [Underwriting] Company has been selected as host company for the Arab War Risks Insurance Syndicate. This syndicate is a fund which the Arab Gulf companies have decided to establish with an initial capital of 3 billion dollars of which the founding companies have paid 5 percent or 150 million dollars.

The founding companies signed the agreement at a meeting held at the Meridian Hotel in July 1980. Article four of the agreement defines the tasks of the syndicate as follows: "Insurance against the risks of war, civil turmoil and uprisings and so forth in the sphere of maritime insurance for both goods and ships."

#### Thirty One Companies Attended Meeting

The meeting was chaired by Khalil al-Shami, Kuwait's representative, and was attended by 42 delegates representing 31 Gulf companies. The Iraqi Reinsurance Company will, in its capacity as the host company, prepare the place necessary for the executive outfit to carry out its work, will prepare the means of telephone and telex communication and will provide the administrative services needed by the syndicate for a period of 5 years.

Our correspondent says that selection of the Iraqi Reinsurance Company is considered a victory for Iraq and an acknowledgement on the part of the Gulf companies of the technical capabilities enjoyed by the Iraqi company. The beginning of 1981 has been set as the date for the syndicate to start accepting risks.

#### Insurance Against War Risks

The syndicate's task can be described briefly as the task of seeking to cover war risks through reinsurance agreements concluded by the syndicate with the companies that deal in insuring ships and goods against such risks. This means that the syndicate can be considered a reinsurance company specialized in risks of war and unrest, to the exclusion of other kinds of shipping risks.

The syndicate will conclude reinsurance treaties with the companies wishing to deal with it so that these companies may be able to transfer to the syndicate in full the

war risks that they underwrite in return for a commission which the syndicate spells out in the treaty. The syndicate will also [pay] a profit commission to the companies that refer to it profitable operations according to a list included in the treaty. The syndicate will only deal with risks concerning ships flying Arab flags or operating in the Arab Gulf area.

This provision does not apply to goods.

#### Membership Conditions

All the Gulf companies (with a majority of their stocks owned by Arab citizens) can take part in accepting risks. The syndicate requires the companies that participate in acceptance operations through it to maintain their net retention for their own account. Such companies cannot reinsure any part of this commitment except within the framework of collective action carried out by the syndicate.

#### Safeguarding Gulf Interests

It is worth noting that the fundamental goal of founding this syndicate is, according to the founders, to protect the Gulf citizen from the arbitrary prices which the foreign markets have become accustomed to imposing on Arab ships and goods. The syndicate will set a reduced tariff for war and unrest risks. This tariff will be determined by the syndicate's management in accordance with the objective facts available to this management on the security situation in the Arab area, provided that the Arab governments associated with the syndicate shoulder the difference in the price charged by the syndicate and the prices prevailing in the other insurance markets. A study conducted by the founding companies shows that value of the war shares expected to be subscribed to the syndicate in 1980 amounts to 12 million dollars—a sum representing the installments which the Gulf markets pay in war risks insurance (both ships and goods) to the London and New York markets annually.

#### Technical Committee Members

While awaiting the syndicate to initiate its operations officially, a technical committee comprised of the following has been entrusted with supervising the preparatory operation:

Ahmad Husayn Abu-al-'Ula.

Dr Ra'uf Maqar.

Dr Mustafa Rajab.

Muwaffiq Husein Rida.

Wasif Habashah.

CSO:



## GERMAN GROUP'S PLANS FOR GAS PROJECT APPEAR PRIMATURE

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 8 Dec 80 p 4

[Text]

A West German consortium announced last week it was negotiating with Qatar over a \$4.5 billion scheme to develop Qatar's North-West Dome, one of the world's biggest gas fields. But, as Marwan Iskandar writes below, the Germans appear to be jumping the gun — the Qatari authorities have still to make up their minds about how the field is to be developed.

Prof Matthias Sefelder, Chairman of West Germany's BASF chemicals firm, said BASF's subsidiary company Wintershall had submitted a technical and economic feasibility study to Qatar for the first stage of exploitation of the North-West Dome and that talks with officials in Doha were now concerned with shaping a contract. Wintershall is the leading partner in the consortium and some 20 per cent of the field lies in concessions explored by the Wintershall group; the remainder of the field lies in concession areas held by Royal Dutch/Shell; Wintershall has a 32.5 per cent stake in the consortium, Veba OI has a 12 per cent holding, Deutsche Schachtbau 10.5 per cent. Other members of the consortium include the US firm Koch Inc and Canada's Gulfstream Resources.

*Marwan Iskandar writes:*

Interest in Qatar's North-West Dome gas resources has been mounting. News items have indicated that the Germans are involved in discussion of a \$4.5 billion deal, whereas still earlier news items reflected great progress in discussions with Shell.

In fact, Qatar has been aware of its gas potential in the North-West Dome for the past two years, and Qatari authorities have been taking their time to assess the potential for development and the most appropriate markets. It is established beyond doubt that resources exceed 200 trillion cubic feet and this reserve base enables Qatar to determine the capacity of the LNG project to be constructed with little restraint. It is not

expected, however, that decisions on partners or associates will be taken before March 1981.

Exploratory talks have not been restricted to the Germans or the British, but have included as well the Japanese the French and the Americans. Decisions on engineering design groups are to be expected, but not before March 1981. Before that date, Qatar should have received studies commissioned by the authorities in Doha from two different groups with special experience in gas utilisation projects. One of the groups is American and the other British.

The prevalent Qatari attitude is one of careful thought because this project will play a significant role in the future of Qatar. On the one hand, it could constitute a substantial income earner and, thereby, reduce Qatar's need to depend on oil revenues from production at present levels. Also, the gas to be produced will cover part of the internal requirements of Qatar for gas, whether for basic utilities such as electricity or for industries such as petrochemicals.

The salient feature of Qatar's plans at present is a determination to think through the project and the intention to make comparisons between various offers for partnership and/or association. The projected costs for the North-West Dome at its lowest conceivable capacity are in the range of \$6 billion in 1980 dollars, which will be spent over a span of seven years. This figure covers costs of gas production, its transmission to the shore and transporting the gas to foreign markets as well as the costs of the LNG plant.

## BRIEFS

**SECOND LARGEST OPEC GAS RESERVES**--Qatar owns one-eighth of the world's gas reserves thus occupying the second position in the OPEC in this respect, an economic study published here today said. The study, prepared by Qatar petroleum organization, said that the exploded gas in the already discovered oil fields in Qatar in addition to the gas found in Al-Khof oil field north of Qatar discovered in cooperation with other multi-national companies, made the country occupy this position. It was formerly occupying the third position after Algeria and Iran. Al Khof field contains more than 300 trillion cubic feet of gas. A Qatari newspaper said that the government has asked the concerned parties to present proposals on how to commercially exploit this wealth in favor of the country's interests. The newspaper said that there were only two options: either to liquefy the associated gas for exports, which is currently adopted, or to establish petrochemical projects. The paper quoted the general manager of the Qatar Petroleum Organization, Ali Jeeda as saying that the organization has begun negotiations with a Japanese company for this purpose. It added that a consortium comprising German and American companies has presented an offer of 4.5 billion dollars to exploit Al Khof's output in a concession area amounting to 20 percent of the field's total area. The paper quoted Jeeda as saying that the offer was still understudy. [Text] [Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 22 Dec 80 p 1]

**POLYTHENE EXPORT AGREEMENT**--The United Arab Shipping Company (UASC) has concluded an agreement to lift 150,000 tonnes of polythene from Qatar to the Far East. The company's General Manager, Abdelaziz Salatt signed for the company in Paris with a French firm undertaking the marketing operations of Qatar's National Petrochemicals Company. The French firm is C.D.F. Chimie. A spokesman for the Arab company here said yesterday that the agreement will run for one year and an extension may be negotiated. According to the agreement, the company will use 20 ft. containers to be loaded by Qatar Petrochemicals Company at an average of 12 per day and each load will be for a minimum 100 containers weighing approximately 20,000 tonnes, he added. The agreement will provide the way for United Arab Shipping to start loading cargo from the Gulf region to various West European and Far East destinations, the spokesman said. The company owned by six Gulf states used to operate one-way traffic in the past and the agreement was viewed as significant in the Gulf region because it is the first to be concluded between two Gulf companies. [Text] [Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 11 Dec 80 p 3]

**OPENING OF PETROCHEMICAL COMPLEX**—Qatar's new CAPCO petrochemical complex has gone on stream and the stream-cracking unit of the four-unit plant is now producing ethylene, the official Qatari news agency announced last week. It quoted sources at the complex as saying that production began on November 29. The complex uses ethane-rich gas from Qatar's natural gas liquids plant as its feedstock. Planned output is 280,000 tonnes a year of ethylene, of which 250,000 tonnes is to be used locally to manufacture polyethylene and the rest exported. The plant is also designed to produce 50,000 tonnes of suphur pellets a year. CAPCO is a joint venture by the Qatar General Petroleum Corporation and LCDP Chimie of France; LCDP Chimie is operating the complex, located in the Umm Said industrial zone about 50 kilometres south of Doha, the capital of Qatar. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 15 Dec 80 p 3]

**RESUMPTION OF NGL EXPORTS**--Qatar has resumed exports of natural gas liquids after an interruption of three years, following the destruction by fire of an NGL plant then under construction. The Director of the Qatar General Petroleum Corporation, Ali Jaidah, said the first shipment last week, including 29,000 tonnes of butane and propane, went to Spanish and Japanese customers. He added that the deliveries were made under contracts ranging from two to five years. The OPEC news agency meanwhile quoted the Deputy Director General of the plant, Kudar al-Majid, saying that output was between 400 and 500 tonnes of liquified gas and 250-350 tonnes of natural gasoline per day. Production of methane-rich gas varied between 80 and 130 tonnes daily, most of it used locally, and output of ethane-rich gas, much of which was consumed in the petrochemical complex, averaged 700 tonnes a day. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 8 Dec 80 p 7]

CSO: 4820

GOVERNOR DISCUSSES NEW FIVE-YEAR PLAN, MILITARY TRAINING, ADVISORY COUNCIL

Jiddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic 22 Jul 80 p 3

[Interview with Prince 'Abd al-Muhsin Ibn Jiluwi, governor of the Eastern Province, by Muhammad Hasan Satih: "The Benefits of the Third Five-Year Plan Will Encompass All Activities and Fields"]

[Text] The Eastern Province is the land of plenty which encompasses the sources of our black gold. It is also the province whose achievements have defied imagination in the fields of industry--especially those having to do with petroleum and heavy industry.

When we speak about this province, the person whose name immediately comes to our mind is the governor of the province, a man of piety. He is His Highness Prince 'Abd al-Muhsin Ibn Jiluwi, whose job it is to serve, and who is responsible for the welfare of, the people of this vast province. He is the one who tirelessly seeks to solve their problems, within the framework of the higher guidelines provided by the wise and prudent government of His Majesty King Khalid and Crown Prince Fahd.

On the occasion of the publication of this special edition about "the Eastern Province," we addressed a number of questions to the governor in an attempt to shed some light on some of the facts which are imbedded in the figures of the new budget and on the most important projects of the third development plan for this province.

With an open mind and with breadth of vision, the governor welcomed this interview during which he met our questions with an open heart and spirit and answered them with total sincerity. What follows is the interview which resulted from this amiable meeting:

The Benefits of the Third Five-Year Plan Will Encompass All Activities

[Question] The second five-year plan is ending and the third five-year plan, which has been authorized by His Majesty King Khalid, is now being prepared. What are your impressions concerning the third five-year plan, and how will it benefit our beloved country?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the third five-year plan, which has been authorized by King Khalid, will bring us tremendous benefits. We will continue to be blessed in the fashion that we have become accustomed to under our wise and prudent govern-



ment. The third five-year plan will not bestow its benefits merely on a particular field or area. God willing, the plan's benefits will embrace all activities and all fields which bring prosperity to our citizens.

#### Various Development Projects

[Question] What are the most important projects which the new budget includes for the Eastern Province?

[Answer] The new budget includes numerous projects which cannot be enumerated in detail here. But what I can say is that they include development projects in a number of fields. There are projects in the field of public health which involve the construction of a number of hospitals and clinics so that public health services can reach even the most remote villages. There are also projects in the field of education which involve the construction of new schools in all areas of the province, both for the education of boys and for girls. This is being done in view of the tremendous desire on the part of our young people, of both sexes, to help bring progress to this country of ours which has spared no effort in its attempt to bring them happiness. In view of this, there are numerous projects contemplated in the areas of youth welfare, electricity, and extending all types of services such as telephone, water, and sewage services. The industrial projects which will be implemented during the coming planning phase in the area of Jubayl will include the implementation of the most important principal projects for the basic industries which our wise and prudent government desires to complete as soon as possible so that the desired goal of these projects can be achieved. In this regard, the government is particularly interested in the area of heavy industry and the development of various resources in order to continue to provide our citizens with prosperity, in order to diversify income, and in order that we not be dependent on a single source for our economy.

#### A Constructive Dialogue Benefits Our Citizens

[Question] Our wise and prudent government is undertaking all possible efforts and utilizing all possible means to solve our citizens' problems. This includes a constructive dialogue which is going on between the government officials and our young people from different levels of university study. What are the most important methods which you are employing to provide for participation of this sort?

[Answer] Our government is always eager to be broad-minded and to open up doors to a free and constructive dialogue between government authorities in all sectors, on the one hand, and our citizens--especially our educated university students--on the other hand. Our government does this in order that they be able to offer what constructive suggestions they have because the implementation of such suggestions will bring benefit to our country and consequently to our citizens. There is no doubt that the method of holding symposiums and meetings has demonstrated its usefulness and effectiveness in increasing our citizens' civic consciousness and awareness of the responsibilities which they must assume concerning the welfare of this honest and upright country.

## Compulsory Military Service Is a Necessity

[Question] One of the Prophet's sayings says: "Teach your children swimming, archery, and horseback-riding." I would like to take this opportunity to ask you opinion concerning the subject of compulsory military service which our wise and prudent government is planning to institute in the near future, God willing.

[Answer] There is no doubt that the saying of the Prophet which calls upon people to teach their children swimming, archery, and horseback-riding is the best way to have a young man improve himself mentally and physically. And this is the way nations are built. No good can be expected in a nation which brings up its young in an atmosphere of vice which is far removed from this basic physical fitness which creates in them courage, strength, affection, and fearlessness. And the best way to do this is to provide them all with compulsory military training, the aim of which is to create strong and well-trained soldiers who will be able to bear the burdens of defending the borders of their homeland with conviction and with faith.

## The Advisory Council

[Question] What is your opinion with regard to what has been stated concerning acceptable development in the system of government and concerning the establishment of the Advisory Council?

[Answer] With regard to the idea of acceptable development in the system of government and the establishment of the Advisory Council, one may quote God's word: "And have them consult each other." What has been publicly stated by His Highness Prince Nayif Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, the minister of the interior and head of the committee for formulating the system of government, in addition to what has been published by the newspapers and transmitted by both Arab and international news agencies, gives sufficient information concerning this matter. What we have to do now is to wait for the system of government to emerge, from our esteemed Council of Ministers, in an integral form. When this happens, our citizens will see how much our king and our leaders love this good and virtuous country and how much they love our noble citizens who desire only to see our country governed by the law of Islam.

[Question] It is well-known that Saudi Arabia is one of the foremost countries in the world in terms of stability and public safety, in addition to what its government provides to its people in terms of numerous services in all fields. What comments do you have regarding this?

[Answer] It is indeed well-known that Saudi Arabia is among the foremost countries of the world in terms of stability and public safety. Nevertheless, our wise and prudent government spares no effort in its utilization of all its potential--in terms of human beings and machines, and on the highest levels of modern technology--to aid in the pursuit and arrest of criminals in the shortest possible time. Evidence of this is demonstrated by the low crime rate which we see in our country. The crimes which are committed are isolated criminal phenomena and individual incidents--crimes which are committed by a few reckless or weak-willed souls whose hearts are not filled with religious faith. They are firmly punished so that their

example can serve as a deterrent and warning to others, and so that our citizens can enjoy the peace and security which is being provided by our wise and prudent government, under the leadership of His Majesty King Khalid and Crown Prince Fahd.

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CSO: 4802

AIR DEFENSE FORCES MOUNT RECRUITING, INFORMATION DRIVE

Jiddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic 26 Jul 80 p 11

[Interview with Master Sergeant 'Abd al-'Aziz Mubarak al-Rashud, head of the Mobile Office of the Saudi Air Defense Forces, by AL-MADINAH in the province of al-Qasim]

[Text] Right now the province of al-Qasim is being visited by the Mobile Office of the Saudi Air Defense Forces. In order to shed some light on the goals and purpose of this visit to al-Qasim, AL-MADINAH conducted this short interview with the head of the Mobile Office, Master Sergeant 'Abd al-'Aziz Mubarak al-Rashud. The interview was as follows:

[Question] What is the purpose of this tour which you are making?

[Answer] The purpose of this tour is to acquaint those young men of al-Qasim who hold elementary school diplomas, or have completed schooling in addition to this, with the importance of the Air Defense Forces and with the objectives and merits of the Air Defense School. We are doing this in order to get young people to sign up for one of the specializations which are offered by the Air Defense Forces. These specializations correspond to the educational level which the young men have attained. The tour is also being undertaken in order to sign up those who want to enlist in this branch of our armed forces and to furnish notification about those who wish to sign up after this tour is over.

[Question] What are these fields and specializations?

[Answer] There are many fields. One of them, for example, teaches young men to operate the equipment and weapons of the Air Defense Forces so that they will be able to defend our virtuous land. And for the sake of looking after our weapons, which an individual should look after as much as he does his own life, a weapons maintenance training section has been created where the students learn about the maintenance and design of the equipment belonging to the Air Defense Forces. There are also numerous other fields and specializations which it would take a long time to talk about.

[Question] What are the benefits in going to the Air Defense School?



[Answer] There are numerous benefits enjoyed by the students while they are in this school. They receive a monthly stipend of 650 riyals, if they are elementary school graduates, and they receive 750 riyals if they have a secondary school diploma or the equivalent.

Also, the students have comfortable and air-conditioned housing and receive free meals, medical care, and uniforms. In addition to this, after they have completed their studies in this school they will have opportunities to be sent on study missions abroad. After graduation, housing will be guaranteed for them and their families in the quarters set aside for people in the Ministry of Defense and Aviation.

[Question] When a student graduates from this school, what is his rank and what salary does he receive?

[Answer] If a student has an elementary school diploma, when he graduates his rank will be that of corporal-specialist and he will receive a salary of 3,680 riyals. But if he has a secondary school diploma, or the equivalent thereof, then his rank will be deputy sergeant-specialist and he will receive a salary of 4,100 riyals.

[Question] What period of time does the student spend learning the maintenance and operation of the equipment of this branch of arms?

[Answer] When a student enrolls in the Air Defense Forces, he is first of all sent to the Air Defense Forces Training Center in al-Ta'if. He spends 3 months there going through infantry basic training. When he finishes this infantry training cycle, he then goes to the Air Defense School. There he learns rocket artillery maintenance as well as how to operate rocket artillery. The training programs are in Arabic and they last from between 6 months to a year. But if the student is in Section 1, then he has to go through a course in English which lasts for about 7 months.

[Question] During your tour in the province of al-Qasim, what are the visits that you have made in order to achieve these important goals?

[Answer] First of all, we had the honor of visiting His Royal Highness Prince 'Abd al-Ilah Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, the governor of the province of al-Qasim. Then we visited the director of education in al-Qasim. Then we visited the director of education in al-Qasim and arranged with him to visit some of the schools. Among the schools which we visited there were, for example, the Abu 'Ubaydah Secondary School in Buraydah, the Quds Elementary School in Buraydah, and the secondary school in 'Unayzah. But since this visit took place during school vacation, some of the schools were not possible for us to visit. However, we made up for this by visiting some of the places where we could expect to find young people. In the public park of the city of Buraydah we showed a film which talked about the benefits of the Air Defense Forces. A large crowd of young people showed up for this film and consequently we noticed that the young people of al-Qasim have a great interest in performing their sacred duty [of defending their homeland]. We also showed a similar film in the public park of the city of 'Unayzah, and most of the young men of the city attended the showing. We are also hoping to visit some of the youth

clubs of the area. We have not been content merely to make visits. We have also distributed posters and pamphlets, concerning the Air Defense Forces, to all gatherings of young people and in some of the streets. We have also set up some photo displays which give information about the objectives of the Air Defense Forces.

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CSO: 4802

HEALTH MINISTER DISCUSSES NEW HOSPITAL CONSTRUCTION

Jiddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic 3 Aug 80 p 3

[Article by Maqbul al-Jahni: "The Crown Prince Is Interested In Immediately Having the Bahah Hospital Start Functioning"]

[Text] Mobile airborne doctor services will be provided in both the northern and southern areas of the country.

Large 500-bed hospitals, as well as 20 50-to-200-bed hospitals, will be constructed.

Al-Taif--At 12 noon last Wednesday, His Excellency Dr Husayn al-Jaza'iry, the minister of health, performed an operation on one of our citizens in the King Faisal Hospital in al-Ta'if. After the operation was successfully concluded, AL-MADINAH conducted an interview with him and asked him about some of the activities of the ministry in the city of al-Ta'if and in other areas of the country. He said: "We are greatly interested in expanding the realm of our health activities so that our health services will include all of the towns and villages of Saudi Arabia. However, we are faced with the problem of a lack of manpower and, God willing, this problem will gradually be solved. The region of al-Ta'if will be getting many more new hospitals under the third development plan." He went on to say: "There will be the addition of 500 new beds for the hospital for pulmonary diseases, and there are several projects for constructing nurses quarters, outpatient clinics, and a new wing in the hospital for treatment of prisoners. Also the hospital, along with its isolation ward, will be completed renovated. Another hospital which will be completely renovated is the King Faisal Hospital in al-Ta'if which formerly had 350 beds, but now has 623 beds. This hospital also has an artificial kidney unit, an intensive care unit, a neurosurgery unit, and a cosmetic surgery unit. An additional 10 million riyals has been allocated for the renovation of this hospital. Within a year from now, this hospital will be in excellent shape--unlike the shape that it is in now. Also, the hospital's emergency ward is being expanded, and an area will be added to it where first aid will be administered. The hospital also has surgeons, specialists in internal medicine, and bone specialists. This is the type of system which exists in the Riyadh Central Hospital, and it is possible to put it into practice in central hospitals such as the King Faisal Hospital in al-Ta'if." The minister of health also pointed out the following: "The Ministry of Health has been concentrating on having the hospital system in large hospitals run by specialized firms. Cooked meals are now provided in full, in accordance with

the patients' prescribed diet and in the proper amounts. These meals are distributed to other regions in the areas of Jizan, Jiddah, and Medina, and within a few months they will also be distributed in the Riyadh region." Then the minister spoke about the Bahah Hospital and about the hospital in al-Jaradah. He said: "The Ministry of Health is concentrating on these hospitals. The Bahah Hospital is receiving great attention on the part of His Highness Prince Fahd Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, the heir apparent and first deputy of the prime minister. Right now, Prince Fahd is keeping track of how fast the hospital is being put into operation so that it can provide medical services to our citizens. The administration of the hospital has been offered to a specialized firm." The minister of health also revealed the following facts: "There are 83 clinics in al-Ta'if which render medical services to our citizens. When the road system and telephone system in Saudi Arabia are completed so that they will reach every village, this will reduce the problems of the Ministry of Health. This is because the ministry is planning to use mobile airborne doctors in both the northern and southern regions in order to improve the ministry's services there. It is also very important to extend electricity to all parts of the country because it will be of considerable help to the Ministry of Health if electricity is available in all of the country's villages."

Concerning the most important project being undertaken by the Ministry of Health, that is, completing the setting up of a network of clinics, Dr al-Jaza'iri said: "During the third five-year development plan, 186 new clinics will have been set up in villages all over Saudi Arabia. Actually most of them have already been completed. Also, large hospitals have been completely furnished in Jiddah, Jizan, Medina, al-Hufuf, and al-Khubar. Each one has a capacity of 500 beds. In Tabuk, Ha'il, and Najran, 3 hospitals have been constructed, the capacity of each one being 200 beds. These hospitals have housing for those who work in the hospitals, and even all of the new clinics have been provided with housing."

The minister of health went on to say: "Within a short time after the third five-year development plan has been underway, 3 large hospitals, each one having a capacity of 500 beds, will have been built. Bidding for these hospitals will be invited in Mecca, Buraydah, and Abha. Also, 20 more hospitals have opened their doors. Each one has a capacity of 200 beds, and they are scattered all over the various areas of Saudi Arabia. An agreement has been reached between our Ministry of Health and the Philippines to bring a number of Filipino nurses here. Further, more, emphasis is now being placed on setting up nursing schools in Saudi Arabia, and the requirement for admission into these schools will be raised to where an applicant must have a secondary school diploma, not merely an elementary school diploma as has been the case. Nursing school graduates will then be assigned to Category 5." The minister of health pointed out that during his visit to the province of al-Jawf, he found that the citizens responded favorably to the idea of enrolling their daughters in nursing schools.

"In view of this fact, the Ministry of Health is going to open up a nursing school in al-Jawf. There was also great interest in al-Ahsa' in having a nursing school." Concerning nurses, the minister of health went on to say: "We actually have a large number of Saudi nurses, and it will only be a matter of time before we solve the problem. The more Saudi nurses we have, the more this will serve to eliminate the problem of a shortage of nurses in our labor force." He pointed out that, in this



regard, the nurses will be treated in the same way that female teachers are. "We are trying to utilize the nurses in hospital units which deal with women's diseases, children's diseases, and childbirth."

AL-MADINAH asked the minister of health a question concerning the inadequacy of the Buraydah Hospital which was noticed by His Highness Prince 'Abd al-Ilah Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, the governor of the province of al-Qasim. His answer was: "The Ministry of Health has delegated responsibilities to the local health departments. The ministry's job is that of conducting planning and follow-up activities. Naturally, a person who is directly faced with a problem is the one who is most able to solve it. Certainly a hospital is inadequate if it has been badly constructed and does not inspire its personnel to engage in serious work. The hospital which exists at the present time will be used only temporarily. We have taken the future into consideration. Also, there is an electrical power problem which stems from the power plant in Buraydah. We already have a plan for building a hospital to replace the present hospital. God willing, this whole picture will change and we will be offering competent health services to our citizens in the area of al-Qasim and its surrounding areas." When speaking about the manpower problem, the minister of health said: "We have a tremendous shortage in administrative personnel since more than 4,000 of our administrative positions still have not been filled." He also pointed out that Saudi Arabia's colleges of medicine will be rendering a great service to the nation.

"Eight percent of our doctors in various fields are Saudis. And it is expected that the great efforts which are currently being expended by our schools of medicine will result in the fact that, during approximately the next 15 years, 50 percent of our doctors will be Saudis."

At the conclusion of his interview with AL-MADINAH, the minister of health referred to the cooperation which exists between the hospitals of the Ministry of Defense and Aviation, the hospitals of the Ministry of the Interior, and the hospitals of the Ministry of Health. "They have been providing the Ministry of Health with all of the help which it needs, whenever we have asked for it. This is due to the interest and concern which has been shown by His Highness Prince Sultan Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, the minister of defense and aviation, and His Highness Prince Nayif Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, the minister of interior."

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CSO: 4802

## DIRECTOR GENERAL DISCUSSES NEW ORGANIZATION OF MORALITY SOCIETIES

Jiddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic 2 Aug 80 p 2

[Article by Maqbul al-Jahmi: "The New Organization of the Societies Is In Keeping With Our Level of Cultural Advancement and Provides a New Impetus For Organized Action and Activity ]

[Text] Al Ta'if--AL-MADINAH conducted an interview with His Excellency Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz Ibn Muhammad Ibn Ibrahim Al al-Shaykh, the director general of the Societies for Promoting Good and Prohibiting Evil (hay'at al-amr bi al-ma'ruf wa al-nahy 'an al-munkar), in which he talked about the new organization of the Societies which was approved by the cabinet during its latest session. He said: "Since I have held the position of director of the Societies for Promoting Good and Prohibiting Evil, I have dedicated all of my effort and interest to the development of this organization so that it can keep pace with the level of cultural advancement which all facets of our life in Saudi Arabia are experiencing. This organization, in particular, is very much in need of change and a careful and fresh start. One of the main activities which we have been interested in has been to see to it that this government body--which has a close relationship to our society--has a comprehensive and well thought-out system of organization. So we proceeded to study and formulate this system of organization. After we had formulated it, we sent the result to His Royal Highness Prince Fahd Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, the heir apparent and deputy prime minister. After a while, on the instructions of His Majesty King Khalid, I received a reply which said that a decree had been issued to form a cabinet committee to study this matter. The chairman of the committee was His Highness Prince Nayif Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, minister of the interior. Members of the committee were the minister of justice, the minister of labor and social affairs, the minister of finance and national economy, and minister of information, and the director general of the Societies for Promoting Good and Prohibiting Evil. After the matter was studied, the minister of the interior took the matter to King Khalid. Then the matter took its course, and the new system of organization was studied and formulated by the Formulation Committee. And praise be to God, the system of organization emerged in a form which is perfect and tailor-made for the job of the Societies for Promoting Good and Prohibiting Evil. The organization received additional authority and advantages which will provide its officials with a new impetus for organized action and activity. One of the most important things included in this new system of organization is that the director's office will begin filling positions in the part of the organization which deals with missionary

activity, spreading religious awareness, and providing guidance. Funds for managerial positions involving this type of work have already been authorized in the director's budget. We will proceed with all due speed to find qualified and enlightened personnel to fill these positions." The director general concluded his statements by saying the following: "I would like to take this opportunity to thank our government, headed by His Majesty King Khalid and His Highness Prince Fahd Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, the heir apparent and deputy prime minister, for the concern and attention which they have given to matters concerning this organization. I implore God to grant us success in achieving what He wishes and what pleases Him. He is the one who is all-hearing and who grants our wishes."

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CSO: 4802

## EDUCATION OFFICIALS DISCUSS COOPERATION

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 27 Dec 80 p 2

[Text]

DAMMAM, Dec. 26 (SPA) — Dr. Muhammad Saud Ouhaim, rector of King Fahd University, discussed academic cooperation with Chinese Deputy Minister of Education Dr. Li Mo here.

Dr. Mo is the head of the Chinese delegation to the Sino-Saudi Arabian Joint Cultural Cooperation Committee. The Chinese official toured the university departments, faculties, central library and the teaching hospital in Al-Khobar. He expressed his admiration for the university's modern educational methods.

The Chinese delegation also visited the University of Petroleum and Minerals in Dhahran. Dr. Mo met with Dr. Bakr Abdulrahman Badr, rector of the university, and inspected the departments and faculties of UPM. The delegation is expected to visit Jeddah as part of its visit to the Kingdom.

The Sino-Saudi joint committee ended its meetings early in the week. The meetings lasted three days led by Dr. Mo and Dr. Mahmoud Muhammad Safar, deputy minister of higher education and secretary general of the higher council of universities. The two countries agreed to draw up a plan to implement cultural agreements already proposed, and consider proposals related to the educational, cultural and information cooperation program. A Saudi Arabian cultural week will be organized in Taiwan, while the next joint committee annual meeting is to be held in Taipei next year.

In other development, higher Education Minister Sheikh Hassan ibn Abdullah Al-Sheikh, the chancellor of Saudi Arabian Universities, met with a Qatari cultural delegation headed by Abdul Rahman Nima Jaber, director of cultural affairs in the ministry of education.

The meeting held in Sheikh Hassan's office in Riyadh Wednesday night dealt with educational cooperation between the Kingdom and Qatar.

Meanwhile, the second seminar for student affairs departments ended its meetings in Dhahran Wednesday night by recommending the necessity of training department employees in the Kingdom's universities, specify their qualifications and the social, scout and administrative activity programs.

The committees that participated in the seminar agreed to take part in student seminars, lectures, travels and camps in cooperation with the teaching staff assembly. In addition, they also will take part in directing cultural and scientific clubs and stress the role of mosques and the necessity of displaying cultural films, supervise student services and organize meetings with students in their housing units. The committees agreed to include these directing and supervising services in the evaluation of academic improvement.

The seminar recommended providing care and educational guidance for students in career consultation and human relations. It also recommended the necessity of specifying appropriate designs for university housing by observing health and other requirements for the students, including recreational, cultural, sports and general services.



# NEW LABOR MEASURES ANNOUNCED

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 22 Dec 80 p 1

[Text]

RIYADH, Dec. 21 (SPA) — The Labor Offices throughout the Kingdom will take over the the transfer of sponsorship of expatriates and their loaning among companies and establishments under an agreement reached between the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior.

An official spokesman of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs said Sunday that a number of measures have been taken to regulate the process. The measures provide that the loaning of a labor should not exceed three months or the period of labor permit, whichever is less. It can be renewed for a similar period.

The measures further stipulate that the loaning of labor should be to cover a job with the hiring employer, bearing the same nature of work as done by the laborer. Furthermore, the loaning should be within a specified limit of 30 per cent of the number of expatriates.

The spokesman said that, according to the new measures, the loaning should be confined to vocations which do not require the labors concerned to work more than a specific period or periods in a single process, as is the case in some construction activities.

Under the new measures, he said, the loaning must be carried out in the form of a written agreement, signed by the original employer, the hiring employer and the hired labor. The agreement must include all terms and conditions specifying the rights and obligations of each party.

The agreement must say that the work contract will continue to be between the original employer and the employee during the period of loaning, and the former would continue to remain sponsor of the latter.

The loaning period must be counted ~~with the period of his service with the original employer.~~

None of the labor's rights agreed to in his work contract must be violated as a result of the loaning process.

Both the original employer and the hiring employer must support all dues of the labor or any other party, in regard to the period of loaning.

The new measures further provide that an advance sanction must be obtained from the competent Labor Office, and an application for loaning must be submitted enclosing the agreement.

The transfer of sponsorship for an expatriate labor will not be possible unless the following conditions are fulfilled:—

(1) The labor in question must have completed at least six months with his sponsor.

(2) The applicant must be in need of the services of the employee in question, and that his (applicant's) profession must conform to that of the employer.

(3) That no such Saud Arabian is available who is willing to take up the job.

The measures make it clear that an application for the transfer of sponsorship must be submitted to the competent Labor Office, enclosing a 'no objection' certificate from the original employer. The Labor Office will then study the application to ensure whether it fulfills all the conditions, and will consequently intimate the competent immigration department about the results of its study.

The applicant will not be allowed to employ such a labor before the submission of his application to the Labor Office. The latter will register the application and will set a date for the completion of formalities connected with the transfer of sponsorship, in case all the conditions are fulfilled.

If the conditions are not met, or if the applicant in question does not call at the Labor Office on the appointed date for the completion of formalities, and employs the labor, he would hold himself responsible for employing the labor in question in an illegal manner.

CSO: 4820

## BRIEFS

CONSTRUCTION OF NEW DAMS--RIYADH--Saudi Arabia is on the verge of finishing the construction of 33 dams in various parts of the country. Twenty of these dams have already been completed, and work on the other 13 will be finished very soon. One of the most important dams which has already been completed is the Wadi Najran Dam, the reservoir capacity of which totals 1 million cubic meters of water. This dam has helped to irrigate an area of 6,000 hectares of agricultural land. Also, an irrigation and drainage network covering 6 regions is going to be constructed. Already this network has been completed in 3 of the regions. Work in the other 3 regions will be completed during the third development plan. Another of the most important dams is the Abha Dam which was constructed in order to furnish water to the city of Abha. In Abha, the water is conveyed to analysis and purification stations, and from there it is distributed by means of the city's water supply system. The Najran Dam is considered to be one of the largest dams in the country since its holding capacity totals 85 million cubic meters. When this dam is finished, it will help to regulate the water flow and to increase the area under cultivation by means of increasing the reserves of ground water. This dam will be completed soon. [Text] [Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 3 Aug 80 p 4] 9468

CSO: 4802

## AMERICAN-EGYPTIAN JOINT MANEUVERS DISCUSSED

Damascus AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 19 Nov 80 p 5

[Article by 'Abd al-Rahman al-Dahhak: "The Egyptian Regime Is Paving the Way For American Aggression"]

[Text] The joint American-Egyptian maneuvers are part of the preparation for imperialist aggression against the Arab world. Since the beginning of this year the American secretary of defense, Harold Brown, has been making announcements about the readiness of the Rapid Deployment units which have been formed from among the United States' seven armies. Training of these units already began last February in the states of California and Florida. These units include 80,000 regular troops, 40,000 reserve troops, 170 Phantom F-16 fighter planes, 23 B-52 bombers, in addition to 4 squadrons of huge transport planes. Gen Kelley, the commander of the Rapid Deployment units, has announced that this new unit's mission will be that of guarding America's interests in the Middle East.

It is no accident that these Rapid Deployment units have been established. They are part of the new American strategy which was planned by Henry Kissinger when he was the American government's national security advisor and when he became secretary of state he made the Rapid Deployment units part of America's actual military strategy.

Political commentators are of the opinion that the basic motive for forming this unit is the United States' fear that another war, such as the October War, will occur between the Arabs and the Zionists and that this will affect the world's oil supply. This fear was expressed by Kissinger after the October War when he threatened to occupy the Arab oil fields unless they were left untouched by the war and outside the scope of the Arab-Zionist conflict.

In March of 1974 the Pentagon gave assurances of its readiness to occupy the oil fields and establish control over these sources of oil in order to keep the oil pumping so that it could continue to be supplied to the United States.

At the time, these statements provoked strong reactions on the part of the Arab nations and the international community. In the face of these reactions, the United States said that it had given up any idea of occupying the oil fields, but in fact the United States continued to lay down a complete American strategy concerning this matter. Nixon, Ford, and Carter, more than once, have stated that the United States will use military force to guard what it has called its vital interests in the Persian Gulf area.



But then there was a succession of events in the Middle East after the signing of the two Camp David treaties. There was the fall of the shah of Iran, who had been playing the role of policeman for the Pentagon in the area, there were the plots to partition Lebanon, there was the failure on the part of the imperialists to expand the civil war in Lebanon, and there was the general expansion of liberation movements in the Arab countries and throughout the world. All of this made the United States give up its policy of being silent on the matter, and it proceeded to reveal its new strategy concerning the Middle East.

In the second conference in Venice, which was held during the latter part of last April, Carter and his secretary of state, Muskie, made announcements concerning America's new plans and concerning Europe's role in carrying out these plans in order to confront what they called the advance of communism and in order to guard their joint imperialist interests.

Part of this plan is that the European nations would provide sufficient military facilities, in terms of logistics and supplies, to the American Rapid Deployment units, and they would participate to the extent that they could in such military efforts. Most of the European nations declared their full readiness to offer facilities, but did not want to become involved in military actions. An exception was Britain, which also announced that it had formed rapid deployment units consisting of airborne troops and squadrons of planes. In connection with this, Britain said that it was going to demand to regain the position that it once had in its base on Cyprus and to the east of Aden. This would be within the framework of co-operation between Britain and the United States.

In October of last year, President Sadat of Egypt signed a treaty with the United States which arranged for providing the U.S. with military facilities, in accordance with the two Camp David agreements. In May of this year the first fruits of this agreement began to appear--in the form of joint maneuvers conducted by the American army and the army of Sadat's regime. These maneuvers went on for 3 months.

A few days ago a second series of maneuvers began. They saw the participation of 1,400 American troops from America's Rapid Deployment forces, in addition to squadrons of transport planes. The maneuvers were being held in order to teach American troops to conduct war in desert terrain, according to a statement made by the Egyptian regime's chief of staff. A few days ago, an S-141 military transport plane crashed near the American air base west of Cairo. All of those on board, including 6 pilots and navigators and 7 passengers, were killed. This was one of the planes participating in the joint American-Egyptian maneuvers which have been called "Rising Star." The objective of the maneuvers is to train a rapid deployment force to deal with emergency situations, in particular those which might occur in the Middle East. They are also being held in order to acclimate American troops to desert terrain and to climatic conditions which predominate in the Arab world. After this crash occurred, Muhsin Hamdi, one of Sadat's major generals, said in a press conference that these maneuvers were being held in order to train Americans in case they would be called upon to intervene in the Arab world.

The training includes land and air maneuvers, with live ammunition, and involves airborne operations. The maneuvers also involve training to defend against tank attacks. These maneuvers are expected to begin before the end of this week.

These American efforts to step up military preparations, which are taking place in Egypt, an Arab country--in addition to American bases which already exist in Somalia, Kenya, Muscat, and Masirah, in addition to expanding the base at Diego Garcia--emphasize the hostile intentions on the part of the United States toward the Arab world. These hostile intentions are being aided and abetted by Sadat, who began this policy by committing his act of treachery and is now paving the way for American aggression not only against the Arab world, but also against liberation movements throughout the world, especially the liberation movements in Africa.

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CSO: 4802

## SYRIA

### GRADUATION OF ARMED WORKERS COMPANY IN LATAKIA

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 9 Dec 80 p 2

[Article: "Graduation of Armed Workers Company in Latakia"]

[Text] Yesterday marked the celebration here of the graduation of an armed workers company under the auspices of Comrade 'Izz-al-Din Nasir, member of the national command of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party and chairman of the General Federation of Trade Unions.

Participating in the celebration were Comrade Muhammad Zaydan, secretary of the al-Latakia branch of the party, members of the command of the party branch, members of the executive office of the General Federation of Trade Unions and the al-Latakia branch of the federation, and heads of popular organizations.

The celebration began with the Ba'th anthem and then Comrade Zaydan and the other participants in the celebration viewed the parade put on by the armed workers platoons.

Next one of the participants in the course delivered an address in which he made a pledge to the party and the commander on behalf of the graduates that they would be soldiers in support of the revolution and the protection of its accomplishments.

A speech was also delivered by Comrade Mustafa 'Isa, member of the executive office of the General Federation of Trade Unions. He criticized the malicious colonialist attack to which our country is being subjected. He said that this attack is reflected in the conspiracies of the Camp David alliance with its new members, the Jordanian and Iraqi regimes, as well as in the black reactionism of the Moslem Brotherhood, that band devoted to murder, crime and sabotage.

Addressing the fighters, he said: "The working class is in the vanguard of the platoons of the Arab and world liberation movement. It has a genuine interest in the revolution and bears a direct responsibility for the support and protection of the revolution and its socialist achievements. We workers are charged with resisting the enemies of the revolution with the utmost determination and strength."

He added: "So that we will be qualified to assume this mission and the burdens of this responsibility, we must arm ourselves with the highest levels of consciousness, vigilance, and caution and we must raise ourselves to the highest levels of political, ideological, and military readiness in order to confront the enemies of the revolution both at home and abroad."

At the conclusion of his address, he pledged to the president on behalf of the working class that the workers would form an insurmountable barrier against all agents, conspirators, and traitors.

Next Comrade Muhammad Zaydan delivered a speech in which he said: "Comrades and workers, the revolution accorded you the highest concern and esteem and considered you one of the main bases from which it unfolded. Moreover, on so many occasions President Hafiz al-Asad has accorded you consideration and respect for the role that your labor movement has performed in both the domestic and foreign fields. For you have rightfully taken part--as you continue to do--in the production process with great effectiveness, supporting the steadfastness of our country and reinforcing its abilities to confront the imperialist designs."

He concluded his speech by saluting the working class, the martyrs of the Arab nation, the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party, and the leader of the march, Comrade Hafiz al-Asad.

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CSO: 4802

PRESIDENT STRESSES IMPORTANCE OF ISLAMIC SUMMIT

JN031145 Doha QNA in Arabic 1040 GMT 3 Jan 81

[Excerpt] Beirut, 3 Jan (QNA)--UAE President His Highness Shaykh Zayid Ibn Sultan al-Nuhayyan has stressed the importance of the Islamic summit conference, scheduled to be held this month, in view of the crucial current situation.

In an interview with the Lebanese paper AL-ANWAR today, his highness said that the conference, to be held in Mecca at the invitation of fraternal Saudi Arabia, is the best action Arab and Muslim leaders can undertake to shoulder their responsibilities and to deal with the needs of their countries and peoples. His highness stressed the need to seek successful solutions to the Palestinian issue, the Iraqi-Iranian war and the Afghanistan issue.

His highness declared that waiting is no longer in the interest of the Arabs and Muslims given changing international circumstances, ranging from the U.S. presidency, international detente, and the European stand to the deterioration of the internal situation in the Zionist enclaves.

His highness stressed that all of these factors must be employed in serving the Arab and Muslim causes and in achieving their objectives. His highness also stressed the need for a collective Arab and Islamic will that will act to attain a change in the balance of power.

On the Iraqi-Iranian war, his highness said that the best way to prepare for a successful Islamic conference and the best method of beginning to deal with our urgent causes is that, as has been announced, the conference devote an important part of its efforts to seeking a peaceful, Islamic and brotherly solution to the Iraqi-Iranian war. He added that a good solution to the Palestinian cause cannot be achieved until the Arab and Islamic preoccupation with this war has been erased.

His highness said that he informed the Algerian foreign minister during his visit to the UAE, that he approves of any effort Algeria might exert to bring about a rapprochement between Iraq and Iran and stressed that he is ready to support any such effort completely.

On the issue of the three Arab islands, his highness Shaykh Zayid reiterated the UAE's constant stand on these islands, which is based on the UAE's right to them. He added: We declared this stand both during and after the time of the shah and we will not hesitate to reiterate it, because this is a national and pan-Arab duty.

His highness said that our means of proving this right will continue to be the submission of evidence, and legal documents and the use of joint dialogue to achieve mutual understanding, so that those with rights will receive them and so that Arab rights will be returned to their owners.



## FIFTEEN-POINT PLAN TO INSURE FOOD QUALITY CONTROL

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 23 Dec 80 pp 1, 3

[Text]

Dubai, Dec. 22 The drafting of a federal food control law, unification of inspection and laboratory testing systems, penalizing of adulterators, the creation of training institutes and the promotion of consumers' associations - all designed to prevent bad food from being imported, produced and marketed in the UAE - are among 15 recommendations drawn up at the concluding session today of the three-day seminar on food quality control held at the Dubai Municipality council hall.

The final recommendations made by some 70 delegates attending the seminar from all over the country and the Gulf region, would have the Director-General of UAE Municipalities initiate the formation of implementation committees drawn from participating UAE municipalities, local departments and the Ministry of Health.

The recommendations made on the basis of discussions and the reading of papers on the subject of food control concerning public health are:

1. That secretaries of municipalities and officials of related bodies elect from among themselves a committee to draft the federal food law that should take into cognizance regulations needed to control, in the interest of public health, the quality, standards and specifications of food that is imported, produced and marketed in this country.

2. That the standards and specifications committee of the UAE be asked to study and consider all the existing regulations, specifications and standards of food products and to cooperate in their implementation with the concerned technical and specialist organizations.

3. That a committee be formed to work towards the improvement of the food inspection system as it operates under the municipalities and the Ministry of Health. The committee's terms of reference would be the provision of technically-qualified food inspectors from among UAE nationals, their training and education program, classification of technical nomenclature and definition of duties within the inspection system and improvement of their salary structure.

4. That a technical committee be formed to evaluate the working of existing laboratories with a view to linking them to the Central Food Laboratory. The committee's terms of reference would include unification of methods of sampling and analysis of food, unification of technical terms

and personnel qualifications and training.

5. That seminars such as the one which concluded today be held periodically.

6. That all sources of information including the popular media in the UAE and the Gulf be called upon to cooperate in the propagation of food control and additionally to project the desired standards and specifications in the Food Act through proper advertising and publicity.

7. That efforts be made to implement the recommendations of the Food Quality and Nutrition Seminar held in Bahrain last April.

8. To promote the formation of consumers' associations throughout the UAE, arouse members of the public against abuse of food regulations and advise such associations on the means and methods of protection.

9. That Arab associations and national and international bodies be asked to give assistance in the creation of training institutes and programs for public health personnel.

10. That re-export of foodstuffs declared unfit for consumption in the country be stopped forthwith.

11. That any company or organization found to be involved in the adulteration of food be blacklisted and banned.

12. That measures be taken to promote domestic production and processing of foodstuffs under a planned program that would guard against the proliferation of certain industries.

13. That a law be framed to regulate the use of insecticides and pesticides in the protection of fruit and vegetables.

14. That recognising the vital role the UAE women can play in the furtherance of food hygiene, educational centres be set up at various places in the country where the UAE women may be taught the principles of food hygiene.

15. That due attention be given to be the above recommendations and the part they could play in the evolution of a comprehensive national food control law and system and that a committee formed and chaired by the Secretary-General of UAE municipalities be formed to ensure the formation of the necessary committee and implementation of the recommendations.

A delegate told Emirates News at the conclusion of the seminar that while the law could take six months to draft and be prepared for the legislative process, the setting up of a laboratory network and revamping of the inspection system could take as much as two years.

The most important achievement of the seminar, apart from laying the foundation for a system to tell pure from impure and hygienic from unhygienic food was that experts in the field had got together for the first time in the UAE not only as a forum for debate and discussion but as a catalyst of the change that is necessary to cope with the massive increase in food consumption. The UAE, being a

major food importing country, is often the target of abuse by unscrupulous exporters who like to think of it as a convenient dumping ground for a lot of inedible foodstuffs. They are often joined by equally unscrupulous importers, wholesalers and even retailers who obviously hold the principle of profit over the principle of food hygiene to the detriment of the consumer. The purpose of the seminar, which had official sponsorship and recognition, was to examine all aspects of food control with a view to plugging the loopholes and resetting the system of quality control on a national footing.

The most interesting recommendation to emerge from the seminar is the call for the formation of consumers' associations. Where they exist, these bodies act as watchdogs for the public, pinpointing sub-standard products and attempts at outright cheating in marketing and advertising. The formation of consumers' associations would, however, require a great deal of effort and organisation in view especially of the multinational character of the population and the existence of often conflicting commercial interests. But there is no doubt that once such an organisation starts functioning, a radical change would be experienced not only in marketing strategies but also in the entire pattern of food consumption in the country.

UAE WILL SUPPLY 500,000 TONS MORE OIL TO INDIA

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 21 Dec 80 p 1

[Text]

New Delhi, Dec. 20 (WAM): The United Arab Emirates and India signed a cooperation agreement at the end of the Joint Commission meetings here today.

Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Rashid Abdalla signed on behalf of the U.A.E. and Indian Foreign Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao signed on behalf of his country.

The agreement provides for support to economic cooperation, trade exchange, studying the setting up of joint economic projects and co-operation in petro-chemical industry and exchange of technical and technological experience.

The agreement also calls for organising relations between the two countries in the fields of health, labour, culture and education.

The Commission's fourth meeting will be held in Abu Dhabi next year.

Meanwhile, an Indian spokesman said that the U.A.E. will supply 500,000 metric tons of additional oil to India in 1981.

The spokesman, J.N. Dixit, added that the visiting Minister had also told the Indian side at the meeting that the U.A.E. was also prepared to consider increasing fuel supplies to India on a "long-term basis."

Dixit told newsmen that the two sides also discussed the likelihood of increased Arab funding for Indian tourism projects and the hotel industry. Also under discussion is the construction of a giant oil refinery, partially funded by the U.A.E., which would have a production capacity of 12 million tons.

After the signing, Rashid Abdalla expressed his satisfaction over the agreement and the atmosphere which prevailed during the meetings.

He added that the U.A.E. would faithfully implement the points of the agreement and welcomed the Indian Foreign Minister's visit to the U.A.E. scheduled for next year.

He said that the visit will open new channels for cooperation between the two countries.

The Indian Foreign Minister also expressed his full satisfaction over the positive and fruitful outcome reached and added that "we have taken progressive steps" in developing relations between the two countries.

Rashid Abdalla reaffirmed the U.A.E.'s view on the need to keep the Gulf region and the Indian Ocean as zones of peace, away from the disputes of the big powers.

In a statement to WAM, he said that his talks with Indian Foreign Minister also covered views on activating the non-aligned movement and coordination of the two countries' stand on the issues to be discussed at the non-aligned foreign ministers' conference scheduled in Baghdad in February.

He added that the situation in the region as well as the international situation were also discussed at the meetings, adding that the viewpoints of the two sides synchronised on a number of current international issues.

Abdalla said that the Indian Foreign Minister reaffirmed his country's support to the Arab issue and the Palestinian people's rights in establishing an independent state of their own.

BRIEFS

OIL CORPORATION BEGINS DISTRIBUTION--The Emirates General Petroleum Corporation started distributing petroleum derivatives in the northern Emirates at midnight last night following completion of all arrangements and preparations for this national move. Under Secretary of the Petroleum and Mineral Resources Ministry and Deputy Chairman of the Board and Director General of the Corporation Al-Shiba al-Hamali said yesterday that quantites of the remaining petroleum derivatives in the reservoirs of Shell, British Petroleum and Caltex companies will be accounted for in order to determine the value and pay the companies DH 800 million from the corporation's capital. The move also will take care of all installations, cars and other properties that belonged to the said companies, Al-Hamali added. The overall consumption of petroleum products is expected to be 1.231 million tons in 1981, Al-Hamali said and added the corporation would save a general reserve stock from the derivatives for 38 days. [Text] [GPO20920 Dubai KHALEEJ TIMES in English 1 Jan 81 p 1]

OFFSHORE EXPLORATION AGREEMENT SIGNED--The UAE state of Sharjah and the Australian company Uni Gulf have concluded an agreement for oil exploration work in the emirate's offshore area. According to the contract, Uni Gulf will have concessionary rights over an area of 500 sq kms and will pay the state of Sharjah an unspecified exploration tax in return. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 8 Dec 80 p 7]

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